Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Folk Psychology', 'Cantorian Abstraction: Recon. and Defence' and 'On the Necessity of Origin'

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10 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
9148 I think of variables as objects rather than as signs [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: It is natural nowadays to think of variables as a certain kind of sign, but I wish to think of them as a certain kind of object.
     From: Kit Fine (Cantorian Abstraction: Recon. and Defence [1998], §2)
     A reaction: Fine has a theory based on 'arbitrary objects', which is a rather charming idea. The cell of a spreadsheet is a kind of object, I suppose. A variable might be analogous to a point in space, where objects can locate themselves.
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 10. Beginning of an Object
18892 Suppose a world where I'm from different gametes; add my gametes; which one is more me? [McGinn]
     Full Idea: It seems essential that you come from your gametes. Suppose (for reductio) that I come from Nixon's actual gametes. Now add my actual gametes to that possible world, and suppose they become an adult. Which has the stronger title to be me?
     From: Colin McGinn (On the Necessity of Origin [1976], p.132), quoted by Nathan Salmon - Reference and Essence (1st edn) 7.25.5
     A reaction: [See Nathan Salmon 1981:209] Feels like the Ship of Theseus. You say 'that's Theseus Ship', until the rival ship appears around the headland. Confusion. If Nixon's gametes can produce McGinn, the second gametes could produce a Nixon! Then what?
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
12019 McGinn falsely claims necessity of origin is a special case of the necessity of identity [Forbes,G on McGinn]
     Full Idea: McGinn assimilates the origin relation among organisms to the identity relation, so that the necessity of origin becomes a special case of the necessity of identity. We argue that this assimilation is illegitimate.
     From: comment on Colin McGinn (On the Necessity of Origin [1976]) by Graeme Forbes - The Metaphysics of Modality 6.1
     A reaction: Not sure about this. I have long suspected what McGinn suspects. Once you have identified the organism with a particular origin, it hardly seems surprising that this particular origin has become inescapable.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
9152 If green is abstracted from a thing, it is only seen as a type if it is common to many things [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: In traditional abstraction, the colour green merely has the intrinsic property of being green, other properties of things being abstracted away. But why should that be regarded as a type? It must be because the property is common to the instances.
     From: Kit Fine (Cantorian Abstraction: Recon. and Defence [1998], §5)
     A reaction: A nice question which shows that the much-derided single act of abstraction is not sufficient to arrive at a concept, so that abstraction is a more complex matter (perhaps even a rational one) than simple empiricists believe.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
7518 If folk psychology gives a network of causal laws, that fits neatly with functionalism [Churchland,PM]
     Full Idea: The portrait of folk psychology as a network of causal laws dovetailed neatly with the emerging philosophy of mind called functionalism.
     From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], II)
     A reaction: And from the lower levels functionalism is supported by the notion that the brain is modular. Note the word 'laws'; this implies an underlying precision in folk psychology, which is then easily attacked. Maybe the network is too complex for simple laws.
7520 Folk psychology never makes any progress, and is marginalised by modern science [Churchland,PM]
     Full Idea: Folk psychology has not progressed significantly in the last 2500 years; if anything, it has been steadily in retreat during this period; it does not integrate with modern science, and its emerging wallflower status bodes ill for its future.
     From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III)
     A reaction: [compressed] However, while shares in alchemy and astrology have totally collapsed, folk psychology shows not the slightest sign of going away, and it is unclear how it ever could. See Idea 3177.
7519 Many mental phenomena are totally unexplained by folk psychology [Churchland,PM]
     Full Idea: Folk psychology fails utterly to explain a considerable variety of central psychological phenomena: mental illness, sleep, creativity, memory, intelligence differences, and many forms of learning, to cite just a few.
     From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III)
     A reaction: If folk psychology is a theory, it will have been developed to predict behaviour, rather than as a full-blown psychological map. The odd thing is that some people seem to be very bad at folk psychology.
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
9149 To obtain the number 2 by abstraction, we only want to abstract the distinctness of a pair of objects [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: In abstracting from the elements of a doubleton to obtain 2, we do not wish to abstract away from all features of the objects. We wish to take account of the fact that the two objects are distinct; this alone should be preserved under abstraction.
     From: Kit Fine (Cantorian Abstraction: Recon. and Defence [1998], §3)
     A reaction: This is Fine's strategy for meeting Frege's objection to abstraction, summarised in Idea 9146. It seems to use the common sense idea that abstraction is not all-or-nothing. Abstraction has degrees (and levels).
9150 We should define abstraction in general, with number abstraction taken as a special case [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: Number abstraction can be taken to be a special case of abstraction in general, which can then be defined without recourse to the concept of number.
     From: Kit Fine (Cantorian Abstraction: Recon. and Defence [1998], §3)
     A reaction: At last, a mathematical logician recognising that they don't have a monopoly on abstraction. It is perfectly obvious that abstractions of simple daily concepts must be chronologically and logically prior to number abstraction. Number of what?
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
9146 After abstraction all numbers seem identical, so only 0 and 1 will exist! [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: In Cantor's abstractionist account there can only be two numbers, 0 and 1. For abs(Socrates) = abs(Plato), since their numbers are the same. So the number of {Socrates,Plato} is {abs(Soc),abs(Plato)}, which is the same number as {Socrates}!
     From: Kit Fine (Cantorian Abstraction: Recon. and Defence [1998], §1)
     A reaction: Fine tries to answer this objection, which arises from §45 of Frege's Grundlagen. Fine summarises that "indistinguishability without identity appears to be impossible". Maybe we should drop talk of numbers in terms of sets.