13 ideas
| 14238 | A class is an aggregate of objects; if you destroy them, you destroy the class; there is no empty class [Frege] |
| Full Idea: A class consists of objects; it is an aggregate, a collective unity, of them; if so, it must vanish when these objects vanish. If we burn down all the trees of a wood, we thereby burn down the wood. Thus there can be no empty class. | |
| From: Gottlob Frege (Elucidation of some points in E.Schröder [1895], p.212), quoted by Oliver,A/Smiley,T - What are Sets and What are they For? | |
| A reaction: This rests on Cantor's view of a set as a collection, rather than on Dedekind, which allows null and singleton sets. |
| 4020 | The modern self has disengaged reason, self-exploration, and personal commitment [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: The modern notion of the self is defined by disengaged reason (with its associated freedom and dignity), by self-exploration, and by personal commitment. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §13.1) | |
| A reaction: Taylor makes a good case that this broader view of how the self is seen is as important as narrow debates about personal identity. |
| 4002 | My aim is to map the connections between our sense of self and our moral understanding [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: My entire way of proceeding involves mapping connections between the sense of the self and moral visions, between identity and the good. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], Pref) | |
| A reaction: An interesting project. Modern brain research supports the idea that emotions and values are tightly integrated into al thought. |
| 4006 | I can only be aware of myself as a person who changes by means of my personal history [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: As a being who grows and becomes I can only know myself through the history of my maturations and regressions, overcomings and defeats. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §2.3) | |
| A reaction: An important insight. My immediate sense of self makes my personal history central, not an extra. But a history must be a history OF something. |
| 7518 | If folk psychology gives a network of causal laws, that fits neatly with functionalism [Churchland,PM] |
| Full Idea: The portrait of folk psychology as a network of causal laws dovetailed neatly with the emerging philosophy of mind called functionalism. | |
| From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], II) | |
| A reaction: And from the lower levels functionalism is supported by the notion that the brain is modular. Note the word 'laws'; this implies an underlying precision in folk psychology, which is then easily attacked. Maybe the network is too complex for simple laws. |
| 7519 | Many mental phenomena are totally unexplained by folk psychology [Churchland,PM] |
| Full Idea: Folk psychology fails utterly to explain a considerable variety of central psychological phenomena: mental illness, sleep, creativity, memory, intelligence differences, and many forms of learning, to cite just a few. | |
| From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III) | |
| A reaction: If folk psychology is a theory, it will have been developed to predict behaviour, rather than as a full-blown psychological map. The odd thing is that some people seem to be very bad at folk psychology. |
| 7520 | Folk psychology never makes any progress, and is marginalised by modern science [Churchland,PM] |
| Full Idea: Folk psychology has not progressed significantly in the last 2500 years; if anything, it has been steadily in retreat during this period; it does not integrate with modern science, and its emerging wallflower status bodes ill for its future. | |
| From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] However, while shares in alchemy and astrology have totally collapsed, folk psychology shows not the slightest sign of going away, and it is unclear how it ever could. See Idea 3177. |
| 4003 | Selfhood and moral values are inextricably intertwined [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: Selfhood and the good, or in another way selfhood and morality, turn out to be inextricably intertwined. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §1.1) | |
| A reaction: This seems an inevitable convergence of three centuries of thought about personal identity and morality. |
| 4021 | Willingness to risk life was the constitutive quality of the man of honour [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: Willingness to risk life was the constitutive quality of the man of honour. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §13.1) | |
| A reaction: Which is why war is required. The growth of civil society meant the inevitable rise of other virtues. |
| 4005 | To have respect for people, you must feel their claims, or their injustices, or hold them in awe [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: If you want to discriminate more finely what makes humans worthy of respect, you must call to mind the claim of human suffering, or what is repugnant about justice, or the awe you feel about human life. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §1.1) | |
| A reaction: A persuasive part of the claim that such feelings are inseparable from thinking about people in any way at all. |
| 4004 | Consistency presupposes intrinsic description [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: The issue of consistency presupposes intrinsic description. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §1.1) | |
| A reaction: This may be the key criticism of Kant. The so-called 'maxim' of an action can be almost infinitely re-expressed to suit the agent. |
| 4010 | In later utilitarianism the modern stress on freedom leads to the rejection of paternalism [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: In mature utilitarianism , the stress on modern freedom emerges in the rejection of paternalism. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §3.3) | |
| A reaction: This seems good; it is the beginnings of a rejection of paternalism. What is better, happiness or freedom? What is the value of freedom? |
| 4009 | Nominalists defended the sovereignty of God against the idea of natural existing good and evil [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: Late medieval nominalism defended the sovereignty of God as incompatible with there being an order in nature which by itself defined good and bad. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §3.3) | |
| A reaction: Part of their attack on Platonism. But what made them place such a high value on the sovereignty of God? |