Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Folk Psychology', 'Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher' and 'The Epistemology of Essence (draft)'

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8 ideas

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible

16978	If conceivability is a priori coherence, that implies possibility [Tahko]
	Full Idea: Maybe conceivability could be understood as a priori coherence, which implies possibility.
	From: Tuomas E. Tahko (The Epistemology of Essence (draft) [2013], 3.2)
	A reaction: I'm not quite sure why 'a priori' has to be there. Assessing conceivability just is assessing coherence. That couches it as a rational activity, rather than as a purely imaginary one. Trying to conceive a square circle isn't just daydreaming.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence

16975	Essences are used to explain natural kinds, modality, and causal powers [Tahko]
	Full Idea: Essences are supposed to do a lot of explanatory work: natural kinds can be identified in terms of their essences, metaphysical modality can be reduced to essence, the causal power of objects can be explained with the help of essence.
	From: Tuomas E. Tahko (The Epistemology of Essence (draft) [2013], 1)
	A reaction: Natural kinds and modality are OK with me, but I'm dubious about the third one. If an essence explains something's causal powers, I have no idea what an essence might be. Essence are largely characterised in terms of causal powers.

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology

7518	If folk psychology gives a network of causal laws, that fits neatly with functionalism [Churchland,PM]
	Full Idea: The portrait of folk psychology as a network of causal laws dovetailed neatly with the emerging philosophy of mind called functionalism.
	From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], II)
	A reaction: And from the lower levels functionalism is supported by the notion that the brain is modular. Note the word 'laws'; this implies an underlying precision in folk psychology, which is then easily attacked. Maybe the network is too complex for simple laws.

7519	Many mental phenomena are totally unexplained by folk psychology [Churchland,PM]
	Full Idea: Folk psychology fails utterly to explain a considerable variety of central psychological phenomena: mental illness, sleep, creativity, memory, intelligence differences, and many forms of learning, to cite just a few.
	From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III)
	A reaction: If folk psychology is a theory, it will have been developed to predict behaviour, rather than as a full-blown psychological map. The odd thing is that some people seem to be very bad at folk psychology.

7520	Folk psychology never makes any progress, and is marginalised by modern science [Churchland,PM]
	Full Idea: Folk psychology has not progressed significantly in the last 2500 years; if anything, it has been steadily in retreat during this period; it does not integrate with modern science, and its emerging wallflower status bodes ill for its future.
	From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III)
	A reaction: [compressed] However, while shares in alchemy and astrology have totally collapsed, folk psychology shows not the slightest sign of going away, and it is unclear how it ever could. See Idea 3177.

25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime

1658	In early Greece the word for punishment was also the word for vengeance [Vlastos]
	Full Idea: Down to the last third of the fifth century, 'timoria', whose original and always primary sense is "vengeance", is THE word for "punishment".
	From: Gregory Vlastos (Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher [1991], p.186)

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism

16976	Scientific essentialists tend to characterise essence in terms of modality (not vice versa) [Tahko]
	Full Idea: The conception of essence taken for granted in much of the 'scientific essentialist' literature is that essence can be explained in terms of modality (rather than the other way round).
	From: Tuomas E. Tahko (The Epistemology of Essence (draft) [2013], 2.1)
	A reaction: [He cites Ellis and Bird] That is, presumably, that they are inclined to say that the essence of gold is a set of necessary properties. Maybe conceptual necessities dictate the properties of gold, and they in turn dictate metaphysical necessities?

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity

16977	If essence is modal and laws are necessary, essentialist knowledge is found by scientists [Tahko]
	Full Idea: If essence is conceived in terms of modality and the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, it seems that the laws of nature constitute essentialist knowledge, so the discovery of essences is mostly due to scientists.
	From: Tuomas E. Tahko (The Epistemology of Essence (draft) [2013], 2.1)
	A reaction: This seems muddled to me. The idea that the laws themselves are essences is way off target. No one thinks all knowledge of necessities is essentialist. Mumford, for example, doesn't even believe in laws.