15537
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If cats are vague, we deny that the many cats are one, or deny that the one cat is many [Lewis]
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Full Idea:
To deny that there are many cats on the mat (because removal of a few hairs seems to produce a new one), we must either deny that the many are cats, or else deny that the cats are many. ...I think both alternatives lead to successful solutions.
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From:
David Lewis (Many, but almost one [1993], 'The paradox')
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A reaction:
He credits the problem to Geach (and Tibbles), and says it is the same as Unger's 'problem of the many' (Idea 15536).
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7510
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Connectionists say the mind is a general purpose learning device [Pinker]
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Full Idea:
Connectionists do not, of course, believe that the mind is a blank slate, but they do believe in the closest mechanistic equivalent, a general purpose learning device.
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From:
Steven Pinker (The Blank Slate [2002], Ch.5)
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A reaction:
This shows the closeness of connectionism to Hume's associationism (Idea 2189), which was just a minimal step away from Locke's mind as 'white paper' (Idea 7507). Pinker is defending 'human nature', but connectionism has a point.
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7513
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Is memory stored in protein sequences, neurons, synapses, or synapse-strengths? [Pinker]
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Full Idea:
Are memories stored in protein sequences, in new neurons or synapses, or in changes in the strength of existing synapses?
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From:
Steven Pinker (The Blank Slate [2002], Ch.5)
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A reaction:
This seems to be a neat summary of current neuroscientific thinking about memory. If you are thinking that memory couldn't possibly be so physical, don't forget the mind-boggling number of events involved in each tiny memory. See Idea 6668.
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7509
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Roundworms live successfully with 302 neurons, so human freedom comes from our trillions [Pinker]
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Full Idea:
The roundworm only has 959 cells, and 302 neurons in a fixed wiring diagram; it eats, mates, approaches and avoids certain smells, and that's about it. This makes it obvious that human 'free' behaviour comes from our complex biological makeup.
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From:
Steven Pinker (The Blank Slate [2002], Ch.5)
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A reaction:
I find this a persuasive example. Three hundred trillion neurons cannot possibly produce behaviour which is more than broadly predictable, and then it is the environment and culture that make it predictable, not the biology.
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7512
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There are five types of reasoning that seem beyond connectionist systems [Pinker, by PG]
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Full Idea:
Connectionist networks have difficulty with the kind/individual distinction (ducks/this duck), with compositionality (relations), with quantification (reference of 'all'), with recursion (embedded thoughts), and the categorical reasoning (exceptions).
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From:
report of Steven Pinker (The Blank Slate [2002], Ch.5) by PG - Db (ideas)
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A reaction:
[Read Pinker p.80!] These are essentially all the more sophisticated aspects of logical reasoning that Pinker can think of. Personally I would be reluctant to say a priori that connectionism couldn't cope with these things, just because they seem tough.
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7520
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Folk psychology never makes any progress, and is marginalised by modern science [Churchland,PM]
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Full Idea:
Folk psychology has not progressed significantly in the last 2500 years; if anything, it has been steadily in retreat during this period; it does not integrate with modern science, and its emerging wallflower status bodes ill for its future.
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From:
Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III)
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A reaction:
[compressed] However, while shares in alchemy and astrology have totally collapsed, folk psychology shows not the slightest sign of going away, and it is unclear how it ever could. See Idea 3177.
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7519
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Many mental phenomena are totally unexplained by folk psychology [Churchland,PM]
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Full Idea:
Folk psychology fails utterly to explain a considerable variety of central psychological phenomena: mental illness, sleep, creativity, memory, intelligence differences, and many forms of learning, to cite just a few.
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From:
Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III)
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A reaction:
If folk psychology is a theory, it will have been developed to predict behaviour, rather than as a full-blown psychological map. The odd thing is that some people seem to be very bad at folk psychology.
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15539
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Basic to pragmatics is taking a message in a way that makes sense of it [Lewis]
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Full Idea:
The cardinal principle of pragmatics is that the right way to take what is said, if at all possible, is the way that makes sense of the message.
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From:
David Lewis (Many, but almost one [1993], 'A better solution')
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A reaction:
Thus when someone misuses a word, suggesting nonsense, we gloss over it, often without even mentioning it, because the underlying sense is obvious. A good argument for the existence of propositions. Lewis doesn't mention truth.
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7505
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Many think that accepting human nature is to accept innumerable evils [Pinker]
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Full Idea:
To acknowledge human nature, many think, is to endorse racism, sexism, war, greed, genocide, nihilism, reactionary politics, and neglect of children and the disadvantaged.
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From:
Steven Pinker (The Blank Slate [2002], Pref)
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A reaction:
The point is that modern liberal thinking says everything is nurture (which can be changed), not nature (which can't). Virtue theory, of which I am a fan, requires a concept of human nature, as the thing which can attain excellence in its function.
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