12 ideas
21463 | Hamann, Herder and Jacobi were key opponents of the Enlightenment [Gardner] |
Full Idea: Hamann, Herder and Jacobi are central figues in the reaction against Enlightenment. | |
From: Sebastian Gardner (Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason [1999], 10 'immediate') | |
A reaction: From a British perspective I would see Hume as the leading such figure. Hamann emphasised the neglect of the role of language. Jacobi was a Christian. |
21459 | Kant halted rationalism, and forced empiricists to worry about foundations [Gardner] |
Full Idea: Kant's Critique swiftly brought rationalism to a halt, and after Kant empiricism has displayed a nervousness regarding its foundations, and been forced to assume more sophisticated forms. | |
From: Sebastian Gardner (Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason [1999], 10 Intro) | |
A reaction: See the ideas of Laurence Bonjour for a modern revival of rationalism. After Kant philosophers either went existential, or stared gloomily into the obscure depths. Formal logic was seen as a possible rope ladder down. |
21460 | Only Kant and Hegel have united nature, morals, politics, aesthetics and religion [Gardner] |
Full Idea: Apart from Hegel, no later philosophical system equals in stature Kant's attempt to weld together the diverse fields of natural science, morality, politics, aesthetics and religion into a systematic overarching epistemological and metaphysical unity. | |
From: Sebastian Gardner (Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason [1999], 10) | |
A reaction: Earlier candidate are Plato and Aristotle. Earlier Enlightenment figures say little about morality or aesthetics. Hobbes ranges widely. Aquinas covered most things. |
21443 | Transcendental proofs derive necessities from possibilities (e.g. possibility of experiencing objects) [Gardner] |
Full Idea: A transcendental proof converts a possibility into a necessity: by saying under what conditions experience of objects is possible, transcendental proofs show those conditions to be necessary for us to the extent that we have any experience of objects. | |
From: Sebastian Gardner (Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason [1999], 02 'Transc') | |
A reaction: They appear to be hypothetical necessities, rather than true metaphysical necessities. Gardner is discussing Kant, but seems to be generalising. Hypothetical necessities are easy: if it is flying, it is necessarily above the ground. |
21444 | Modern geoemtry is either 'pure' (and formal), or 'applied' (and a posteriori) [Gardner] |
Full Idea: There is now 'pure' geometry, consisting of formal systems based on axioms for which truth is not claimed, and which are consequently not synthetic; and 'applied', a branch of physics, the truth of which is empirical, and therefore not a priori. | |
From: Sebastian Gardner (Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason [1999], 03 'Maths') | |
A reaction: His point is that there is no longer any room for a priori geometry. Might the same division be asserted of arithmetic, or analysis, or set theory? |
21453 | Leibnizian monads qualify as Kantian noumena [Gardner] |
Full Idea: Leibnizian monads clearly satisfy Kant's definition of noumena. | |
From: Sebastian Gardner (Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason [1999], 06 'Noumena') | |
A reaction: This needs qualifying, because Leibniz clearly specifies the main attributes of monads, where Kant is adamant that we can saying virtually nothing about noumena. |
7518 | If folk psychology gives a network of causal laws, that fits neatly with functionalism [Churchland,PM] |
Full Idea: The portrait of folk psychology as a network of causal laws dovetailed neatly with the emerging philosophy of mind called functionalism. | |
From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], II) | |
A reaction: And from the lower levels functionalism is supported by the notion that the brain is modular. Note the word 'laws'; this implies an underlying precision in folk psychology, which is then easily attacked. Maybe the network is too complex for simple laws. |
7519 | Many mental phenomena are totally unexplained by folk psychology [Churchland,PM] |
Full Idea: Folk psychology fails utterly to explain a considerable variety of central psychological phenomena: mental illness, sleep, creativity, memory, intelligence differences, and many forms of learning, to cite just a few. | |
From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III) | |
A reaction: If folk psychology is a theory, it will have been developed to predict behaviour, rather than as a full-blown psychological map. The odd thing is that some people seem to be very bad at folk psychology. |
7520 | Folk psychology never makes any progress, and is marginalised by modern science [Churchland,PM] |
Full Idea: Folk psychology has not progressed significantly in the last 2500 years; if anything, it has been steadily in retreat during this period; it does not integrate with modern science, and its emerging wallflower status bodes ill for its future. | |
From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III) | |
A reaction: [compressed] However, while shares in alchemy and astrology have totally collapsed, folk psychology shows not the slightest sign of going away, and it is unclear how it ever could. See Idea 3177. |
21785 | We are only free, with rights, if we claim our freedom, and there are no natural rights [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
Full Idea: Hegel says we are only truly free, and so bearers of rights, in so far as we claim our freedom. ...So there are no merely natural rights, and animal's have no rights. | |
From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the Philosophy of Right [1819], p.78) by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 08 'Rights' | |
A reaction: If there are no natural rights, then it is hard to see how claiming a right will create it. I can't create a right to drink the best champagne. It seems particularly unjust to deny rights to people so enslaved that freedom has never occurred to them. |
22041 | Representatives by region ignores whether they care about the national interest [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
Full Idea: Selecting representatives on the basis of geography means selecting people without any regard to whether they represent the basic and important interests of the 'whole' of society. | |
From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the Philosophy of Right [1819]) by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 11 | |
A reaction: Proportional representation seems to get away from this, but that can still be arranged according to large regions. Some means is needed to prevent the whole nation from exploitation a regional minority (such as Welsh speakers). |
21781 | The absolute right is the right to have rights [Hegel] |
Full Idea: The absolute right is the right to have rights. | |
From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the Philosophy of Right [1819], p.127), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 08 'Rights' | |
A reaction: What a beautifully succinct and important idea! Does a foetus, or a dog, or a person in a vegetative state, or a slave, qualify? |