65 ideas
22733 | Epicurus accepted God in his popular works, but not in his writings on nature [Epicurus, by Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Epicurus in his popular exposition allows the existence of God, but in expounding the real nature of things he does not allow it. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Physicists (two books) I.58 | |
A reaction: Plato and Aristotle also distinguished their esoteric from their exoteric writings, but this is an indication that thei popular works may always have presented safer doctrines. |
13291 | Slavery to philosophy brings true freedom [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: To win true freedom you must be a slave to philosophy. | |
From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 008 | |
A reaction: A lovely idea. It is one thing to free the body, or to free one's social situation, but the challenge to 'free your mind' is either romantic nonsense or totally baffling, apart from the suggestion offered here. Reason is freedom. Very Kantian. |
22758 | Philosophy aims at a happy life, through argument and discussion [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Philosophy is an activity which secures the happy life by arguments and discussions. | |
From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Ethicists (one book) VI.169 | |
A reaction: Presumably this aims at the happiness of the participant. Universal happiness would need to be much more political. If this is your aim then you can't just follow the winds of the argument, but must channel it towards happiness. No nasty truths? |
14523 | We should come to philosophy free from any taint of culture [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: I congratulate you, sir, because you have come to philosophy free of any taint of culture. | |
From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) | |
A reaction: [source: Athenaeus, 'Deipnosophists' 13 588b] No one nowadays thinks such an aspiration remotely possible, not least because the culture is embedded in your native language, but I find the idea very appealing. |
22240 | The aim of medicine is removal of sickness, and philosophy similarly removes our affections [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Just as there is no benefit to medicine if it does not heal the sicknesses [nosos] of bodies, so too there is none to philosophy unless it expels that affections of the soul. | |
From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE], fr 221), quoted by James Allen - Soul's Virtue and the Health of the Body p.78 | |
A reaction: This sounds rather Buddhist, if the only route to happiness is to suppress the emotions. Epicurus probably refers to the more extreme desires, which only lead to harm. Galen quotes Chrysippus as endorsing this idea (see footnote 5). |
1484 | We should say nothing of the whole if our contact is with the parts [Epicurus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: We should make no assertion about the whole when our contact is with the parts. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes 1109e |
2670 | Epicurus despises and laughs at the whole of dialectic [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Epicurus despises and laughs at the whole of dialectic. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - Academica II.30.97 |
10301 | The axiom of choice is controversial, but it could be replaced [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: The axiom of choice has a troubled history, but is now standard in mathematics. It could be replaced with a principle of comprehension for functions), or one could omit the variables ranging over functions. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Higher-Order Logic [2001], n 3) |
17610 | The Axiom of Choice paradoxically allows decomposing a sphere into two identical spheres [Maddy] |
Full Idea: One feature of the Axiom of Choice that troubled many mathematicians was the so-called Banach-Tarski paradox: using the Axiom, a sphere can be decomposed into finitely many parts and those parts reassembled into two spheres the same size as the original. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Defending the Axioms [2011], 1.3) | |
A reaction: (The key is that the parts are non-measurable). To an outsider it is puzzling that the Axiom has been universally accepted, even though it produces such a result. Someone can explain that, I'm sure. |
10588 | First-order logic is Complete, and Compact, with the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Early study of first-order logic revealed a number of important features. Gödel showed that there is a complete, sound and effective deductive system. It follows that it is Compact, and there are also the downward and upward Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Higher-Order Logic [2001], 2.1) |
10298 | Some say that second-order logic is mathematics, not logic [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Some authors argue that second-order logic (with standard semantics) is not logic at all, but is a rather obscure form of mathematics. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Higher-Order Logic [2001], 2.4) |
10299 | If the aim of logic is to codify inferences, second-order logic is useless [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: If the goal of logical study is to present a canon of inference, a calculus which codifies correct inference patterns, then second-order logic is a non-starter. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Higher-Order Logic [2001], 2.4) | |
A reaction: This seems to be because it is not 'complete'. However, moves like plural quantification seem aimed at capturing ordinary language inferences, so the difficulty is only that there isn't a precise 'calculus'. |
10300 | Logical consequence can be defined in terms of the logical terminology [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Informally, logical consequence is sometimes defined in terms of the meanings of a certain collection of terms, the so-called 'logical terminology'. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Higher-Order Logic [2001], 2.4) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a compositional account, where we build a full account from an account of the atomic bits, perhaps presented as truth-tables. |
17620 | Critics of if-thenism say that not all starting points, even consistent ones, are worth studying [Maddy] |
Full Idea: If-thenism denies that mathematics is in the business of discovering truths about abstracta. ...[their opponents] obviously don't regard any starting point, even a consistent one, as equally worthy of investigation. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Defending the Axioms [2011], 3.3) | |
A reaction: I have some sympathy with if-thenism, in that you can obviously study the implications of any 'if' you like, but deep down I agree with the critics. |
21668 | Epicurus rejected excluded middle, because accepting it for events is fatalistic [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Epicurus said that not every proposition is either true or false. ...Epicurus was afraid that if he admits that every proposition is true or false he will also have to admit that all events are caused by fate (if they are so from all eternity). | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 10.21 | |
A reaction: Epicurus proposed his 'swerve' in the movements of atoms to avoid this fatalism. Epicurus is agreeing with Aristotle, who did not accept excluded middle for a future contingent sea-fight. |
21676 | Epicureans say disjunctions can be true whiile the disjuncts are not true [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Epicureans make the impudent assertion that disjunctions consisting of contrary propositions are true, but that the statements contained in the propositions are neither of them true. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 16.36 | |
A reaction: Is that 'it is definitely one or the other, but we haven't a clue which one'? Seems to fit speculations about Goldbach's Conjecture. It doesn't sound terribly impudent to me. Or is it the crazy 'It's definitely one of them, but it's neither of them'? |
10290 | Second-order variables also range over properties, sets, relations or functions [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Second-order variables can range over properties, sets, or relations on the items in the domain-of-discourse, or over functions from the domain itself. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Higher-Order Logic [2001], 2.1) |
10292 | Downward Löwenheim-Skolem: if there's an infinite model, there is a countable model [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Downward Löwenheim-Skolem: a finite or denumerable set of first-order formulas that is satisfied by a model whose domain is infinite is satisfied in a model whose domain is the natural numbers | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Higher-Order Logic [2001], 2.1) |
10590 | Up Löwenheim-Skolem: if natural numbers satisfy wffs, then an infinite domain satisfies them [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Upward Löwenheim-Skolem: if a set of first-order formulas is satisfied by a domain of at least the natural numbers, then it is satisfied by a model of at least some infinite cardinal. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Higher-Order Logic [2001], 2.1) |
10296 | The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems fail for second-order languages with standard semantics [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Both of the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems fail for second-order languages with a standard semantics | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Higher-Order Logic [2001], 2.3.2) |
10297 | The Löwenheim-Skolem theorem seems to be a defect of first-order logic [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: The Löwenheim-Skolem theorem is usually taken as a sort of defect (often thought to be inevitable) of the first-order logic. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Higher-Order Logic [2001], 2.4) | |
A reaction: [He is quoting Wang 1974 p.154] |
17605 | Hilbert's geometry and Dedekind's real numbers were role models for axiomatization [Maddy] |
Full Idea: At the end of the nineteenth century there was a renewed emphasis on rigor, the central tool of which was axiomatization, along the lines of Hilbert's axioms for geometry and Dedekind's axioms for real numbers. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Defending the Axioms [2011], 1.3) |
17625 | If two mathematical themes coincide, that suggest a single deep truth [Maddy] |
Full Idea: The fact that two apparently fruitful mathematical themes turn out to coincide makes it all the more likely that they're tracking a genuine strain of mathematical depth. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Defending the Axioms [2011], 5.3ii) |
17615 | Every infinite set of reals is either countable or of the same size as the full set of reals [Maddy] |
Full Idea: One form of the Continuum Hypothesis is the claim that every infinite set of reals is either countable or of the same size as the full set of reals. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Defending the Axioms [2011], 2.4 n40) |
10294 | Second-order logic has the expressive power for mathematics, but an unworkable model theory [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Full second-order logic has all the expressive power needed to do mathematics, but has an unworkable model theory. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Higher-Order Logic [2001], 2.1) | |
A reaction: [he credits Cowles for this remark] Having an unworkable model theory sounds pretty serious to me, as I'm not inclined to be interested in languages which don't produce models of some sort. Surely models are the whole point? |
17618 | Set-theory tracks the contours of mathematical depth and fruitfulness [Maddy] |
Full Idea: Our set-theoretic methods track the underlying contours of mathematical depth. ...What sets are, most fundamentally, is markers for these contours ...they are maximally effective trackers of certain trains of mathematical fruitfulness. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Defending the Axioms [2011], 3.4) | |
A reaction: This seems to make it more like a map of mathematics than the actual essence of mathematics. |
17614 | The connection of arithmetic to perception has been idealised away in modern infinitary mathematics [Maddy] |
Full Idea: Ordinary perceptual cognition is most likely involved in our grasp of elementary arithmetic, but ...this connection to the physical world has long since been idealized away in the infinitary structures of contemporary pure mathematics. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Defending the Axioms [2011], 2.3) | |
A reaction: Despite this, Maddy's quest is for a 'naturalistic' account of mathematics. She ends up defending 'objectivity' (and invoking Tyler Burge), rather than even modest realism. You can't 'idealise away' the counting of objects. I blame Cantor. |
10591 | Logicians use 'property' and 'set' interchangeably, with little hanging on it [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: In studying second-order logic one can think of relations and functions as extensional or intensional, or one can leave it open. Little turns on this here, and so words like 'property', 'class', and 'set' are used interchangeably. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Higher-Order Logic [2001], 2.2.1) | |
A reaction: Important. Students of the metaphysics of properties, who arrive with limited experience of logic, are bewildered by this attitude. Note that the metaphysics is left wide open, so never let logicians hijack the metaphysical problem of properties. |
1823 | We can't seek for things if we have no idea of them [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: We could not seek for anything if we had not some notion of it. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.21 |
1824 | To name something, you must already have an idea of what it is [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: We could not give names to things, if we had not a preliminary notion of what the things were. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.21 |
5949 | Epicurus says colours are relative to the eye, not intrinsic to bodies [Epicurus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Epicurus says that colours are not intrinsic to bodies but a result of certain arrangements and positions relative to the eye, which implies that body is no more colourless than coloured. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE], Fr 30) by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes §1110 | |
A reaction: This seems to me such a self-evident truth that I am puzzled as to why anyone would claim that colours are real features of bodies. Epicurus points out that entering a dark room we see no colour, but then colour appears after a while. |
1821 | Sensations cannot be judged, because similar sensations have equal value, and different ones have nothing in common [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Sensation is out of reach of control, because one sensation cannot judge another which resembles itself, as they have equal value, and different sensations have different objects. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.20 | |
A reaction: Scepticism about the possibility of purely empirical knowledge; an interesting comment on the question of whether perceptions contain any intrinsic knowledge. |
1820 | The criteria of truth are senses, preconceptions and passions [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: The criteria of truth are the senses, the preconceptions, and the passions. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.20 |
1822 | Reason can't judge senses, as it is based on them [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Reason cannot judge the senses, because it is based on them. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.20 |
4549 | Epicurus denied knowledge in order to retain morality or hedonism as the highest values [Nietzsche on Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Epicurus denied the possibility of knowledge in order to retain moral (or hedonistic) values as the highest values. | |
From: comment on Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - The Will to Power (notebooks) §578 | |
A reaction: The history of philosophy suggests that this dichotomy is unnecessary. Dogmatist place a high value on multitudes of things. |
2668 | Epicurus says if one of a man's senses ever lies, none of his senses should ever be believed [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Epicurus says that if one sense has told a lie once in a man's life, no sense must ever be believed. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - Academica II.25.79 |
1487 | When entering a dark room it is colourless, but colour gradually appears [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: On entering a dark room we see no colour, but do so after waiting a short time. | |
From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]), quoted by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes 1110d |
1483 | Bath water is too hot for some, too cold for others [Epicurus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: In the very same bath some treat the water as too hot, others as too cold. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes 1109b |
1482 | If two people disagree over taste, who is right? [Epicurus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: If one person says the wine is dry and the other that it is sweet, and neither errs in his sensation, how is the wine any more dry than sweet? | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes 1109b |
14526 | The rational soul is in the chest, and the non-rational soul is spread through the body [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Democritus and Epicurus say the soul has two parts, one which is rational and is situated in the chest area, and the other which is non-rational and is spread throughout the entire compound of the body | |
From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) | |
A reaction: [source Aetius 4.4.6] |
6035 | Soul is made of four stuffs, giving warmth, rest, motion and perception [Epicurus, by Aetius] |
Full Idea: Epicurus says the soul is a blend of fiery stuff (for bodily warmth), airy stuff (rest), breath (motion), and a nameless stuff (sense-perception). | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Aetius - fragments/reports 4.3.11 | |
A reaction: Obviously Epicurus thought the four stuffs were different combinations of atoms, rather than being elements. Is there no stuff which gives reason? Reason must reduce to motion, presumably. |
6018 | Epicurus was the first to see the free will problem, and he was a libertarian [Epicurus, by Long/Sedley] |
Full Idea: By posing the problem of determinism, Epicurus became arguably the first philosopher to recognise the philosophical centrality of what we call the Free Will Question. His strongly libertarian approach is strongly contrasted with Stoic determinism. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by AA Long / DN Sedley - Hellenic Philosophers commentary | |
A reaction: Epicurus introduced the rather dubious 'swerve' of the atoms to make room for free will. It seems to me more consistent to stick with the determinism of Democritus. Zeno became a determinist in reaction to Epicurus. |
20922 | Epicurus showed that the swerve can give free motion in the atoms [Epicurus, by Diogenes of Oen.] |
Full Idea: There is a free motion in the atoms, which Democritus did not discover, but which Epicurus brought to light, and which consists in a swerve, as he demonstrated on the basis of what is seen to be the case? | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes (Oen) - Wall inscription 54.II-III | |
A reaction: I presume the last bit means that we see that we have freedom of choice, and infer the swerve in the atoms as the only possible explanation. The worry for libertarians is, of course, who is in charge of the swerve. |
14516 | There is no necessity to live with necessity [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Necessity is a bad thing, but there is no necessity to live with necessity. | |
From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE], 9) |
1909 | How can pleasure or judgement occur in a heap of atoms? [Sext.Empiricus on Epicurus] |
Full Idea: If Epicurus makes the end consist in pleasure and asserts that the soul, like all else, is composed of atoms, it is impossible to explain how in a heap of atoms there can come about pleasure, or judgement of the good. | |
From: comment on Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Sextus Empiricus - Outlines of Pyrrhonism III.187 | |
A reaction: This is a nice statement of the mind-body problem. Ontologically, physics still seems to present reality as a 'heap of particles', which gives no basis for the emergence of anything as strange as consciousness. But then magnetism is pretty strange. |
7814 | It was Epicurus who made the question of the will's freedom central to ethics [Epicurus, by Grayling] |
Full Idea: Epicurus was responsible for the innovatory recognition that the question of the will's freedom is central to ethics. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by A.C. Grayling - What is Good? Ch.3 | |
A reaction: Compare Ideas 7672 and 6018. Obviously ethical action needs freedom, but the idea of a 'free will' is quite different. It is a fiction, created to give some sort of arrogant ultimate responsibility to our actions, like God. |
3562 | Fine things are worthless if they give no pleasure [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: I spit on the fine and those who emptily admire it, when it doesn't make any pleasure. | |
From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]), quoted by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness Ch.16 | |
A reaction: in Athenaeus |
1840 | Pleasure is the chief good because it is the most natural, especially for animals [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Pleasure is the chief good, because all animals from the moment of their birth are delighted with pleasure and offended by pain by their natural instinct, without the employment of reason. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.29 | |
A reaction: The highest pleasure of predators is likely to be the killing of weaker animals. What all animals do isn't much of a criterion for the natural chief good. They also breathe. |
3557 | The end for Epicurus is static pleasure [Epicurus, by Annas] |
Full Idea: Epicurus identifies our final end with what he calls tranquillity or 'ataraxia', which is static pleasure. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness Ch.7 | |
A reaction: I don't recall any Greek ever spotting that boredom is a problem. But then they didn't have privacy, so other people always hold their attention. Maybe this is a dream of privacy. |
1839 | Pains of the soul are worse than pains of the body, because it feels the past and future [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: The pains of the soul are worst, for the flesh is only sensible of present affliction, but the soul feels the past, present and future. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.29 | |
A reaction: I don't think feeling extended across time is very relevant. What matters is that pains of the soul usually endure far longer than physical suffering. |
1842 | Pleasures only differ in their duration and the part of the body affected [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: If every pleasure lasted long, and affected the whole body, then there would be no difference between one pleasure and another | |
From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.31.08 | |
A reaction: This seems to miss out on intensity, which is of great importance to most pleasure seekers. Also it is a pleasure to be alive, which is lifelong, but we barely notice it. |
1845 | Justice has no independent existence, but arises entirely from keeping contracts [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Justice has no independent existence; it results from mutual contracts, and establishes itself wherever there is a mutual engagement to guard against doing or sustaining mutual injury. | |
From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.31.35 |
1841 | We choose virtue because of pleasure, not for its own sake [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: We choose the virtues for the sake of pleasure, and not on their own account. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.30 |
1829 | A wise man would be happy even under torture [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Even if the wise man were put to the torture, he would still be happy. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.26 |
1843 | Friendship is by far the most important ingredient of a complete and happy life [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Of all the things which wisdom provides for the happiness of the whole life, by far the most important is the acquisition of friendship. | |
From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.31.28 |
1831 | Wise men should partake of life even if they go blind [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Even though he lose his eyes, a wise man should still partake of life. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.26 |
12044 | Only Epicurus denied purpose in nature, for the whole world, or for its parts [Epicurus, by Annas] |
Full Idea: Epicurus alone among the ancient schools denies that in nature we find any teleological explanations. Nothing in nature is for anything, neither the world as a whole nor anything in it. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Julia Annas - Ancient Philosophy: very short introduction | |
A reaction: This may explain the controversial position that epicureanism held in the seventeenth century, as well as its incipient atheism. |
20907 | Democritus says atoms have size and shape, and Epicurus added weight [Epicurus, by Ps-Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Democritus said that the properties of the atoms are in number two, magnitude and shape, but Epicurus added to these a third one, weight. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Pseudo-Plutarch - On the Doctrine of the Philosophers 1.3.18 | |
A reaction: The addition of Epicurus seems very sensible, and an odd omission by Democritus. He seems to think that atoms have a uniform density, so that volume indicates weight. |
21669 | Atoms don't swerve by being struck, because they move in parallel, so the swerve is uncaused [Cicero on Epicurus] |
Full Idea: The swerve of Epicurus takes place without a cause; it does not take place in consequence of being struck by another atom, since how can that take place if they are indivisible bodies travelling perpendicularly in straight lines by the force of gravity? | |
From: comment on Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 10.22 | |
A reaction: The swerve is the most ad hoc proposal in the history of theoretical physics. This is interesting for spelling out that the travel in vertical parallels. What's that all about, then? |
21680 | What causes atomic swerves? Do they draw lots? What decides the size or number of swerves? [Cicero on Epicurus] |
Full Idea: What fresh cause exists in nature to make the atom swerve (or do the atoms cast lots among them which is to swerve and which not?), or to serve as the reason for making a very small swerve and not a large one, or one swerve, and not two or three swerves? | |
From: comment on Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 20.46 | |
A reaction: This is an appeal to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which seems to be the main ground for rejecting the swerve. The only reason to accept the swerve is reluctance to accept determinism or fatalism. |
14525 | Stoics say time is incorporeal and self-sufficient; Epicurus says it is a property of properties of things [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Stoics posited that time is an incorporeal which is conceived of all by itself, while Epicurus thinks that it is an accident of certain things, ...and he called in a property of properties. | |
From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) | |
A reaction: [Source Sextus 'Adversus Mathematicos' 10.219-227] |
2637 | For Epicureans gods are made of atoms, and are not eternal [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: For Epicureans the gods are made of atoms, so in that case they are not eternal. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') I.68 |
2633 | Epicurus saw that gods must exist, because nature has imprinted them on human minds [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Epicurus alone saw that gods must exist because nature herself has imprinted an idea of them in the minds of all mankind. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') I.43 |
2639 | Some say Epicurus only pretended to believe in the gods, so as not to offend Athenians [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Some believe that Epicurus gave lip-service only to the gods, so as not to offend the Athenians, but in fact did not believe in them. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') I.84 |
14527 | If god answered prayers we would be destroyed, because we pray for others to suffer [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: If god acted in accordance with the prayers of men, all men would rather quickly be destroyed, since they constantly pray for many sufferings to befall each other. | |
From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) | |
A reaction: [source Maximus the Abbott 'Gnom.' 14] |