56 ideas
22317 | Truth does not admit of more and less [Frege] |
Full Idea: What is only half true is untrue. Truth does not admit of more and less. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (works [1890], CP 353), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 48 'Truth' | |
A reaction: What about a measurement which is accurate to three decimal places? Maybe being 'close to' the truth is not the same as being 'more' true. The truth about a distance between two points is unknowable? |
13455 | Frege did not think of himself as working with sets [Frege, by Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: Frege did not think of himself as working with sets. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 1 | |
A reaction: One can hardly blame him, given that set theory was only just being invented. |
16895 | The null set is indefensible, because it collects nothing [Frege, by Burge] |
Full Idea: Frege regarded the null set as an indefensible entity from the point of view of iterative set theory. It collects nothing. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by Tyler Burge - Frege on Apriority (with ps) 2 | |
A reaction: The null set defines the possibility that something could be collected. At the very least, it introduces curly brackets into the language. |
17610 | The Axiom of Choice paradoxically allows decomposing a sphere into two identical spheres [Maddy] |
Full Idea: One feature of the Axiom of Choice that troubled many mathematicians was the so-called Banach-Tarski paradox: using the Axiom, a sphere can be decomposed into finitely many parts and those parts reassembled into two spheres the same size as the original. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Defending the Axioms [2011], 1.3) | |
A reaction: (The key is that the parts are non-measurable). To an outsider it is puzzling that the Axiom has been universally accepted, even though it produces such a result. Someone can explain that, I'm sure. |
3328 | Frege proposed a realist concept of a set, as the extension of a predicate or concept or function [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Contrary to Dedekind's anti-realism, Frege proposed a realist definition of a set as the extension of a predicate (or concept, or function). | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.13 |
9179 | Frege frequently expressed a contempt for language [Frege, by Dummett] |
Full Idea: Frege frequently expressed a contempt for language. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890], p.228) by Michael Dummett - Frege's Distinction of Sense and Reference p.228 | |
A reaction: This strikes me as exactly the right attitude for a logician to have. Russell seems to have agreed. Attitudes to vagueness are the test case. Over-ambitious modern logicians dream of dealing with vagueness. Forget it. Stick to your last. |
13473 | Frege thinks there is an independent logical order of the truths, which we must try to discover [Frege, by Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: Frege thinks there is a single right deductive order of the truths. This is not an epistemic order, but a logical order, and it is our job to arrange our beliefs in this order if we can make it out. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 2 | |
A reaction: Frege's dream rests on the belief that there exists a huge set of logical truths. Pluralism, conventionalism, constructivism etc. about logic would challenge this dream. I think the defence of Frege must rest on Russellian rooting of logic in nature. |
17620 | Critics of if-thenism say that not all starting points, even consistent ones, are worth studying [Maddy] |
Full Idea: If-thenism denies that mathematics is in the business of discovering truths about abstracta. ...[their opponents] obviously don't regard any starting point, even a consistent one, as equally worthy of investigation. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Defending the Axioms [2011], 3.3) | |
A reaction: I have some sympathy with if-thenism, in that you can obviously study the implications of any 'if' you like, but deep down I agree with the critics. |
3319 | Frege gives a functional account of predication so that we can dispense with predicates [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: The whole point of Frege's functional account of predication lies in its allowing us to dispense with all properties across the board. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.9 |
6076 | For Frege, predicates are names of functions that map objects onto the True and False [Frege, by McGinn] |
Full Idea: For Frege, a predicate does not refer to the objects of which it is true, but to the function that maps these objects onto the True and False; ..a predicate is a name for this function. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by Colin McGinn - Logical Properties Ch.3 | |
A reaction: McGinn says this is close to the intuitive sense of a property. Perhaps 'predicates are what make objects the things they are?' |
9871 | Frege always, and fatally, neglected the domain of quantification [Dummett on Frege] |
Full Idea: Frege persistently neglected the question of the domain of quantification, which proved in the end to be fatal. | |
From: comment on Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics Ch.16 | |
A reaction: The 'fatality' refers to Russell's paradox, and the fact that not all concepts have extensions. Common sense now says that this is catastrophic. A domain of quantification is a topic of conversation, which is basic to all language. Cf. Idea 9874. |
16884 | Basic truths of logic are not proved, but seen as true when they are understood [Frege, by Burge] |
Full Idea: In Frege's view axioms are basic truth, and basic truths do not need proof. Basic truths can be (justifiably) recognised as true by understanding their content. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by Tyler Burge - Frege on Knowing the Foundations 1 | |
A reaction: This is the underpinning of the rationalism in Frege's philosophy. |
17605 | Hilbert's geometry and Dedekind's real numbers were role models for axiomatization [Maddy] |
Full Idea: At the end of the nineteenth century there was a renewed emphasis on rigor, the central tool of which was axiomatization, along the lines of Hilbert's axioms for geometry and Dedekind's axioms for real numbers. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Defending the Axioms [2011], 1.3) |
17625 | If two mathematical themes coincide, that suggest a single deep truth [Maddy] |
Full Idea: The fact that two apparently fruitful mathematical themes turn out to coincide makes it all the more likely that they're tracking a genuine strain of mathematical depth. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Defending the Axioms [2011], 5.3ii) |
17615 | Every infinite set of reals is either countable or of the same size as the full set of reals [Maddy] |
Full Idea: One form of the Continuum Hypothesis is the claim that every infinite set of reals is either countable or of the same size as the full set of reals. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Defending the Axioms [2011], 2.4 n40) |
3331 | If '5' is the set of all sets with five members, that may be circular, and you can know a priori if the set has content [Benardete,JA on Frege] |
Full Idea: There is a suspicion that Frege's definition of 5 (as the set of all sets with 5 members) may be infected with circularity, …and how can we be sure on a priori grounds that 4 and 5 are not both empty sets, and hence identical? | |
From: comment on Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.14 |
17618 | Set-theory tracks the contours of mathematical depth and fruitfulness [Maddy] |
Full Idea: Our set-theoretic methods track the underlying contours of mathematical depth. ...What sets are, most fundamentally, is markers for these contours ...they are maximally effective trackers of certain trains of mathematical fruitfulness. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Defending the Axioms [2011], 3.4) | |
A reaction: This seems to make it more like a map of mathematics than the actual essence of mathematics. |
17614 | The connection of arithmetic to perception has been idealised away in modern infinitary mathematics [Maddy] |
Full Idea: Ordinary perceptual cognition is most likely involved in our grasp of elementary arithmetic, but ...this connection to the physical world has long since been idealized away in the infinitary structures of contemporary pure mathematics. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Defending the Axioms [2011], 2.3) | |
A reaction: Despite this, Maddy's quest is for a 'naturalistic' account of mathematics. She ends up defending 'objectivity' (and invoking Tyler Burge), rather than even modest realism. You can't 'idealise away' the counting of objects. I blame Cantor. |
16880 | Frege aimed to discover the logical foundations which justify arithmetical judgements [Frege, by Burge] |
Full Idea: Frege saw arithmetical judgements as resting on a foundation of logical principles, and the discovery of this foundation as a discovery of the nature and structure of the justification of arithmetical truths and judgments. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by Tyler Burge - Frege on Knowing the Foundations Intro | |
A reaction: Burge's point is that the logic justifies the arithmetic, as well as underpinning it. |
8689 | Eventually Frege tried to found arithmetic in geometry instead of in logic [Frege, by Friend] |
Full Idea: After the problem with Russell's paradox, Frege did not publish for fourteen years, and he then tried to re-found arithmetic in Euclidean geometry, rather than in logic. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890], 3.4) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 3.4 | |
A reaction: I take it that his new road would have led him to modern Structuralism, so I think he was probably on the right lines. Unfortunately Frege had already done enough for one good lifetime. |
5657 | Frege's logic showed that there is no concept of being [Frege, by Scruton] |
Full Idea: Frege's quantificational logic vindicates Kant's insight that existence is not a predicate and leads to fallacies when treated as one; and we might also say, despite Hegel, that there is no concept of being. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.17 | |
A reaction: I notice that Colin McGinn has questioned the value of quantificational logic. It is difficult to assert that 'there is no concept of x', if several people have written large books about it. |
3318 | Frege made identity a logical notion, enshrined above all in the formula 'for all x, x=x' [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: It was Frege who first made identity a logical notion, enshrining it above all in the formula (x) x=x. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.9 |
16885 | To understand a thought, understand its inferential connections to other thoughts [Frege, by Burge] |
Full Idea: Frege famously realised that understanding a thought requires understanding its inferential connections to other thoughts. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by Tyler Burge - Frege on Knowing the Foundations 1 | |
A reaction: If true, this is probably our greatest advance in grasping the concept of 'understanding' since Aristotle - but is it true? It is a striking and interesting idea, and central to the importance of Frege in modern analytic philosophy. |
16887 | Frege's concept of 'self-evident' makes no reference to minds [Frege, by Burge] |
Full Idea: Frege's terms that translate 'self-evident' usually make no explicit reference to actual minds. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by Tyler Burge - Frege on Knowing the Foundations 4 | |
A reaction: This follows the distinction in Aquinas, between things that are intrinsically self-evident, and things that are self-evident to particular people. God, presumably, knows all of the former. |
16894 | An apriori truth is grounded in generality, which is universal quantification [Frege, by Burge] |
Full Idea: Generality for Frege is simply universal quantification; what makes a truth apriori is that its ultimate grounds are universally quantified. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by Tyler Burge - Frege on Apriority (with ps) 2 |
16882 | The building blocks contain the whole contents of a discipline [Frege] |
Full Idea: The ultimate building blocks of a discipline contain, as it were in a nutshell, its whole contents. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (works [1890]), quoted by Tyler Burge - Frege on Knowing the Foundations 1 | |
A reaction: [Burge gives a reference] I would describe this nutshell as the 'essence' of the subject, and it fits Aristotle's concept of an essence perfectly. Does it fit biology or sociology, in the way it might fit maths or logic? Think of DNA or cells in biology. |
5816 | Frege said concepts were abstract entities, not mental entities [Frege, by Putnam] |
Full Idea: Frege, rebelling against 'psychologism', identified concepts (and hence 'intensions' or meanings) with abstract entities rather than mental entities. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by Hilary Putnam - Meaning and Reference p.119 | |
A reaction: This, of course, assumes that 'abstract' entities and 'mental' entities are quite distinct things. A concept is presumably a mental item which has content, and the word 'concept' is simply ambiguous, between the container and the contents. |
7307 | A thought is not psychological, but a condition of the world that makes a sentence true [Frege, by Miller,A] |
Full Idea: For Frege, a thought is not something psychological or subjective; rather, it is objective in the sense that it specifies some condition in the world the obtaining of which is necessary and sufficient for the truth of the sentence that expresses it. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by Alexander Miller - Philosophy of Language 2.2 | |
A reaction: It is worth emphasising Russell's anti-Berkeley point about 'ideas', that the idea is in the mind, but its contents are in the world. Since the contents are what matter, this endorses Frege, and also points towards modern externalism. |
7309 | Frege's 'sense' is the strict and literal meaning, stripped of tone [Frege, by Miller,A] |
Full Idea: Frege held that "and" and "but" have the same 'sense' but different 'tones' (note: they have the same truth tables); the sense of an expression is what a sentence strictly and literally means, stripped of its tone. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by Alexander Miller - Philosophy of Language 2.6 | |
A reaction: It seems important when studying Frege to remember what has been stripped out. In "he is a genius and he plays football", if you substitute 'but' for 'and', the new version says (literally?) something very distinctive about football. |
7312 | 'Sense' solves the problems of bearerless names, substitution in beliefs, and informativeness [Frege, by Miller,A] |
Full Idea: Frege's introduction of 'sense' was motivated by the desire to solve three problems: the problem of bearerless names, the problem of substitution in belief contexts, and the problem of informativeness. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by Alexander Miller - Philosophy of Language 2.9 | |
A reaction: A proposal which solves three problems sounds pretty good! These three problems can be used to test the counter-proposals of Russell and Kripke. |
7725 | 'P or not-p' seems to be analytic, but does not fit Kant's account, lacking clear subject or predicate [Frege, by Weiner] |
Full Idea: 'It is raining or it is not raining' appears to true because of the general principle 'p or not-p', so it is analytic; but this does not fit Kant's idea of an analytic truth, because it is not obvious that it has a subject concept or a predicate concept. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by Joan Weiner - Frege Ch.2 | |
A reaction: The general progress of logic seems to be a widening out to embrace problem sentences. However, see Idea 7315 for the next problem that arises with analyticity. All this culminates in Quine's attack (e.g. Idea 1624). |
7316 | Analytic truths are those that can be demonstrated using only logic and definitions [Frege, by Miller,A] |
Full Idea: Frege (according to Quine) characterises analytic truths as those that can be demonstrated or proved using only logical laws and definitions as premises. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by Alexander Miller - Philosophy of Language 4.2 | |
A reaction: This is the big shift away from the Kantian version (predicate contained in the subject) towards a modern version, perhaps fixed by a truth table giving true for all values. |
23616 | Legal excuses are duress, ignorance, and diminished responsibility [McMahan] |
Full Idea: The common legal practice is to distinguish three broad categories of excuse: duress, epistemic limitation, and diminished responsibility. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 3.2.1) | |
A reaction: McMahan cites these with reference to soldiers in wartime, but they have general application. The third one seems particularly open to very wide interpretation. Presumably I can't be excused by just being irresponsible. |
23606 | Liberty Rights are permissions, and Claim Rights are freedom from intervention [McMahan] |
Full Idea: There are two types of right. A Liberty right is merely a permission, meaning it is not wrong to do it. But a Claim right is a right against intervention, meaning no one has a liberty right to prevent it. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 2.3) | |
A reaction: There must also be a third type of right, which requires other people to perform actions on your behalf. If you pay for a book in a shop, you must then be given the book. |
23594 | Wars can be unjust, despite a just cause, if they are unnecessary or excessive or of mixed cause [McMahan] |
Full Idea: Wars can be unjust despite having a just cause, because they are not actually needed, or they will cause excessive harm, or they also pursue some unjust causes. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 1.1) | |
A reaction: [compressed] The point is that older writers often think that a 'just cause' is sufficient. He is obviously right. |
23595 | The worst unjustified wars have no aim at all [McMahan] |
Full Idea: The most serious reason why a war might be unjustified is that it lacks any justifying aim at all. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 1.1) | |
A reaction: It seems that Louis XIV invaded the Netherlands in around 1674 purely to enhance his own glory. That strikes me as worse. I supposed Ghenghis Khan invaded places simply because he enjoyed fighting. |
23598 | You (e.g. a police officer) are not liable to attack just because you pose a threat [McMahan] |
Full Idea: It is false that by posing a threat to another, one necessarily makes oneself liable to defensive action. A police officer who shoots an active murderer does not thereby by make herself liable to defensive action. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 1.2) | |
A reaction: This is one of his arguments against the moral equality of combatants. It is not morally OK to shoot all the local soldiers when you unjustly invade a territory. Sounds right to me. |
23619 | A defensive war is unjust, if it is responding to a just war [McMahan] |
Full Idea: It is possible for a defensive war to be unjust, when the defensive war to which it is a response is a just war. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 3.3.3) | |
A reaction: An example might be a state resisting an intervention from outside, when the state is in the process of exterminating some unwanted minority. Or perhaps the invaders are crossing the state's territory to achieve some admirable end. |
23597 | Just war theory says all and only persons posing a threat are liable to attack [McMahan] |
Full Idea: In mainstream just war theory (Anscombe, Nagel, Walzer) the criterion of liability to attack is simply posing a threat. Since all combatants pose a threat to each other, they are morally liable to attack; because noncombatants do not, they are not liable. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 1.2) | |
A reaction: McMahan says that the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate targets rests mostly on this basis. The problem is that a huge range of unarmed people can also pose various degrees of threat. |
23620 | A person or state may be attacked if they are responsible for an unjustified threat [McMahan] |
Full Idea: It is a necessary condition of liability to defensive attack that one be morally responsible for posing an objectively unjustified threat. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 4.1.1) | |
A reaction: This implies that one may not actually be doing the threatening (but merely ordering it, or enabling it). McMahan aims to have the same criteria for wartime as for peacetime. He denies Anscombe's claim that merely posing the threat is enough. |
23617 | If the unjust combatants are morally excused they are innocent, so how can they be killed? [McMahan] |
Full Idea: If most unjust combatants are morally innocent because they are excused, and if it is wrong to intentionally kill morally innocent people, then a contingent form of pacificism may be inescapable. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 3.3.1) | |
A reaction: A very nice argument against the moral equality of combatants. If I think we are the good guys, and the opposing troops are no morally different from us, how can I possibly kill them? |
23600 | Proportionality in fighting can't be judged independently of the justice of each side [McMahan] |
Full Idea: There is simply no satisfactory understanding of proportionality in war that can be applied independently of whether the acts that are evaluated support a just or an unjust cause. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 1.3) | |
A reaction: He rejects traditional just war theory, which sees both sides as morally equal in combat, and hence equally subject to the principles of proportional response. But the just can then be harsher, when their just principles should make them milder. |
23603 | Can an army start an unjust war, and then fight justly to defend their own civilians? [McMahan] |
Full Idea: There is a paradox if the unjust are justified in fighting the just in order to protect their own civilians who have been endangered by the starting of an unjust war. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 2.1) | |
A reaction: [my summary of MacMahan pp.48-49] It suggests that in a war there may be local concepts of justice which are at odds with the general situation - which is the ad bellum/in bello distinction. But this is the justice of fighting, not how it is conducted. |
23611 | Soldiers cannot freely fight in unjust wars, just because they behave well when fighting [McMahan] |
Full Idea: We must stop reassuring soldiers that they act permissibly when they fight in an unjust war, provided that they conduct themselve honorably on the battlefield by fighting in accordance with the rules of engagement. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 2.8) | |
A reaction: This culminates McMahan's arguments against the moral equality of combatants, and against the sharp division of justice of war from justice in war. How rare it is for philosophy to culminate in a policy recommendation! |
23612 | The law of war differs from criminal law; attacking just combatants is immoral, but legal [McMahan] |
Full Idea: Unlike domestic criminal law, the law of war is designed not to protect moral rights but to prevent harm. …This means when unjust combatants attack just combatants they violate their moral rights, yet they act within their legal rights. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 3.1.1) | |
A reaction: He says we must bring the law of war much closer to the morality of war. If there is any hope of slowly eliminating war, it may lie in reforms such as these. |
23596 | If all combatants are seen as morally equal, that facilitates starting unjust wars [McMahan] |
Full Idea: It would be naïve to doubt that the widespread acceptance of the moral equality of combatants has facilitated the ability of governments to fight unjust wars. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 1.1) | |
A reaction: The point is that their armies are both compliant and seeing their actions as guiltless, which makes them perfect tools for evil. McMahan's ideal is an army which asks sharp questions about the justification of the war, before they fight it. |
23599 | You don't become a legitimate target, just because you violently resist an unjust attack [McMahan] |
Full Idea: It is hard to see how just combatants could become legitimate targets simply by offering violent resistance to unjust attacks by unjust coombatants. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 1.3) | |
A reaction: It is, however, hard to criticise a soldier who is dragged into fighting for an unjust cause, and then kills just defenders in the course of the fight. Once the bullets fly, normal morality seems to be suspended. Just survive. |
23604 | Volunteer soldiers accept the risk of attack, but they don't agree to it, or to their deaths [McMahan] |
Full Idea: When soldiers go to war, they undoubtedly assume a certain risk. They voluntarily expose themselves to a significant risk of being attacked. But this is entirely different from consenting to being attacked. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 2.2.1) | |
A reaction: This is his response to Walzer's thought that soldiers resemble people who volunteer for a boxing match. The sailors at Pearl Harbour obviously didn't consent to the attack, or accept the Japanese right to kill them. |
23605 | Soldiers cannot know enough facts to evaluate the justice of their war [McMahan] |
Full Idea: When soldiers are commanded to fight, they cannot reasonably be expected to have the factual knowledge necessary to evaluate the war as just or unjust. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 2.3) | |
A reaction: This is part of the 'epistemic' justification for a soldier to fight in an unjust war. Sometimes soldiers do have enoough knowledge, especially if they join up late on in a war, when they have studied and observed its progress. |
23608 | If being part of a big collective relieves soldiers of moral responsibility, why not the leaders too? [McMahan] |
Full Idea: If acting as an agent of a political collective justifies the combatants fighting an unjust war, that should also release the leaders from responsibility for their role in the fighting of that war. No one ever explains why this is not so. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 2.5) | |
A reaction: At the very least there seems to be a problem of the cut off point between innocent soldiers and culpable leaders. Which rank in the army or executive triggers the blame? |
23610 | If soldiers can't refuse to fight in unjust wars, can they choose to fight in just wars? [McMahan] |
Full Idea: There is a certain symmetry here. The permissibility of disobeying a command to fight in an unjust war suggests the permissibility of disobeying a command not to fight in a just war. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 2.7) | |
A reaction: The argument considered here is that since we could never allow soldiers to choose to fight in their own wars, we similarly cannot let them opt out of the official wars. Implying obedience is absolute. Soldiers don't get to 'choose' anything! |
23613 | Equality is both sides have permission, or both sides are justified, or one justified the other permitted [McMahan] |
Full Idea: Moral equality means either 1) because just combatants are permitted to fight in a just way, so are the unjust , or 2) because the just are justified, so are the unjust, or 3) because the just are justified, the unjust are therefore permitted. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 3.1.2) | |
A reaction: [summary] McMahan calls 1) the weak version, and 2) the strong. He suggests that although 3) is unusual, it is what most people believe - that if the good are justified, the bad are permitted to fight back. He rejects them all. |
23615 | Fighting unjustly under duress does not justify it, or permit it, but it may excuse it [McMahan] |
Full Idea: It is said that combatants are compelled to fight; they have no choice. But duress is not a justification; nor does it ground a permission - not even a subjective permission. It is, instead, an excusing condition. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 3.1.2) | |
A reaction: The 'subjective' permission is believing you are just, even if you aren't. A nice, accurate and true distinction made by McMahan, I think. It is roughly our postwar attitude to the Nazi army. |
23602 | Innocence implies not being morally responsible, rather than merely being guiltless [McMahan] |
Full Idea: My alternative conception is that one is 'innocent' if one is neither morally responsible for nor guilty of a wrong. Classical theory focused on guilt, but I think we should focus on moral responsibility (which is something less). | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 1.4) | |
A reaction: This seems to make the supporters of evil equally liable to attack with its perpetrators. But you can observe perpetration a lot more easily than you can observe support. |
23618 | Unconditional surrender can't be demanded, since evil losers still have legitimate conditions [McMahan] |
Full Idea: Achieving unconditional surrender can never be a justification for the continuation of war, since there are always conditions that a vanquished adversary, no matter how evil, can be justified in demanding. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 3.3.1) | |
A reaction: McMahan is particularly discussing Hiroshima, but this also applies to the European war in 1945. Presumably a civilised victor will grant the conditions which the losers would have demanded, and that probably happened in 1945. It's about power. |
3307 | Frege put forward an ontological argument for the existence of numbers [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Frege put forward an ontological argument for the existence of numbers. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.4 |