90 ideas
11300 | Agathon: good [PG] |
Full Idea: Agathon: good, the highest good | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 01) |
11301 | Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness [PG] |
Full Idea: Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 02) |
11302 | Aitia / aition: cause, explanation [PG] |
Full Idea: Aitia / aition: cause, explanation | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 03) | |
A reaction: The consensus is that 'explanation' is the better translation, and hence that the famous Four Causes (in 'Physics') must really be understood as the Four Modes of Explanation. They then make far more sense. |
11303 | Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will [PG] |
Full Idea: Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 04) | |
A reaction: The whole Greek debate (and modern debate, I would say) makes much more sense if we stick to 'lack of control' as the translation, and forget about weakness of will - and certainly give up 'incontinence' as a translation. |
11304 | Aletheia: truth [PG] |
Full Idea: Aletheia: truth | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 05) |
11305 | Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance [PG] |
Full Idea: Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 06) | |
A reaction: This is used for Plato's doctrine that we recollect past lives. |
11306 | Ananke: necessity [PG] |
Full Idea: Ananke: necessity | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 07) |
11307 | Antikeimenon: object [PG] |
Full Idea: Antikeimenon: object | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 08) |
11375 | Apatheia: unemotional [PG] |
Full Idea: Apatheia: lack of involvement, unemotional | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 09) |
11308 | Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite [PG] |
Full Idea: Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 10) | |
A reaction: Key term in the philosophy of Anaximander, the one unknowable underlying element. |
11376 | Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction [PG] |
Full Idea: Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 11) |
11309 | Apodeixis: demonstration [PG] |
Full Idea: Apodeixis: demonstration, proof | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 12) |
11310 | Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly [PG] |
Full Idea: Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 13) |
11311 | Arche: first principle, the basic [PG] |
Full Idea: Arché: first principle, the basic | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 14) | |
A reaction: Interchangeable with 'aitia' by Aristotle. The first principle and the cause are almost identical. |
11312 | Arete: virtue, excellence [PG] |
Full Idea: Areté: virtue, excellence | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 15) | |
A reaction: The word hovers between moral excellence and being good at what you do. Annas defends the older translation as 'virtue', rather than the modern 'excellence'. |
11313 | Chronismos: separation [PG] |
Full Idea: Chronismos: separation | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 16) |
11314 | Diairesis: division [PG] |
Full Idea: Diairesis: division, distinction | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 17) |
11315 | Dialectic: dialectic, discussion [PG] |
Full Idea: Dialectic: dialectic, discussion | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 18) |
11316 | Dianoia: intellection [cf. Noesis] [PG] |
Full Idea: Dianoia: intellection, understanding [cf. Noesis] | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 21) |
11317 | Diaphora: difference [PG] |
Full Idea: Diaphora: difference | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 22) |
11318 | Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice [PG] |
Full Idea: Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 23) | |
A reaction: Usually translated as 'justice' in 'Republic', but it is a general term of moral approbation, not like the modern political and legal notion of 'justice'. 'Justice' actually seems to be bad translation. |
11319 | Doxa: opinion, belief [PG] |
Full Idea: Doxa: opinion, belief, judgement | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 24) |
11320 | Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity [PG] |
Full Idea: Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 25) |
11321 | Eidos: form, idea [PG] |
Full Idea: Eidos: form, idea | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 26) | |
A reaction: In Plato it is the word best translated as 'Form' (Theory of...); in Aritotle's 'Categories' it designates the species, and in 'Metaphysics' it ends up naming the structural form of the species (and hence the essence) [Wedin p.120] |
11322 | Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation [PG] |
Full Idea: Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 27) |
11323 | Empeiron: experience [PG] |
Full Idea: Empeiron: experience | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 28) |
11324 | Energeia: employment, actuality, power? [PG] |
Full Idea: Energeia: employment, actuality, power? | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 31) |
11325 | Enkrateia: control [PG] |
Full Idea: Enkrateia: control | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 32) | |
A reaction: See 'akrasia', of which this is the opposite. The enkratic person is controlled. |
11326 | Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end [PG] |
Full Idea: Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 33) |
11327 | Epagoge: induction, explanation [PG] |
Full Idea: Epagoge: induction, explanation, leading on | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 34) |
11328 | Episteme: knowledge, understanding [PG] |
Full Idea: Episteme: knowledge, understanding | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 35) | |
A reaction: Note that 'episteme' can form a plural in Greek, but we can't say 'knowledges', so we have to say 'branches of knowledge', or 'sciences'. |
11329 | Epithumia: appetite [PG] |
Full Idea: Epithumia: appetite | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 36) |
11330 | Ergon: function [PG] |
Full Idea: Ergon: function, work | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 37) |
11331 | Eristic: polemic, disputation [PG] |
Full Idea: Eristic: polemic, disputation | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 38) | |
A reaction: This is confrontational argument, rather than the subtle co-operative dialogue of dialectic. British law courts and the House of Commons are founded on eristic, rather than on dialectic. Could there be a dialectical elected assembly? |
11332 | Eros: love [PG] |
Full Idea: Eros: love, desire | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 41) |
11333 | Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment [PG] |
Full Idea: Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 42) | |
A reaction: Some people defend 'happiness' as the translation, but that seems to me wildly misleading, since eudaimonia is something like life going well, and certainly isn't a psychological state - and definitely not pleasure. |
11334 | Genos: type, genus [PG] |
Full Idea: Genos: type, genus, kind | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 43) |
11335 | Hexis: state, habit [PG] |
Full Idea: Hexis: state, habit | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 44) |
11336 | Horismos: definition [PG] |
Full Idea: Horismos: definition | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 45) |
11337 | Hule: matter [PG] |
Full Idea: Hule: matter | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 46) | |
A reaction: The first half of the 'hylomorphism' of Aristotle. See 'morphe'! |
11338 | Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing [cf. Tode ti] [PG] |
Full Idea: Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing, substratum [cf. Tode ti] | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 47) | |
A reaction: Literally 'that which lies under'. Latin version is 'substratum'. In Aristotle it is the problem, of explaining what lies under. It is not the theory that there is some entity called a 'substratum'. |
11339 | Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility [PG] |
Full Idea: Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 48) | |
A reaction: A revealing Greek word, which is not only our rather pure notion of 'beauty', but also seems to mean something like wow!, and (very suggestive, this) applies as much to actions as to objects. |
11340 | Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially [PG] |
Full Idea: Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 51) |
11341 | Kinesis: movement, process [PG] |
Full Idea: Kinesis: movement, process, change | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 52) |
11342 | Kosmos: order, universe [PG] |
Full Idea: Kosmos: order, universe | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 53) |
11343 | Logos: reason, account, word [PG] |
Full Idea: Logos: reason, account, word | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 54) |
11344 | Meson: the mean [PG] |
Full Idea: Meson: the mean | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 55) | |
A reaction: This is not the 'average', and hence not some theoretical mid-point. I would call it the 'appropriate compromise', remembering that an extreme may be appropriate in certain circumstances. |
11345 | Metechein: partaking, sharing [PG] |
Full Idea: Metechein: partaking, sharing | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 56) | |
A reaction: The key word in Plato for the difficult question of the relationships between the Forms and the particulars. The latter 'partake' of the former. Hm. Compare modern 'instantiation', which strikes me as being equally problematic. |
11377 | Mimesis: imitation, fine art [PG] |
Full Idea: Mimesis: imitation, fine art | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 57) |
11346 | Morphe: form [PG] |
Full Idea: Morphe: form | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 58) |
11347 | Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] [PG] |
Full Idea: Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 59) |
11348 | Nomos: convention, law, custom [PG] |
Full Idea: Nomos: convention, law, custom | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 61) |
11349 | Nous: intuition, intellect, understanding [PG] |
Full Idea: Nous: intuition, intellect | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 62) | |
A reaction: There is a condensed discussion of 'nous' in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics B.19 |
11350 | Orexis: desire [PG] |
Full Idea: Orexis: desire | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 63) |
11351 | Ousia: substance, (primary) being, [see 'Prote ousia'] [PG] |
Full Idea: Ousia: substance, (primary) being [see 'Prote ousia'] | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 64) | |
A reaction: It is based on the verb 'to be'. Latin therefore translated it as 'essentia' (esse: to be), and we have ended up translating it as 'essence', but this is wrong! 'Being' is the best translation, and 'substance' is OK. It is the problem, not the answer. |
11352 | Pathos: emotion, affection, property [PG] |
Full Idea: Pathos: emotion, affection, property | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 65) |
11353 | Phantasia: imagination [PG] |
Full Idea: Phantasia: imagination | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 66) |
11354 | Philia: friendship [PG] |
Full Idea: Philia: friendship | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 67) |
11355 | Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom [PG] |
Full Idea: Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 68) | |
A reaction: The point of the word is its claim only to love wisdom, and not actually to be wise. |
11356 | Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense [PG] |
Full Idea: Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 71) | |
A reaction: None of the experts use my own translation, which is 'common sense', but that seems to me to perfectly fit all of Aristotle's discussions of the word in 'Ethics'. 'Prudence' seems a daft translation in modern English. |
11357 | Physis: nature [PG] |
Full Idea: Physis: nature | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 72) |
11358 | Praxis: action, activity [PG] |
Full Idea: Praxis: action, activity | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 73) |
11359 | Prote ousia: primary being [PG] |
Full Idea: Prote ousia: primary being | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 74) | |
A reaction: The main topic of investigation in Aristotle's 'Metaphysics'. 'Ousia' is the central problem of the text, NOT the answer to the problem. |
11360 | Psuche: mind, soul, life [PG] |
Full Idea: Psuche: mind, soul, life | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 75) | |
A reaction: The interesting thing about this is that we have tended to translate it as 'soul', but Aristotle says plants have it, and not merely conscious beings. It is something like the 'form' of a living thing, but then 'form' is a misleading translation too. |
11361 | Sophia: wisdom [PG] |
Full Idea: Sophia: wisdom | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 76) |
11362 | Sophrosune: moderation, self-control [PG] |
Full Idea: Sophrosune: moderation, self-control | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 77) |
11363 | Stoicheia: elements [PG] |
Full Idea: Stoicheia: elements | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 78) |
11364 | Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism [PG] |
Full Idea: Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 81) |
11365 | Techne: skill, practical knowledge [PG] |
Full Idea: Techne: skill, practical knowledge | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 82) |
11366 | Telos: purpose, end [PG] |
Full Idea: Telos: purpose, end | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 83) |
11367 | Theoria: contemplation [PG] |
Full Idea: Theoria: contemplation | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 84) |
11368 | Theos: god [PG] |
Full Idea: Theos: god | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 85) |
11369 | Ti esti: what-something-is, essence [PG] |
Full Idea: Ti esti: the what-something-is, essence, whatness | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 86) |
11370 | Timoria: vengeance, punishment [PG] |
Full Idea: Timoria: vengeance, punishment | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 87) |
11371 | To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be [PG] |
Full Idea: To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 88) | |
A reaction: This is Aristotle's main term for what we would now call the 'essence'. It is still not a theory of essence, merely an identification of the target. 'Form' is the nearest we get to his actual theory. |
11372 | To ti estin: essence [PG] |
Full Idea: To ti estin: essence | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 91) |
11373 | Tode ti: this-such, subject of predication [cf. hupokeimenon] [PG] |
Full Idea: Tode ti: this-something, subject of predication, thisness [cf. hupokeimenon] | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 92) |
7518 | If folk psychology gives a network of causal laws, that fits neatly with functionalism [Churchland,PM] |
Full Idea: The portrait of folk psychology as a network of causal laws dovetailed neatly with the emerging philosophy of mind called functionalism. | |
From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], II) | |
A reaction: And from the lower levels functionalism is supported by the notion that the brain is modular. Note the word 'laws'; this implies an underlying precision in folk psychology, which is then easily attacked. Maybe the network is too complex for simple laws. |
7519 | Many mental phenomena are totally unexplained by folk psychology [Churchland,PM] |
Full Idea: Folk psychology fails utterly to explain a considerable variety of central psychological phenomena: mental illness, sleep, creativity, memory, intelligence differences, and many forms of learning, to cite just a few. | |
From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III) | |
A reaction: If folk psychology is a theory, it will have been developed to predict behaviour, rather than as a full-blown psychological map. The odd thing is that some people seem to be very bad at folk psychology. |
7520 | Folk psychology never makes any progress, and is marginalised by modern science [Churchland,PM] |
Full Idea: Folk psychology has not progressed significantly in the last 2500 years; if anything, it has been steadily in retreat during this period; it does not integrate with modern science, and its emerging wallflower status bodes ill for its future. | |
From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III) | |
A reaction: [compressed] However, while shares in alchemy and astrology have totally collapsed, folk psychology shows not the slightest sign of going away, and it is unclear how it ever could. See Idea 3177. |
23529 | Conduct is not isolated from its effect on the moral code [Hart,HLA] |
Full Idea: We must not view conduct in isolation from its effect on the moral code. | |
From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], II 'Moderate') | |
A reaction: The moral code may be excessively conservative, but there is no denying this point. Extreme individualistic libertarians must recognise that 'no man is an island'. |
23530 | The great danger of democracy is that the oppression of the minority becomes unobjectionable [Hart,HLA] |
Full Idea: For Mill and De Tocqueville the greatest of the dangers was not that in fact the majority might use their power to oppress a minority, but that, with the spread of democratic ideas, it might come to be thought unobjectionable that they should do so. | |
From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], III 'Populism') | |
A reaction: This was vivid in the 2016 Brexit referendum, which was 52-48 in favour of leaving. There were lots voices saying 'you lost, get over it'. It should be a basic (if neglected) principle that the winners of elections now represent the whole population. |
23522 | In an organised society all actions have some effect on other people [Hart,HLA] |
Full Idea: In an organised society it is impossible to identify classes of actions which harm no one, or no one but the individual who does them. | |
From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], I 'Enforcement') | |
A reaction: This is attributed to 'some critics' of Mill. I agree with this. The idea that actions performed behind close doors never come to influence social life is an illusion, held by people whose quest for freedom is selfish. |
23528 | The value of liberty allows freedom of action, even if that distresses other people [Hart,HLA] |
Full Idea: Recognition of individual liberty as a value involves, as a minimum, acceptance of the principle that the individual may do what he wants, even if others are distressed when the learn what it is that he does. | |
From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], II 'Private') | |
A reaction: He notes that there could be other reasons to block the freedom, such as harm done. This idea seems to identify a key component of liberalism - that we must all tolerate actions which we dislike. |
23523 | The principle of legality requires crimes to be precisely defined in advance of any action [Hart,HLA] |
Full Idea: The principle of legality requires criminal offences to be as precisely defined as possible, so that it can be known with reasonable certainty beforehand what acts are criminal and what are not. | |
From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], I 'Conspiracy') | |
A reaction: Hart is discussing a breach of this, where moral judgements are used to condemn something which was not obviously illegal. Families and schools don't have such precise rules, but it seems needed in a vast and pluralistic society. |
23524 | Some private moral issues are no concern of the law [Hart,HLA] |
Full Idea: An official report [of 1957] on homosexuality declared that 'there must remain a realm of private morality and immorality which is, in brief and crude terms, not the law's business'. | |
From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], I 'Conspiracy') | |
A reaction: We might wonder whether these issues are actually moral, if the law is not interested in them. Are they just a matter of taste? The law doesn't enforce a preference for Mozart over Salieri. |
23521 | Do morals influence law? Is morality an aspect of law? Can law be morally criticised? [Hart,HLA] |
Full Idea: Four questions: 1) Has the development of law been influenced by morals? 2) Must reference to morality enter into an adequate definition of law or legal system? 3) Is law open to moral criticism? 4) Does immorality justify legal punishment? | |
From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], I 'Enforcement') | |
A reaction: [compressed] Three nice questions, which are his agenda for the book. It is obvious that immoral laws can be created, and that laws can be criticised for being too concerned with morality, so there is no clear general answer to these dilemmas. |
23525 | Is the enforcement of morality morally justifiable? [Hart,HLA] |
Full Idea: The question about morality and the law is also a question of morality - of whether the enforcement of morality is morally justified. | |
From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], I 'Positive') | |
A reaction: This is a very nice meta-moral question. What moral standards are used to justify the enforcement of moral standards? Presumably there should be no contradiction between the levels, to brutally enforce softness, or softly recommend brutality? |
23526 | Modern law still suppresses practices seen as immoral, and yet harmless [Hart,HLA] |
Full Idea: English and American law still [in1963] contain rules which suppress practices condemned as immoral by positive morality though they involve nothing that would be ordinarily thought of as harm to other persons. | |
From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], II 'Use') | |
A reaction: He says most of the examples of this concern sexual practices. In the UK we have moved away from such laws, but many states of the USA still maintain them (or are reintroducing them, in 2023). |
23527 | Moral wickedness of an offence is always relevant to the degree of punishment [Hart,HLA] |
Full Idea: Leslie Stephen argued that when the question is how severely an offender should be punished, an estimate of the degree of moral wickedness involved in the crime is always relevant. | |
From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], II 'Moral') | |
A reaction: [Stephen 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity' 1873] The degree of responsibility (after excuses etc.) is obviously also highly relevant. If vicious murder is punished more harshly, that seems to be an assessment of the character of the murderer. |