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All the ideas for 'Realism in Mathematics', 'Lectures on Aesthetics' and 'Killing and Letting Die'

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16 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Genuine truth is the resolution of the highest contradiction [Hegel]
     Full Idea: The highest truth, truth as such, is the resolution of the highest opposition and contradiction.
     From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on Aesthetics [1826], I: 99), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 09 'Art'
     A reaction: Uneasy about the word 'highest', and the general Hegelian dream of 'resolving' contradictions, rather than just eliminating at least one component of them. No one else uses the word 'truth' like this. I suppose this Truth has a capital 'T'.
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
What I hold true must also be part of my feelings and character [Hegel]
     Full Idea: Whatever I hold as true, whatever ought to be valid for me, must also be in my feeling, must belong to my being and character.
     From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on Aesthetics [1826], I: 97), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 09 'Philosophy'
     A reaction: I can see that truths do tend to become part of our character, but not that they ought to do so. I suppose I try to live my life enmeshed in the many truths which I have personally selected from the maelstrom of possibilities that engulf us.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
Maddy replaces pure sets with just objects and perceived sets of objects [Maddy, by Shapiro]
     Full Idea: Maddy dispenses with pure sets, by sketching a strong set theory in which everything is either a physical object or a set of sets of ...physical objects. Eventually a physiological story of perception will extend to sets of physical objects.
     From: report of Penelope Maddy (Realism in Mathematics [1990]) by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 8.3
     A reaction: This doesn't seem to find many supporters, but if we accept the perception of resemblances as innate (as in Hume and Quine), it is isn't adding much to see that we intrinsically see things in groups.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
A natural number is a property of sets [Maddy, by Oliver]
     Full Idea: Maddy takes a natural number to be a certain property of sui generis sets, the property of having a certain number of members.
     From: report of Penelope Maddy (Realism in Mathematics [1990], 3 §2) by Alex Oliver - The Metaphysics of Properties
     A reaction: [I believe Maddy has shifted since then] Presumably this will make room for zero and infinities as natural numbers. Personally I want my natural numbers to count things.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 2. Intuition of Mathematics
Intuition doesn't support much mathematics, and we should question its reliability [Maddy, by Shapiro]
     Full Idea: Maddy says that intuition alone does not support very much mathematics; more importantly, a naturalist cannot accept intuition at face value, but must ask why we are justified in relying on intuition.
     From: report of Penelope Maddy (Realism in Mathematics [1990]) by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 8.3
     A reaction: It depends what you mean by 'intuition', but I identify with her second objection, that every faculty must ultimately be subject to criticism, which seems to point to a fairly rationalist view of things.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
We know mind-independent mathematical truths through sets, which rest on experience [Maddy, by Jenkins]
     Full Idea: Maddy proposes that we can know (some) mind-independent mathematical truths through knowing about sets, and that we can obtain knowledge of sets through experience.
     From: report of Penelope Maddy (Realism in Mathematics [1990]) by Carrie Jenkins - Grounding Concepts 6.5
     A reaction: Maddy has since backed off from this, and now tries to merely defend 'objectivity' about sets (2011:114). My amateurish view is that she is overrating the importance of sets, which merely model mathematics. Look at category theory.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
It is not true that killing and allowing to die (or acts and omissions) are morally indistinguishable [Foot]
     Full Idea: Many philosophers (e.g. Rachels) have argued that there is no morally relevant distinction between killing and allowing to die (or the related 'acts and omissions'),..as in not sending food, or sending poisoned food. I disagree.
     From: Philippa Foot (Killing and Letting Die [1985], p.78)
     A reaction: It appears that some omissions are worse than acts. It is more honest to just shoot an injured person, than to walk away and leave them to die. A range of cases.
Making a runaway tram kill one person instead of five is diverting a fatal sequence, not initiating one [Foot]
     Full Idea: If a runaway tram is heading towards a track on which five people are standing, and there is someone who can switch the points, diverting it onto a track where there is one person,...this is diverting a fatal sequence, not starting a new one.
     From: Philippa Foot (Killing and Letting Die [1985], p.85)
     A reaction: Suppose the one person was of immense community value, or someone you personally hated? Clearly she is interested in the agent's virtue, rather than the actual consequences.
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
Nineteenth century aesthetics focused on art rather than nature (thanks to Hegel) [Hegel, by Scruton]
     Full Idea: Only In the course of the nineteenth century, and in the wake of Hegel's posthumously published lectures on aesthetics, did the topic of art come to replace that of natural beauty as the core subject-matter of aesthetics.
     From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on Aesthetics [1826], 5) by Roger Scruton - Beauty: a very short introduction
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
Hegel largely ignores aesthetic pleasure, taste and beauty, and focuses on the meaning of artworks [Hegel, by Pinkard]
     Full Idea: Unlike his predecessors (including Kant), Hegel does not focus on aesthetic pleasure, nor on good taste, nor even on the nature and criteria for beauty. Instead he focuses on the meaning of artworks and their role in forming mankind's self-consciousness.
     From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on Aesthetics [1826]) by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 11
     A reaction: Personally I dislike over-intellectualising art. The aim of a work of art is to give a certain experience, not to generate an ensuing sequence of theorising. I doubt whether Vermeer had any 'meaning' in mind in his obsessive work.
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
Natural beauty is unimportant, because it doesn't show human freedom [Hegel, by Pinkard]
     Full Idea: Hegel thinks that natural beauty is of no real significance since it cannot display our freedom to us; nature per se is meaningless.
     From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on Aesthetics [1826]) by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 11
     A reaction: Presumably freedom is in the creation, and so creativity is what matters in aesthetics. But what are the criteria of good creativity?
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 6. Art as Institution
For Hegel the importance of art concerns the culture, not the individual [Hegel, by Eldridge]
     Full Idea: Hegel locates the significance of art in its role in cultural life in general, not in relation to the psychological needs of individuals.
     From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on Aesthetics [1826]) by Richard Eldridge - G.W.F. Hegel (aesthetics) 1
     A reaction: I'm beginning to see that art is a wonderful focus and test case for political attitudes. Roughly, liberalism focuses on individual responses, but more societal views (from right and left) see it in terms of role in the community. Which are you?
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 6. Value of Art
The purpose of art is to reveal to Spirit its own nature [Hegel, by Davies,S]
     Full Idea: According to Hegel, the goal of art was to serve as a phase in a process by which Spirit would come to understand its own nature.
     From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on Aesthetics [1826]) by Stephen Davies - The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) 2.7
     A reaction: I try very hard to understand ideas like this. Really really hard. However, since I see little sign of 'Spirit' really understanding its own nature, I'm guessing that the project is not going well.
The main purpose of art is to express the unity of human life [Hegel]
     Full Idea: Art's primary function, for Hegel, is to give expression to the unity and wholeness of life - especially human life - that the contingencies of everyday existence frequently conceal.
     From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on Aesthetics [1826]), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 09 'Beauty'
     A reaction: I don't find the view that human life is 'unified' and 'whole' vary illuminating, and I have no objection to art which reflects the fragmentary and unstable aspects of life. I suspect Hegel would just prefer it if life were a unity.
Art forms a bridge between the sensuous world and the world of pure thought [Hegel]
     Full Idea: Spirit generates out of itself works of fine art as the first reconciling middle term between pure thought and what is merely external, sensuous and transient - between finite natural reality and the infinite freedom of conceptual thinking.
     From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on Aesthetics [1826], p.8), quoted by Richard Eldridge - G.W.F. Hegel (aesthetics)
     A reaction: This apparently says that there is necessarily an intellectual and conceptual component in art. This means little to me. Does he include portraits? Dutch domestic scenes? Would photography qualify?
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
The right of non-interference (with a 'negative duty'), and the right to goods/services ('positive') [Foot]
     Full Idea: There are rights to non-interference (and their corresponding "negative duties"), and the rights to goods and services (with corresponding "positive duties"). Interference usually needs more justification than withholding goods.
     From: Philippa Foot (Killing and Letting Die [1985], p.82)
     A reaction: This invites the question of which is the stronger, and whether paternalism can overrule non-interference, or an expectation of self-sufficiency overrule the positive rights.