Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Folk Psychology', 'Letters to a German Princess' and 'Morality, Action, and Outcome'

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10 ideas

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
7518 If folk psychology gives a network of causal laws, that fits neatly with functionalism [Churchland,PM]
     Full Idea: The portrait of folk psychology as a network of causal laws dovetailed neatly with the emerging philosophy of mind called functionalism.
     From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], II)
     A reaction: And from the lower levels functionalism is supported by the notion that the brain is modular. Note the word 'laws'; this implies an underlying precision in folk psychology, which is then easily attacked. Maybe the network is too complex for simple laws.
7519 Many mental phenomena are totally unexplained by folk psychology [Churchland,PM]
     Full Idea: Folk psychology fails utterly to explain a considerable variety of central psychological phenomena: mental illness, sleep, creativity, memory, intelligence differences, and many forms of learning, to cite just a few.
     From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III)
     A reaction: If folk psychology is a theory, it will have been developed to predict behaviour, rather than as a full-blown psychological map. The odd thing is that some people seem to be very bad at folk psychology.
7520 Folk psychology never makes any progress, and is marginalised by modern science [Churchland,PM]
     Full Idea: Folk psychology has not progressed significantly in the last 2500 years; if anything, it has been steadily in retreat during this period; it does not integrate with modern science, and its emerging wallflower status bodes ill for its future.
     From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III)
     A reaction: [compressed] However, while shares in alchemy and astrology have totally collapsed, folk psychology shows not the slightest sign of going away, and it is unclear how it ever could. See Idea 3177.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect
22465 We see a moral distinction between doing and allowing to happen [Foot]
     Full Idea: We have an intuition that there is a morally relevant distinction between what we do and what we allow to happen.
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.88)
     A reaction: She says many deny this distinction, but she defends it. Presumably consequentialists deny the distinction. What is bad if I do it, but OK if I allow it to happen? Neglecting a victim to save others, she suggests.
22466 We see a moral distinction between our aims and their foreseen consequences [Foot]
     Full Idea: We have an intuition that there is a moral distinction between what we aim at and what we foresee as a result of what we do.
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.88)
     A reaction: Cf. Idea 22465. This seems to be the classic doctrine of double effect. It is hard to defend the claim that we are only responsible for what we aim at. A wide assessment of consequences is a moral duty. Well-meaning fools are bad.
22467 Acts and omissions only matter if they concern doing something versus allowing it [Foot]
     Full Idea: The difference between acts and omissions is irrelevant to any moral issue except in so far as it corresponds to the distinction between allowing something to happen and being the agent to whom the happening can be ascribed.
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.89)
     A reaction: The list of anyone's omissions is presumably infinite, but what they 'allow' must be in some way within their power. But what of something I can't now prevent, only because I failed to do some relevant task yesterday?
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
22470 A good moral system benefits its participants, and so demands reciprocity [Foot]
     Full Idea: It has been suggested that one criterion for a good moral system is that it should be possible to demand reciprocity from every individual because of the good the system renders to him.
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.104)
     A reaction: Money seems to have this feature, that we mostly conform to the rules for its use, because we value the whole system. Foot accepts this, but says there are also other criteria, such as leaving freedom to live well (ie. not too puritanical).
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
22468 Virtues can have aims, but good states of affairs are not among them [Foot]
     Full Idea: Some virtues do give us aims, but nothing from within morality suggests the kind of good state of affairs which it would seem always to be our duty to promote. And why indeed should there be any such thing?
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.101)
     A reaction: Isn't successful human functioning, such as heath, always to be desired? If honour is a worthy aim, doesn't that make being rightly honoured a desirable state of affairs? She is attacking consequentialism, but I'm not convinced here.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
22469 Some virtues imply rules, and others concern attachment [Foot]
     Full Idea: Virtues such as justice consist mainly in adherence to rules of conduct, while those such as benevolence we might call virtues of attachment.
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.101)
     A reaction: Not sure about 'attachment'. We should be benevolent towards people to whom we are not particularly attached. Courage doesn't fall into either group.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
5467 Euler said nature is instrinsically passive, and minds cause change [Euler, by Ellis]
     Full Idea: Euler thought the powers necessary for the maintenance of the changing universe would turn out to be just the passive ones of inertia and impenetrability. There are no active powers, he urged, other than those of God and living beings.
     From: report of Leonhard Euler (Letters to a German Princess [1765]) by Brian Ellis - The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism Ch.4
     A reaction: Very significant, I think, for revealing the religious framework behind early theories of natural laws. If there is nothing external to impose powers and movements on nature, the source must be sought within - hence essentialism.