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12741
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If experience is just a dream, it is still real enough if critical reason is never deceived [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
Even if this whole life were said to be only a dream, and the visible world only a phantasm, I should call this dream or phantasm real enough if we were never deceived by it when we make good use of reason.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (De modo distinguendi phaenomena [1685], A6.4.1502), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 7
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A reaction:
I find this response more satisfactory than his response in Idea 12740. As a supporter of the coherence account of justification, I take the closest we get to knowledge to be when our full critical faculties and experience are brought to bear, and shared.
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12740
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The strongest criterion that phenomena show reality is success in prediction [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
The most powerful criterion of the reality of phenomena, sufficient even by itself, is success in predicting future phenomena from past and present ones.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (De modo distinguendi phaenomena [1685], A6.4.1502), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 7
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A reaction:
I would say that this is clutching at straws, as there is no reason at all to deny that dreams could be thoroughly coherent and predictable in their events. We must just live with these doubts, not try to defeat them.
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12721
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Light, heat and colour are apparent qualities, and so are motion, figure and extension [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
Concerning bodies I can demonstrate that not merely light, heat, color, and similar qualities are apparent but also motion, figure, and extension.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (De modo distinguendi phaenomena [1685], A6.4.1504), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4
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A reaction:
Leibniz is not consistent on this. Here he is flirting with idealism, but he often backs away from that. In Discourse §12 he makes secondary qualities certainly subjective, and primary qualities possibly so. He admits the primaries contain eternal truths.
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7519
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Many mental phenomena are totally unexplained by folk psychology [Churchland,PM]
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Full Idea:
Folk psychology fails utterly to explain a considerable variety of central psychological phenomena: mental illness, sleep, creativity, memory, intelligence differences, and many forms of learning, to cite just a few.
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From:
Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III)
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A reaction:
If folk psychology is a theory, it will have been developed to predict behaviour, rather than as a full-blown psychological map. The odd thing is that some people seem to be very bad at folk psychology.
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7520
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Folk psychology never makes any progress, and is marginalised by modern science [Churchland,PM]
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Full Idea:
Folk psychology has not progressed significantly in the last 2500 years; if anything, it has been steadily in retreat during this period; it does not integrate with modern science, and its emerging wallflower status bodes ill for its future.
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From:
Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III)
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A reaction:
[compressed] However, while shares in alchemy and astrology have totally collapsed, folk psychology shows not the slightest sign of going away, and it is unclear how it ever could. See Idea 3177.
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7098
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There is a new sort of moral scepticism, about the possibility of moral theories [Statman]
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Full Idea:
Since the 1980s, ethics has witnessed a new sort of moral scepticism, this time about the possibility of moral theories.
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From:
Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §4)
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A reaction:
He cites McDowell, Williams, Nussbaum and Baier as the culprits. 'Particularism' (every situation is different, so there can't be rules) seems an essential part of virtue theory, but total absence of principles sounds to me like moral drift.
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7100
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Virtue theory isn't a genuine ethical theory, because it doesn't have universal application [Statman]
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Full Idea:
It can be claimed that universality is a necessary property of any ethical theory and therefore virtue theory, which fails in this respect, is not a theory, and hence poses no alternative to genuine ethical theories.
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From:
Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §5)
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A reaction:
Replies: a) totally universal morality is an idle dream (part of the 'Enlightenment Project' to prove everything) and we must settle for something more relative; b) virtues aren't totally universal, but they are truths about humanity. I prefer b).
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7104
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The ancients recognised imperfect duties, but we have added perfect duties like justice [Statman]
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Full Idea:
The advantage of modern thinkers over the ancient virtue ethicists is that in addition to imperfect duties (i.e. virtues) they also recognise the existence of perfect duties, or duties of justice, which are essential for the existence of society.
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From:
Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §7)
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A reaction:
Even the Greeks had laws (e.g. Idea 422), so they understood that a society needs rules, but many laws don't seem to be moral rules (e.g. car parking), and the Greeks thought morality was about human excellence, not avoiding traffic jams.
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7103
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Abortion issues focus on the mother's right over her body, and the status of the foetus [Statman]
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Full Idea:
Most of the debate on abortion focuses on two issues, the mother's assumed right over her body, and the status of the foetus.
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From:
Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §6)
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A reaction:
Personally I think society as a whole might have a say (if, perhaps, we are over- or under-populated, or we have a widely accepted state religion, or we are just very shocked). Mother's have virtues and duties as well as rights.
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