Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Folk Psychology', 'Elements of Intuitionism' and 'Letters to Varignon'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


6 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / c. Potential infinite
Platonists ruin infinity, which is precisely a growing structure which is never completed [Dummett]
     Full Idea: The platonist destroys the whole essence of infinity, which lies in the conception of a structure which is always in growth, precisely because the process of construction is never completed.
     From: Michael Dummett (Elements of Intuitionism [1977], p.57), quoted by Thomas J. McKay - Plural Predication
     A reaction: I don't warm to intuitionism, but I warm to this conception of infinity. Completed infinities are convenient reifications for mathematicians.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / a. Constructivism
For intuitionists it is constructed proofs (which take time) which make statements true [Dummett]
     Full Idea: For an intuitionist a mathematical statement is rendered true or false by a proof or disproof, that is, by a construction, and constructions are effected in time.
     From: Michael Dummett (Elements of Intuitionism [1977], p.336), quoted by Shaughan Lavine - Understanding the Infinite VI.2
     A reaction: Lavine is quoting this to draw attention to the difficulties of thinking of it as all taking place 'in time', especially when dealing with infinities.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
If folk psychology gives a network of causal laws, that fits neatly with functionalism [Churchland,PM]
     Full Idea: The portrait of folk psychology as a network of causal laws dovetailed neatly with the emerging philosophy of mind called functionalism.
     From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], II)
     A reaction: And from the lower levels functionalism is supported by the notion that the brain is modular. Note the word 'laws'; this implies an underlying precision in folk psychology, which is then easily attacked. Maybe the network is too complex for simple laws.
Folk psychology never makes any progress, and is marginalised by modern science [Churchland,PM]
     Full Idea: Folk psychology has not progressed significantly in the last 2500 years; if anything, it has been steadily in retreat during this period; it does not integrate with modern science, and its emerging wallflower status bodes ill for its future.
     From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III)
     A reaction: [compressed] However, while shares in alchemy and astrology have totally collapsed, folk psychology shows not the slightest sign of going away, and it is unclear how it ever could. See Idea 3177.
Many mental phenomena are totally unexplained by folk psychology [Churchland,PM]
     Full Idea: Folk psychology fails utterly to explain a considerable variety of central psychological phenomena: mental illness, sleep, creativity, memory, intelligence differences, and many forms of learning, to cite just a few.
     From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III)
     A reaction: If folk psychology is a theory, it will have been developed to predict behaviour, rather than as a full-blown psychological map. The odd thing is that some people seem to be very bad at folk psychology.
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Men are related to animals, which are related to plants, then to fossils, and then to the apparently inert [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Men are related to animals, these to plants, and the latter directly to fossils which will be linked in their turn to bodies which the senses and the imagination represent to us as perfectly dead and formless.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Varignon [1702], 1702)
     A reaction: Leibniz would be a bit surprised to find the way in which this has turned out to be largely true, since he is basing it on his picture of a hierarchy of monads. Nevertheless, the idea that we are all related wasn't invented in 1859.