60 ideas
23948 | Wisdom needs both thought and passion, with each reflecting on the other [Solomon] |
Full Idea: Wisdom is a matter of living both thoughtfully and passionately, bringing understanding to bear on every passion and forcing every passion into the light of reflection. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 3.4) | |
A reaction: His main point is that passion is a key part of wisdom, and the idea that wisdom is cold and detached is quite false. Good point. At the very least, wise people must relate sympathetically to others. |
23942 | Philosophy is creating an intellectual conceptual structure for life [Solomon] |
Full Idea: Philosophy is conceptual sculpture, the shaping and developing of the intellectual structures within which we live our lives. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Intro.1) | |
A reaction: Nice. I tend to see philosophy as conceptual analysis (though creating new concepts doesn't quite fit that), but the vision of creating a huge conceptual sculpture sounds good. I would call it a system. (See my book, 'Natural Ideas'!). |
18390 | All metaphysical discussion should be guided by a quest for truthmakers [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: My plea, whatever conclusions are drawn, is to control the metaphysical discussion by continual reference to suggested truthmakers. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 08.7) | |
A reaction: ...And my plea is to control metaethical discussion by continual reference to value-makers. In general, this is the approach which will deliver a unified account of the world. Truthmakers are the ideal restraint on extravagant metaphysics. |
23945 | Reason is actually passions, guided by perspicacious reflection [Solomon] |
Full Idea: What is called 'reason' is the passions enlightened, 'illuminated' by reflection and supported by a perspicacious deliberation that the emotions in their urgency normally excluded. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Intro.4) | |
A reaction: To suggest that reason more or less is emotions strikes me as missing the point of 'perspicacious', which takes in facts outside our emotional world. We excitedly climb a cliff, then stop when we see the rocks are crumbling. |
18467 | Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Truth-making cannot be any form of entailment. Both terms of an entailment relation must be propositions, but the truth-making term of the truth-making relation is a portion of reality, and, in general at least, portions of reality are not propositions. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 02.3) | |
A reaction: Along with Idea 18466, that seems to firmly demolish the idea that truth-making is a logical entailment. |
18468 | Armstrong says truthmakers necessitate their truth, where 'necessitate' is a primitive relation [Armstrong, by MacBride] |
Full Idea: In a bold manouevre Armstrong posited a metaphysically primitive relation of necessitation, and then defined truth-makers in terms of this bridging relation, as a thing that necessitates something being true. | |
From: report of David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 02.3) by Fraser MacBride - Truthmakers 1.2 | |
A reaction: [Not sure of page reference] Spelled out so clearly by MacBride, this sounds dubious. How many truths are necessitated by the City of London? Do truthmakers necessitate the existence of their truths? MacBride says it's a circular theory. |
18377 | Negative truths have as truthmakers all states of affairs relevant to the truth [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Postulate a higher-order state of affairs, of all the states of affairs in which Theaetetus is involved. Is this not a good candidate for a truthmaker for the negative truth that 'Theaetetus is not flying'? | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 05.2) | |
A reaction: It certainly seems extravagant to need the whole universe to make true 'there are no lions in this room'. But for 'there are no unicorns' it is not clear which states of affairs unicorns are involved. (Armstrong is aware of this). |
18382 | The nature of arctic animals is truthmaker for the absence of penguins there [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Each of the arctic animals is by its nature different from a penguin, so this general state of affairs seems truthmaker enough for this negative existential. Similarly, the totality of all birds eliminates the phoenix. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 06.2) | |
A reaction: Why is it 'animals' in one case, and 'birds' in the other? What if there was no life in arctic? Would the snow then do the job? This doesn't seem to work. |
18394 | In mathematics, truthmakers are possible instantiations of structures [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: A mathematical entity exists if and only if it is possible that there be instantiations of that structure. This transforms the question of truthmakers for the existence of mathematical entities into a question of truthmakers for certain possibilities. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 09.3) | |
A reaction: This modal approach to structuralism [for which he endorses Hellman 1989] opens up a modal approach to other truthmakers, which places dispositions at the centre of physical truthmaking. No sets of Meinongian objects? |
18386 | What is the truthmaker for 'it is possible that there could have been nothing'? [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: It is possible that there could have been nothing. ...What would be its truthmaker? | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 07.4) | |
A reaction: I suppose the truthmaker here is the whole of reality, with its dispositions and contingencies. But that won't do for 'possibly there might never have been anything'. In such a case there wouldn't be any truths. |
18384 | One truthmaker will do for a contingent truth and for its contradictory [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: It seems reasonable to say that a truthmaker for a contingent truth is also a truthmaker for the truth that the contradictory of that truth is possible. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 07.2) | |
A reaction: The truthmaker will have to be not only some fact, but also the additional fact that it is contingent, in order to generate the possibility of the contradictory. |
18387 | The truthmakers for possible unicorns are the elements in their combination [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: The obvious minimal truthmaker for the truth that 'it is possible that a unicorn exists' is combinatorial. The elements of the combination are all that is needed. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 07.5) | |
A reaction: This seems to imply that there are no possibilities which are not combinations of what currently exists. |
18381 | Necessitating general truthmakers must also specify their limits [Armstrong] |
Full Idea:
The mereological sum of what happens to be all the men does not necessitate that it is all the men. So if truthmaking involves necessitation, then this object cannot be the complete truthmaker for |
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From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 06.1) | |
A reaction: [He invokes Russell has his source] His point is that the truthmaker needs a further fact, beyond the men, which specifies that this is all of them. But only if truthmakers necessitate their truths (as Armstrong claims). I'm sympathetic to both claims. |
18396 | The set theory brackets { } assert that the member is a unit [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: The idea is that braces { } attribute to an entity the place-holding, or perhaps determinable, property of unithood. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 09.5) | |
A reaction:
I like this. There is Socrates himself, then there is my concept |
18393 | For 'there is a class with no members' we don't need the null set as truthmaker [Armstrong] |
Full Idea:
The null class is useful in formal set theory, but I hope that does not require that there be a thing called the null class which is truthmaker for the strange proposition |
|
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 09.1) | |
A reaction: It is not quite clear why it doesn't, but then it is not quite clear to philosophers what the status of the null set is, in comparison with sets that have members. |
18392 | Classes have cardinalities, so their members must all be treated as units [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Classes, because they have a particular cardinality, are essentially a certain number of ones, things that, within the particular class, are each taken as a unit. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 09.1) | |
A reaction: [Singletons are exceptions] So units are basic to set theory, which is the foundations of technical analytic philosophy (as well as, for many, of mathematics). If you can't treat something as a unit, it won't go into set theory. Vagueness... |
18385 | Logical atomism builds on the simple properties, but are they the only possible properties? [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: One of the assumptions of logical atomism is that all structural properties, all complex properties, are composed of simple properties and relations. ...But does the totality of the simple properties consist of the only possible simple properties? | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 07.3) | |
A reaction: This refers to what Lewis calls 'alien' properties - possible properties that cannot even be constructed from actual properties. Armstrong's question is about the truthmakers for such things. A bit speculative... |
18391 | 'Naturalism' says only the world of space-time exists [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: I define 'naturalism' as the hypothesis that the world of space-time is all that there is. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 09.1) | |
A reaction: This is helpful, because it doesn't mention the nature of the physical matter contained in space-time, leaving theories like panpsychism as possible naturalistic theories. Galen Strawson, for example. |
18374 | Truthmaking needs states of affairs, to unite particulars with tropes or universals. [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: There must exist states of affairs as truthmakers, to get us beyond 'loose and separate' entities. ...They can be bundles of tropes, or trope-with-particular, or bundles of universals ('compresence'), or instantiations. They are an addition to ontology. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 04.5) | |
A reaction: Armstrong is the great champion of states of affairs. They seem rather vague to me, and disconcertingly timeless. |
18372 | We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: The 'thing itself' seems not be a minimal truthmaker for the thing having its particular mass. ...The thing has a great many other properties. ...It seems entirely reasonable to postulate that the object has properties that are objectively there. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 04.2) | |
A reaction: This is Armstrong using the truthmaker principle to argue for the existence of properties (as instantiated universals). I like truthmakers, but truths do not have enough precision in their parts for us to read off reality from them. |
18379 | The determinates of a determinable must be incompatible with each other [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: A set of determinates under the one determinable are incompatible by definition. If an object is not one mile in length, then its actual length will be incompatible with being one mile in length. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 05.2.1) | |
A reaction: This is a much better general version of the standard example 'if it is red it can't be green'. Armstrong uses it to give a more precise account of incompatibility. Useful. |
18378 | Length is a 'determinable' property, and one mile is one its 'determinates' [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Length is a 'determinable' property; being some particular length, such as a mile, is one of its 'determinates'. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 05.2.1) | |
A reaction: The seem to be 'type' and 'token' properties, except that this other vocabulary indicates the link between them. |
18373 | If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: 'Non-transferable' theories of tropes hold that the mass is of this stone by necessity. It is an identity condition for the property. Every property then becomes an essential property. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 04.3) | |
A reaction: [He cites Martin and Heil for this view] It is hard to see in this proposal how the trope is in any way separate from its substance, and hence it seems a bit of a vacuous theory. (The other theories of properties aren't much cop either). |
18400 | Properties are not powers - they just have powers [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Properties are not powers. But properties have powers. They bestow powers. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 10.4) | |
A reaction: I think this is the wrong way round. In this view, powers become extremely vague things, ranging from the fine-grained to the hugely broad. It seems to me that powers are precise and real, but properties are the vague unhelpful things. |
18397 | Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Powers must surely issue in manifestations that are something more than just powers. A world where potency never issued in act, but only in more potency, would be one where one travelled without ever having the possibility of arriving. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 10.4) | |
A reaction: Tricky. The picture I favour is that the distinction between powers and categorical properties is a misunderstanding. What is fundamental is active and powerful categoricals. |
18399 | How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over? [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: If masses are powers, the forces generated between two particulars have to vary inversely with the square of their distance apart. Have not the masses got to 'know' at what distance they are from each other, to exert the right amount of force? | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 10.4) | |
A reaction: This seems like a good warning against a simplistic account of powers doing all the work, but I suspect that more sophisticated physics would offer the fan of powers a solution here. The power is to 'spread' the force around. |
18371 | The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: For a Class Nominalist 'the class of all 4-kilo objects' is the truthmaker for the truth that the particular has just that mass. Yet this looks far too big! Would not the object still be four kilos even if the other members of the class had never existed? | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 04.2) | |
A reaction: This seems so obvious to me as to be hardly worth saying. To identify redness with the class of red entities just seems crazy. Why do they belong in that class? Armstrong is illustrating the value of the truthmaker idea in philosophy. |
18389 | When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: There is 'partial identity' where one entity contains another with something to spare, or else where entities overlap each other. ...Extensive quantities, such as length and mass, are the particularly plausible cases. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 08.5) | |
A reaction: This looks like a very useful concept which deserves wider use. It will help discussions of rivers, statues, intersecting roads etc. |
18388 | Possible worlds don't fix necessities; intrinsic necessities imply the extension in worlds [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: It seems natural and plausible to say that it is the fact that a necessary truth is itself necessary that determines its truth in all possible worlds. This intension determines its extension across possible worlds. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 08.1) | |
A reaction: Well said. To me (but not to Armstrong) this implies essentialism, that the necessity arises from the intrinsic natures of the things involved. The whole Lewisian approach of explaining things by mapping them strikes me as wrong. |
23957 | We often trust our intuitions as rational, despite their lack of reflection [Solomon] |
Full Idea: We trust certain rational 'intuitions' in ourselves which dispense with reflection but seem to follow an indisputable logic. (note: it is thought ineffable because reflection is the paradigm of rationality. It is no less rational than reflection). | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 6.4) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Solomon uses the example to support that emotion is part of rationality. Since this view of intuition is more or less mine (that intuition can be knowledge, when the justification is obscure), it seems to support his claim. |
23943 | Distinguishing reason from passion is based on an archaic 'faculty' theory [Solomon] |
Full Idea: The distinction between reason and passion is based on an archaic 'faculty' psychology of the human soul. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Intro.2) | |
A reaction: I like faculties, for philosophical purposes, as explanatory tools to account for our metaphysical and conceptual framework, but this point is well made. The danger is that we impose sharp divisions, where reality is more complex. |
18375 | General truths are a type of negative truth, saying there are no more ravens than black ones [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: General truths are a species of negative truth, 'no more' truths, asserting that there are no more men than the mortal ones, no more ravens than the black ones. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 05.1) | |
A reaction: He goes on to distinguish between 'absences' and 'limits' in this area. |
23952 | I say bodily chemistry and its sensations have nothing to do with emotions [Solomon] |
Full Idea: I shall be making the claim (sujectively) that the chemistry of the body and the sensations caused by that chemistry have nothing to do with the emotions. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 4.1) | |
A reaction: Surely an unexpected stabbing pain causes fear? Isn't pain supposed to trigger appropriate emotions? That is not to say that emotions are a feature of body chemistry. |
23954 | Emotions are judgements about ourselves, and our place in the world [Solomon] |
Full Idea: An emotion is a basic judgement about our Selves and our place in the world, the projection of the values and ideals, structures and mythologies | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 5.3) | |
A reaction: Solomon's main theory. What about the Frege-Geach problem - that I feel emotions (and judgements) about fictions and remote events, in which my personal concerns and involvement are zero? Presumably these emotions are parasitic on his primary type? |
23960 | Emotions are defined by their objects [Solomon] |
Full Idea: Direction, scope and focus set the stage, but the specific object is what defines the emotion. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 7.3) | |
A reaction: This is presumably the main distinction between an emotion and a mood. He emphasises that the objects are subjective, rather than factual. |
23961 | The heart of an emotion is its judgement of values and morality [Solomon] |
Full Idea: The heart of every emotion is its value judgements, its appraisals of gain and loss, its indictment of offences and its praise of virtue, its often Manichean judgement of 'good' and 'evil'. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 7.6) | |
A reaction: He adds blame and excuse. Some of our strongest emotions can just be identifications, rather than judgements, as when we learn of someone else's triumph or disaster. On the whole I agree, though. This is important for Aristotelian virtue theory. |
23965 | Emotions can be analysed under fifteen headings [Solomon] |
Full Idea: Emotions can be analysed by direction, scope/focus, object, criteria, status, evaluations, responsibility, intersubjectivity, distance, mythology, desire, power, strategy. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 8) | |
A reaction: These are the headings Solomon actually applies in his breakdown of most of the main emotions. See his book for explanations of each of them. If people say philosophy makes no progress, I'd at least point to helpful thinking of this kind. |
23959 | Some emotions are externally directed, others internally [Solomon] |
Full Idea: 'Outer-directed' emotions (such as fear) are about particular situations, objects, or other people. …The 'inner-directed' emotions (such as vanity or regret) take one's Self as their focal point. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 7.1) | |
A reaction: This is Solomon's own distinction. Some of the emotions he cites, such as vanity, seem to me more like long term virtues or vices, rather than emotions. He did say, though, that you can have emotions without feeling, such as long-term hate. |
23946 | The passions are subjective, concerning what is important to me, rather than facts [Solomon] |
Full Idea: The passions are uniquely subjective, although they sometimes pretend to have a certain objective status. They are not concerned with the world, but with my world. They are not concerned with 'the facts', but with what is important. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Intro.5) | |
A reaction: Values pick out what is 'important'. This idea sums up Solomon's rather solipsistic view of emotions. I accept that emotions are responses, rather than objective judgements, but there is objectivity in their social dimension. Why care about politics? |
23940 | Emotions are strategies for maximising our sense of dignity and self-esteem [Solomon] |
Full Idea: Every emotion is a strategy, a purposive attempt to structure our world in such a way as to maximise our sense of personal dignity and self-esteem. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Pref) | |
A reaction: This is the main thesis of Solomon's book. There doesn't seem to be much to admire in what he takes to be our chief motivation. I would put a much more social spin on it - that our underlying urge is not self-promotion, but to fit into a community. |
23949 | Passions exist as emotions, moods and desires, which all generate meaning [Solomon] |
Full Idea: There are three fundamental species passions - emotions, moods, and desires. …What all passions have in common is their ability to bestow meaning to the circumstances of our lives. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 3.2) | |
A reaction: Moods are said to be 'generalised emotions', where emotions are about something, and desires add objectives. Solomon criticises rigid divisions between mental faculties and states, but it is hard to disagree with this distinction. |
23956 | The Myth of the Passions says they are irrational, uncontrolled and damaging [Solomon] |
Full Idea: The Myth of the Passions says emotions are irrational forces beyond our control, disruptive and stupid, unthinking and counterproductive, against our 'better interests', and often ridiculous. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 6.4) | |
A reaction: The Myth is very unlikely to be correct, for evolutionary reasons. How could there be a selection for a mental feature which distorts truths and leads to dangerous misjudgements? Most emotions motivate us to act successfully. So why do some run wild? |
23963 | Which emotions we feel depends on our sense of our own powers [Solomon] |
Full Idea: An emotion depends on an estimation of our own power. If a lover is jealous they welcome confrontation, but if they are just envious they assume impotence from the start. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 7.12) | |
A reaction: This seems particularly true of politics, where the possibility (or not) of influencing events makes a huge difference. We can picture a huge variety of emotions when a fight breaks out in public. |
23936 | It is only our passions which give our lives meaning [Solomon] |
Full Idea: It is our passions, and our passions alone, which provide our lives with meaning. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Pref) | |
A reaction: This presumably entails that the lives of plants have no meaning. It also seems to be rather egotistical, since it is not clear why anyone else's life should have meaning for me, if I don't directly experience their passions. Interesting, though. |
23953 | Feeling is a superficial aspect of emotion, and may be indeterminate, or even absent [Solomon] |
Full Idea: Feeling is the ornamentation of emotion, not its essence. ...For example, what is the difference in feeling between embarrassment and shame? …We may also experience an emotion like subdued anger or envy with no feeling. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 4.2) | |
A reaction: This is very persuasive, and supports the idea that what matters in an emotion is its content, rather than its phenomenology. He adds later that we are often mistaken about our own emotions. |
23964 | There are no 'basic' emotions, only socially prevalent ones [Solomon] |
Full Idea: There are no 'basic' emotions, only those emotions which are prevalent in a particular society. This reduction to a small set makes it impossible to appreciate the richness of our emotional lives. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 8) | |
A reaction: He cites Descartes as a culprit, and John Watson's famous list of fear, dependency and rage. I think Solomon is probably right. He suggests that the lists are usually individualistic and negative. Individuals may have their private basics! |
23937 | It is reason which needs the anchorage of passions, rather than vice versa [Solomon] |
Full Idea: It is not the passions who require the controls and rationalisations of reason. Rather, it is reason that requires the anchorage and earthy wisdom of the passions. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Pref) | |
A reaction: I like the second half of this. We don't just follow the winds of arguments; we decide into which of the many conflicting winds we should steer the rational arguments, and that needs passions. Only a fool doesn't rationally control their passions. |
23947 | Dividing ourselves into confrontational reason and passion destroys our harmonious whole [Solomon] |
Full Idea: To divide the soul into reason and passion …divides us against ourselves, forcing us each to be defensively half a person, instead of a harmonious whole. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 2.3) | |
A reaction: This is the best aspect of Solomon's book. I'm not sure, though, how this works in practice. Should I allow the winds of emotion to alter the course of my reasoning, or stunt my feelings by always insisting that reason plays a part? That's too dualist! |
23958 | The supposed irrationality of our emotions is often tactless or faulty expression of them [Solomon] |
Full Idea: What is often called the 'irrationality' of our emotions is rather the faulty timing or inept choice of their expressions. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 6.4) | |
A reaction: The irrationality can be pretty obvious when having a tantrum over trivia, or resenting some tiny slight, or falling in love with a dead film star. That said, his point is well made. |
7518 | If folk psychology gives a network of causal laws, that fits neatly with functionalism [Churchland,PM] |
Full Idea: The portrait of folk psychology as a network of causal laws dovetailed neatly with the emerging philosophy of mind called functionalism. | |
From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], II) | |
A reaction: And from the lower levels functionalism is supported by the notion that the brain is modular. Note the word 'laws'; this implies an underlying precision in folk psychology, which is then easily attacked. Maybe the network is too complex for simple laws. |
7519 | Many mental phenomena are totally unexplained by folk psychology [Churchland,PM] |
Full Idea: Folk psychology fails utterly to explain a considerable variety of central psychological phenomena: mental illness, sleep, creativity, memory, intelligence differences, and many forms of learning, to cite just a few. | |
From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III) | |
A reaction: If folk psychology is a theory, it will have been developed to predict behaviour, rather than as a full-blown psychological map. The odd thing is that some people seem to be very bad at folk psychology. |
7520 | Folk psychology never makes any progress, and is marginalised by modern science [Churchland,PM] |
Full Idea: Folk psychology has not progressed significantly in the last 2500 years; if anything, it has been steadily in retreat during this period; it does not integrate with modern science, and its emerging wallflower status bodes ill for its future. | |
From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III) | |
A reaction: [compressed] However, while shares in alchemy and astrology have totally collapsed, folk psychology shows not the slightest sign of going away, and it is unclear how it ever could. See Idea 3177. |
18368 | For all being, there is a potential proposition which expresses its existence and nature [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: The thesis of 'expressibility' says that for all being, there is a proposition (perhaps one never formulated by any mind at any time) that truly renders the existence and nature of this being. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 02.3.2) | |
A reaction: [He credits Stephen Read 2000:68-9 for this] Armstrong accepts this, but I deny it. I can't make any sense of this vast plethora of propositions, each exactly expressing some minute nuance of the infinity complexity of all being. |
18370 | A realm of abstract propositions is causally inert, so has no explanatory value [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: We could not stand in any causal or nomic relation to a realm of propositions over and above the space-time world, ...so it is unclear that such a postulation is of any explanatory value. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 02.6) | |
A reaction: I agree, and I like Armstrong's appeal to explanation as a criterion for whether we should make an ontological commitment here. I am baffled by anyone who thinks reality is crammed full of unarticulated propositions. Only a philosopher.... |
23944 | Emotions are our life force, and the source of most of our values [Solomon] |
Full Idea: Emotions are the life force of the soul, the source of most of our values (not all: there is always hunger, thirst, and fatigue). | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Intro.4) | |
A reaction: I am beginning to worry that Solomon's account is too individual and subjective. My personal values may derive from my emotions, but I think human and social values are based much more on objective observations and facts. We are social, not solipsists. |
23962 | Lovers adopt the interests of their beloved, rather than just valuing them [Solomon] |
Full Idea: It is often said that love takes the interests of the lover as being more important than one's own; but here again we would rather say that love takes the lovers interests as its own. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 7.9) | |
A reaction: This is because he sees emotions as almost entirely self-centred, and almost never altruistic. To me the evolutionary picture suggest a more social view. Many people want the lives of their ex- to go well, without knowing their new interests. |
23941 | 'Absurdity' is just the result of our wrong choices in life [Solomon] |
Full Idea: The 'absurdity of life' is nothing than our own unsatisfactory choices, typically of defensiveness and resentment, competition, and 'meaningless' routines. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Pref) | |
A reaction: He seems to have Camus particularly in mind. He sees love and co-operation as the cure. I sort of agree, but somewhere in all of our minds there lurks an abyss, with the good life looking like a distraction from it. |
23955 | Ideologies are mythologies which guide our actions [Solomon] |
Full Idea: Mythologies become ideologies when we play a role in them, live in them, take action and take sides. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 6.1) | |
A reaction: This may well be a sceptical American attitude to ideology, since 'mythology' implies a fiction. But I think for most of us there exists the possibility of a good ideology, which correctly points us towards a better life. Dangerous things, though! |
18380 | Negative causations supervene on positive causations plus their laws? [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Is it not very plausible that negative causations supervene on the positive causations together with the laws that govern the positive causations? | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 05.2.3) | |
A reaction: This obviously has a naturalistic appeal, since all causation can then be based on the actual world. |
18401 | The pure present moment is too brief to be experienced [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: The metaphysical present will be a strict instant, or, if time is not infinitely divisible, the present will be a minimum granule of duration. But strict instants or minimal granules of duration, if these exist, cannot be experienced. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 11) | |
A reaction: He points out that this is ironic, since Presentism lies on the basic experience of the present. |