Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Folk Psychology', 'Syntagma' and 'Against the Logicians (two books)'

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12 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis

22764	Ordinary speech is not exact about what is true; we say we are digging a well before the well exists [Sext.Empiricus]
	Full Idea: We must allow ordinary speech to use inexact terms, as it does not seek after what is really true but what is supposed to be true. We speak of digging a well or weaving a cloak, but there is no well or cloak when they are being dug or woven.
	From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Logicians (two books) [c.180], II.129)
	A reaction: Nice examples. The imprecision is reduced if I say I am creating a well, because that implies something that is not yet complete. If I say I intend to dig a well, is that imprecise because the well does not exist?

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes

16730	If matter is entirely atoms, anything else we notice in it can only be modes [Gassendi]
	Full Idea: Since these atoms are the whole of the corporeal matter or substance that exists in bodies, if we conceive or notice anything else to exist in these bodies, that is not a substance but only some kind of mode of the substance.
	From: Pierre Gassendi (Syntagma [1658], II.1.6.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 22.4
	A reaction: If the atoms have a few qualities of their own, are they just modes? If they are genuine powers, then there can be emergent powers, which are rather more than mere 'modes'.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties

22762	Some properties are inseparable from a thing, such as the length, breadth and depth of a body [Sext.Empiricus]
	Full Idea: Some properties are inseparable from the things to which they belong - as are length, breadth and depth from bodies, for without their presence it is impossible to perceive Body.
	From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Logicians (two books) [c.180], I.270)
	A reaction: For the opposite case he suggests a man running, talking or sleeping. He doesn't mention essential natures, but this is clearly correct. We might say that they are properties which need to be mentioned in a full definition.

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification

22759	Fools, infants and madmen may speak truly, but do not know [Sext.Empiricus]
	Full Idea: The fool and the infant and the madman at times say something true, but they do not possess knowledge of the true.
	From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Logicians (two books) [c.180], I.042)
	A reaction: This may be correct of someone who is insane, but seems unfair to the fool and the infant. At what age do children begin to know things? If speech was just random nonsense, an accidental truth seems impossible.

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge

22760	Madmen are reliable reporters of what appears to them [Sext.Empiricus]
	Full Idea: The madman is a trustworthy criterion of the appearances which occur in madness.
	From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Logicians (two books) [c.180], I.062)
	A reaction: It is hard to conceive of an genuinely insane person deliberately misreporting their hallucinations. They are, of course, the sole witness.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction

16619	We observe qualities, and use 'induction' to refer to the substances lying under them [Gassendi]
	Full Idea: Nothing beyond qualities is perceived by the senses. …When we refer to the substance in which the qualities inhere, we do this through induction, by which we reason that some subject lies under the quality.
	From: Pierre Gassendi (Syntagma [1658], II.1.6.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 07.1
	A reaction: He talks of 'induction' (in an older usage), but he seems to mean abduction, since he never makes any observations of the substances being proposed.

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology

7518	If folk psychology gives a network of causal laws, that fits neatly with functionalism [Churchland,PM]
	Full Idea: The portrait of folk psychology as a network of causal laws dovetailed neatly with the emerging philosophy of mind called functionalism.
	From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], II)
	A reaction: And from the lower levels functionalism is supported by the notion that the brain is modular. Note the word 'laws'; this implies an underlying precision in folk psychology, which is then easily attacked. Maybe the network is too complex for simple laws.

7519	Many mental phenomena are totally unexplained by folk psychology [Churchland,PM]
	Full Idea: Folk psychology fails utterly to explain a considerable variety of central psychological phenomena: mental illness, sleep, creativity, memory, intelligence differences, and many forms of learning, to cite just a few.
	From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III)
	A reaction: If folk psychology is a theory, it will have been developed to predict behaviour, rather than as a full-blown psychological map. The odd thing is that some people seem to be very bad at folk psychology.

7520	Folk psychology never makes any progress, and is marginalised by modern science [Churchland,PM]
	Full Idea: Folk psychology has not progressed significantly in the last 2500 years; if anything, it has been steadily in retreat during this period; it does not integrate with modern science, and its emerging wallflower status bodes ill for its future.
	From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III)
	A reaction: [compressed] However, while shares in alchemy and astrology have totally collapsed, folk psychology shows not the slightest sign of going away, and it is unclear how it ever could. See Idea 3177.

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts

22763	We can only dream of a winged man if we have experienced men and some winged thing [Sext.Empiricus]
	Full Idea: He who in his sleep dreams of a winged man does not dream so without having seen some winged thing and a man. And in general it is impossible to find in conception anything which one does not possess as known by experience.
	From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Logicians (two books) [c.180], II.058)
	A reaction: This precisely David Hume's empiricist account of the formation of concepts. Hume's example is a golden mountain, which he got from Aquinas. How do we dream of faces we have never encountered, or shapes we have never seen?

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism

16593	Atoms are not points, but hard indivisible things, which no force in nature can divide [Gassendi]
	Full Idea: The vulgar think atoms lack parts and are free of all magnitude, and hence nothing other than a mathematical point, but it is something solid and hard and compact, as to leave no room for division, separation and cutting. No force in nature can divide it.
	From: Pierre Gassendi (Syntagma [1658], II.1.3.5), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 03.2
	A reaction: If you gloatingly think the atom has now been split, ask whether electrons and quarks now fit his description. Pasnau notes that though atoms are indivisible, they are not incorruptible, and could go out of existence, or be squashed.

16729	How do mere atoms produce qualities like colour, flavour and odour? [Gassendi]
	Full Idea: If the only material principles of things are atoms, having only size, shape, and weight, or motion, then why are so many additional qualities created and existing within the things: color, heat, flavor, odor, and innumerable others?
	From: Pierre Gassendi (Syntagma [1658], II.1.5.7), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 22.4
	A reaction: This is pretty much the 'hard question' about the mind-body relation. Bacon said that heat was just motion of matter. I would say that this problem is gradually being solved in my lifetime.