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All the ideas for 'Folk Psychology', 'talk' and 'Truth-making without Truth-makers'

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5 ideas

14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
'Grue' is not a colour [Milsted]
     Full Idea: 'Grue' is not a colour.
     From: Tom Milsted (talk [2006]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: This simple observation strikes me as rather crucial in assessing Goodman's paradox. Blue is a colour, but grue is some sort of behaviour. Blue is a secondary quality, but grue seems to be a primary quality.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
There are 'conceptual' explanations, with their direction depending on complexity [Schnieder]
     Full Idea: The direction of conceptual explanations seems to be owed to factors of conceptual complexity and primitiveness.
     From: Benjamin Schnieder (Truth-making without Truth-makers [2006], p.33), quoted by David Liggins - Truth-makers and dependence 10.2
     A reaction: Schnieder proposes that there are just 'causal' and 'conceptual' explanations. Liggins objects that there are other types of dependence which offer explanations.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
If folk psychology gives a network of causal laws, that fits neatly with functionalism [Churchland,PM]
     Full Idea: The portrait of folk psychology as a network of causal laws dovetailed neatly with the emerging philosophy of mind called functionalism.
     From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], II)
     A reaction: And from the lower levels functionalism is supported by the notion that the brain is modular. Note the word 'laws'; this implies an underlying precision in folk psychology, which is then easily attacked. Maybe the network is too complex for simple laws.
Many mental phenomena are totally unexplained by folk psychology [Churchland,PM]
     Full Idea: Folk psychology fails utterly to explain a considerable variety of central psychological phenomena: mental illness, sleep, creativity, memory, intelligence differences, and many forms of learning, to cite just a few.
     From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III)
     A reaction: If folk psychology is a theory, it will have been developed to predict behaviour, rather than as a full-blown psychological map. The odd thing is that some people seem to be very bad at folk psychology.
Folk psychology never makes any progress, and is marginalised by modern science [Churchland,PM]
     Full Idea: Folk psychology has not progressed significantly in the last 2500 years; if anything, it has been steadily in retreat during this period; it does not integrate with modern science, and its emerging wallflower status bodes ill for its future.
     From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III)
     A reaction: [compressed] However, while shares in alchemy and astrology have totally collapsed, folk psychology shows not the slightest sign of going away, and it is unclear how it ever could. See Idea 3177.