Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Defending the Axioms', 'Possible Worlds' and 'On Female Body Experience'

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11 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
The Axiom of Choice paradoxically allows decomposing a sphere into two identical spheres [Maddy]
     Full Idea: One feature of the Axiom of Choice that troubled many mathematicians was the so-called Banach-Tarski paradox: using the Axiom, a sphere can be decomposed into finitely many parts and those parts reassembled into two spheres the same size as the original.
     From: Penelope Maddy (Defending the Axioms [2011], 1.3)
     A reaction: (The key is that the parts are non-measurable). To an outsider it is puzzling that the Axiom has been universally accepted, even though it produces such a result. Someone can explain that, I'm sure.
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Critics of if-thenism say that not all starting points, even consistent ones, are worth studying [Maddy]
     Full Idea: If-thenism denies that mathematics is in the business of discovering truths about abstracta. ...[their opponents] obviously don't regard any starting point, even a consistent one, as equally worthy of investigation.
     From: Penelope Maddy (Defending the Axioms [2011], 3.3)
     A reaction: I have some sympathy with if-thenism, in that you can obviously study the implications of any 'if' you like, but deep down I agree with the critics.
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
Hilbert's geometry and Dedekind's real numbers were role models for axiomatization [Maddy]
     Full Idea: At the end of the nineteenth century there was a renewed emphasis on rigor, the central tool of which was axiomatization, along the lines of Hilbert's axioms for geometry and Dedekind's axioms for real numbers.
     From: Penelope Maddy (Defending the Axioms [2011], 1.3)
If two mathematical themes coincide, that suggest a single deep truth [Maddy]
     Full Idea: The fact that two apparently fruitful mathematical themes turn out to coincide makes it all the more likely that they're tracking a genuine strain of mathematical depth.
     From: Penelope Maddy (Defending the Axioms [2011], 5.3ii)
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / g. Continuum Hypothesis
Every infinite set of reals is either countable or of the same size as the full set of reals [Maddy]
     Full Idea: One form of the Continuum Hypothesis is the claim that every infinite set of reals is either countable or of the same size as the full set of reals.
     From: Penelope Maddy (Defending the Axioms [2011], 2.4 n40)
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Set-theory tracks the contours of mathematical depth and fruitfulness [Maddy]
     Full Idea: Our set-theoretic methods track the underlying contours of mathematical depth. ...What sets are, most fundamentally, is markers for these contours ...they are maximally effective trackers of certain trains of mathematical fruitfulness.
     From: Penelope Maddy (Defending the Axioms [2011], 3.4)
     A reaction: This seems to make it more like a map of mathematics than the actual essence of mathematics.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
The connection of arithmetic to perception has been idealised away in modern infinitary mathematics [Maddy]
     Full Idea: Ordinary perceptual cognition is most likely involved in our grasp of elementary arithmetic, but ...this connection to the physical world has long since been idealized away in the infinitary structures of contemporary pure mathematics.
     From: Penelope Maddy (Defending the Axioms [2011], 2.3)
     A reaction: Despite this, Maddy's quest is for a 'naturalistic' account of mathematics. She ends up defending 'objectivity' (and invoking Tyler Burge), rather than even modest realism. You can't 'idealise away' the counting of objects. I blame Cantor.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
Lewis's distinction of 'existing' from 'being actual' is Meinong's between 'existing' and 'subsisting' [Lycan on Lewis]
     Full Idea: I suggest that Lewis's view in fact is just Meinong's view. ...Meinong distinguishes between 'existing' and merely 'subsisting', Lewis between 'being actual' and merely 'existing'.
     From: comment on David Lewis (Possible Worlds [1973]) by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 06
     A reaction: Lewis attempts to make actuality purely 'indexical' in character, like distinguishing the world 'here' from the world 'elsewhere', but Lycan seems right that he is committed to more than that.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
Lewis can't know possible worlds without first knowing what is possible or impossible [Lycan on Lewis]
     Full Idea: Lewis's knowledge of what possible worlds there are and of other general truths about worlds is posterior, not prior, to his knowledge of what things are possible and what things are impossible.
     From: comment on David Lewis (Possible Worlds [1973]) by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 07
     A reaction: This elementary objection seems to me to destroy any attempt to explain modality in terms of possible worlds. It is a semantics for modal statements, but that doesn't make it an ontology. To assess possibilities, study actuality.
What are the ontological grounds for grouping possibilia into worlds? [Lycan on Lewis]
     Full Idea: Lewis must seek some ontological ground for the grouping of possibilia into disjoint worlds.
     From: comment on David Lewis (Possible Worlds [1973]) by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 07
     A reaction: I do love people like Lycan who ask the simple commonsense questions about these highly sophisticated systems that students of philosophy are required to study. If a proposition is a 'set of worlds', understanding a proposition is beyond me.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 12. Feminism
As a young girl assumes her status as feminine, she acts in a more fragile immobile way [Young,IM]
     Full Idea: The young girl acquires many subject habits of feminine body comportment - walking, tilting her head, standing and sitting like a girl, and so on ….The more a girl assumes her status as feminine, the more she takes herself to be fragile and immobile.
     From: Iris Marion Young (On Female Body Experience [2005], p.43), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 3 'Aspects'
     A reaction: This strikes me as true of young women, but it largely wears off as they get older, at least among modern women. A whole book could be written about women and smiling.