9 ideas
16489 | Is it possible to state every possible truth about the whole course of nature without using 'not'? [Russell] |
Full Idea: Imagine a person who knew everything that can be stated without using the word 'not' or some equivalent; would such a person know the whole course of nature, or would he not? | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Human Knowledge: its scope and limits [1948], 9) | |
A reaction: Nowadays we might express Russell's thought as 'Does God need the word 'not'?'. Russell's thesis is that such words concern psychology, and not physics. God would need 'not' to describe how human minds work. |
16490 | Some facts about experience feel like logical necessities [Russell] |
Full Idea: The impossibility of seeing two colours simultaneously in a given direction feels like a logical impossibility. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Human Knowledge: its scope and limits [1948], 9) | |
A reaction: I presume all necessities feel equally necessary. If we distinguish necessities by what gives rise to them (a view I favour) then how strong they 'feel' will be irrelevant. We can see why Russell is puzzled by the phenomenon, though. |
16488 | It is hard to explain how a sentence like 'it is not raining' can be found true by observation [Russell] |
Full Idea: If 'it is not raining' means 'the sentence "it is raining" is false', that makes it almost impossible to understand how a sentence containing the word 'not' can be found true by observation. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Human Knowledge: its scope and limits [1948], 9) | |
A reaction: Russell goes on to explore the general difficulty of deciding negative truths by observation. The same problem arises for truthmaker theory. Obviously I can observe that it isn't raining, but it seems parasitic on observing when it is raining. |
18284 | Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper] |
Full Idea: Whereas particular reality statements are in principle completely verifiable or falsifiable, things are different for general reality statements: they can indeed be conclusively falsified, they can acquire a negative truth value, but not a positive one. | |
From: Karl Popper (Two Problems of Epistemology [1932], p.256), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 18 'Laws' | |
A reaction: This sounds like a logician's approach to science, but I prefer to look at coherence, where very little is actually conclusive, and one tinkers with the theory instead. |
7518 | If folk psychology gives a network of causal laws, that fits neatly with functionalism [Churchland,PM] |
Full Idea: The portrait of folk psychology as a network of causal laws dovetailed neatly with the emerging philosophy of mind called functionalism. | |
From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], II) | |
A reaction: And from the lower levels functionalism is supported by the notion that the brain is modular. Note the word 'laws'; this implies an underlying precision in folk psychology, which is then easily attacked. Maybe the network is too complex for simple laws. |
7519 | Many mental phenomena are totally unexplained by folk psychology [Churchland,PM] |
Full Idea: Folk psychology fails utterly to explain a considerable variety of central psychological phenomena: mental illness, sleep, creativity, memory, intelligence differences, and many forms of learning, to cite just a few. | |
From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III) | |
A reaction: If folk psychology is a theory, it will have been developed to predict behaviour, rather than as a full-blown psychological map. The odd thing is that some people seem to be very bad at folk psychology. |
7520 | Folk psychology never makes any progress, and is marginalised by modern science [Churchland,PM] |
Full Idea: Folk psychology has not progressed significantly in the last 2500 years; if anything, it has been steadily in retreat during this period; it does not integrate with modern science, and its emerging wallflower status bodes ill for its future. | |
From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III) | |
A reaction: [compressed] However, while shares in alchemy and astrology have totally collapsed, folk psychology shows not the slightest sign of going away, and it is unclear how it ever could. See Idea 3177. |
16491 | If we define 'this is not blue' as disbelief in 'this is blue', we eliminate 'not' as an ingredient of facts [Russell] |
Full Idea: We can reintroduce 'not' by a definition: the words 'this is not blue' are defined as expressing disbelief in what is expressed by the words 'this is blue'. In this way the need of 'not' as an indefinable constituent of facts is avoided. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Human Knowledge: its scope and limits [1948], 9) | |
A reaction: This is part of Russell's programme of giving a psychological account of logical connectives. See other ideas from his 1940 and 1948 works. He observes that disbelief is a state just as positive as belief. I love it. |
4786 | Russell's 'at-at' theory says motion is to be at the intervening points at the intervening instants [Russell, by Psillos] |
Full Idea: To reply to Zeno's Arrow Paradox, Russell developed his 'at-at' theory of motion, which says that to move from A to B is to be at the intervening points at the intervening instants. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Human Knowledge: its scope and limits [1948]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §4.2 | |
A reaction: I wonder whether Russell's target was actually Zeno, or was it a simplified ontology of points and instants? The ontology will also need identity, to ensure it is the same thing which arrives at each point. |