Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Folk Psychology', 'Of Grammatology' and 'Presupposition and Conversational Implicature'

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6 ideas

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals

10990	Conditionals are truth-functional, but unassertable in tricky cases? [Grice, by Read]
	Full Idea: The 'conversational defence' of the truth-functional view of conditionals is that a conditional may not be assertible in difficult cases.
	From: report of H. Paul Grice (Presupposition and Conversational Implicature [1977]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.3

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology

7518	If folk psychology gives a network of causal laws, that fits neatly with functionalism [Churchland,PM]
	Full Idea: The portrait of folk psychology as a network of causal laws dovetailed neatly with the emerging philosophy of mind called functionalism.
	From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], II)
	A reaction: And from the lower levels functionalism is supported by the notion that the brain is modular. Note the word 'laws'; this implies an underlying precision in folk psychology, which is then easily attacked. Maybe the network is too complex for simple laws.

7519	Many mental phenomena are totally unexplained by folk psychology [Churchland,PM]
	Full Idea: Folk psychology fails utterly to explain a considerable variety of central psychological phenomena: mental illness, sleep, creativity, memory, intelligence differences, and many forms of learning, to cite just a few.
	From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III)
	A reaction: If folk psychology is a theory, it will have been developed to predict behaviour, rather than as a full-blown psychological map. The odd thing is that some people seem to be very bad at folk psychology.

7520	Folk psychology never makes any progress, and is marginalised by modern science [Churchland,PM]
	Full Idea: Folk psychology has not progressed significantly in the last 2500 years; if anything, it has been steadily in retreat during this period; it does not integrate with modern science, and its emerging wallflower status bodes ill for its future.
	From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III)
	A reaction: [compressed] However, while shares in alchemy and astrology have totally collapsed, folk psychology shows not the slightest sign of going away, and it is unclear how it ever could. See Idea 3177.

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 9. Ambiguity

21929	Derrida focuses on ambiguity, but talks of 'dissemination', not traditional multiple meanings [Derrida]
	Full Idea: Derrida affirms something like an 'ambiguity of meaning'. But he explicitly contrasts the word he uses to characterize the phenomenon at issue, what he calls 'dissemination', with the traditional concept of 'polysemia' - multiple meanings.
	From: Jacques Derrida (Of Grammatology [1967]), quoted by Simon Glendinning - Derrida: A Very Short Introduction 2 'After'
	A reaction: The point, I presume, is that there is vagueness and elision to the meanings, rather than a list of options, such as bank/bank. Context (sense-making paths) is crucial for Derrida. Can the analytic apparatus for the logic of vagueness be brought to bear?

19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature

10991	Key conversational maxims are 'quality' (assert truth) and 'quantity' (leave nothing out) [Grice, by Read]
	Full Idea: Grice particularly identified two maxims as guiding conversation: the maxim of 'quality' (that one should assert only what one believes to be true and justified), and of 'quantity' (one should not assert less than one can).
	From: report of H. Paul Grice (Presupposition and Conversational Implicature [1977]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.3
	A reaction: I think it would be very foolish to boldly embrace the second maxim when talking to strangers. If white lies are occasionally acceptable, then what is the status of the first 'maxim'? Is it a moral maxim?