7 ideas
8755 | Maddy replaces pure sets with just objects and perceived sets of objects [Maddy, by Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Maddy dispenses with pure sets, by sketching a strong set theory in which everything is either a physical object or a set of sets of ...physical objects. Eventually a physiological story of perception will extend to sets of physical objects. | |
From: report of Penelope Maddy (Realism in Mathematics [1990]) by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 8.3 | |
A reaction: This doesn't seem to find many supporters, but if we accept the perception of resemblances as innate (as in Hume and Quine), it is isn't adding much to see that we intrinsically see things in groups. |
10718 | A natural number is a property of sets [Maddy, by Oliver] |
Full Idea: Maddy takes a natural number to be a certain property of sui generis sets, the property of having a certain number of members. | |
From: report of Penelope Maddy (Realism in Mathematics [1990], 3 §2) by Alex Oliver - The Metaphysics of Properties | |
A reaction: [I believe Maddy has shifted since then] Presumably this will make room for zero and infinities as natural numbers. Personally I want my natural numbers to count things. |
8756 | Intuition doesn't support much mathematics, and we should question its reliability [Maddy, by Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Maddy says that intuition alone does not support very much mathematics; more importantly, a naturalist cannot accept intuition at face value, but must ask why we are justified in relying on intuition. | |
From: report of Penelope Maddy (Realism in Mathematics [1990]) by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 8.3 | |
A reaction: It depends what you mean by 'intuition', but I identify with her second objection, that every faculty must ultimately be subject to criticism, which seems to point to a fairly rationalist view of things. |
17733 | We know mind-independent mathematical truths through sets, which rest on experience [Maddy, by Jenkins] |
Full Idea: Maddy proposes that we can know (some) mind-independent mathematical truths through knowing about sets, and that we can obtain knowledge of sets through experience. | |
From: report of Penelope Maddy (Realism in Mathematics [1990]) by Carrie Jenkins - Grounding Concepts 6.5 | |
A reaction: Maddy has since backed off from this, and now tries to merely defend 'objectivity' about sets (2011:114). My amateurish view is that she is overrating the importance of sets, which merely model mathematics. Look at category theory. |
8840 | There are five possible responses to the problem of infinite regress in justification [Cleve] |
Full Idea: Sceptics respond to the regress problem by denying knowledge; Foundationalists accept justifications without reasons; Positists say reasons terminate is mere posits; Coherentists say mutual support is justification; Infinitists accept the regress. | |
From: James Van Cleve (Why coherence is not enough [2005], I) | |
A reaction: A nice map of the territory. The doubts of Scepticism are not strong enough for anyone to embrace the view; Foundationalist destroy knowledge (?), as do Positists; Infinitism is a version of Coherentism - which is the winner. |
8841 | Modern foundationalists say basic beliefs are fallible, and coherence is relevant [Cleve] |
Full Idea: Contemporary foundationalists are seldom of the strong Cartesian variety: they do not insist that basic beliefs be absolutely certain. They also tend to allow that coherence can enhance justification. | |
From: James Van Cleve (Why coherence is not enough [2005], III) | |
A reaction: It strikes me that they have got onto a slippery slope. How certain are the basic beliefs? How do you evaluate their certainty? Could incoherence in their implications undermine them? Skyscrapers need perfect foundations. |
17060 | Best Explanation is the core notion of epistemology [Harman, by Smart] |
Full Idea: Gilbert Harman introduced the term 'inference to the best explanation', and argued that it is the core notion of epistemology. | |
From: report of Gilbert Harman (The Inference to the Best Explanation [1974]) by J.J.C. Smart - Explanation - Opening Address p. 01 | |
A reaction: Hard to assess that, but it sounds right. I'm a fan of coherence theories of justification, and also coherence theories of explanation, and there is a neat package there somewhere. |