7 ideas
8755 | Maddy replaces pure sets with just objects and perceived sets of objects [Maddy, by Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Maddy dispenses with pure sets, by sketching a strong set theory in which everything is either a physical object or a set of sets of ...physical objects. Eventually a physiological story of perception will extend to sets of physical objects. | |
From: report of Penelope Maddy (Realism in Mathematics [1990]) by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 8.3 | |
A reaction: This doesn't seem to find many supporters, but if we accept the perception of resemblances as innate (as in Hume and Quine), it is isn't adding much to see that we intrinsically see things in groups. |
10718 | A natural number is a property of sets [Maddy, by Oliver] |
Full Idea: Maddy takes a natural number to be a certain property of sui generis sets, the property of having a certain number of members. | |
From: report of Penelope Maddy (Realism in Mathematics [1990], 3 §2) by Alex Oliver - The Metaphysics of Properties | |
A reaction: [I believe Maddy has shifted since then] Presumably this will make room for zero and infinities as natural numbers. Personally I want my natural numbers to count things. |
8756 | Intuition doesn't support much mathematics, and we should question its reliability [Maddy, by Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Maddy says that intuition alone does not support very much mathematics; more importantly, a naturalist cannot accept intuition at face value, but must ask why we are justified in relying on intuition. | |
From: report of Penelope Maddy (Realism in Mathematics [1990]) by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 8.3 | |
A reaction: It depends what you mean by 'intuition', but I identify with her second objection, that every faculty must ultimately be subject to criticism, which seems to point to a fairly rationalist view of things. |
17733 | We know mind-independent mathematical truths through sets, which rest on experience [Maddy, by Jenkins] |
Full Idea: Maddy proposes that we can know (some) mind-independent mathematical truths through knowing about sets, and that we can obtain knowledge of sets through experience. | |
From: report of Penelope Maddy (Realism in Mathematics [1990]) by Carrie Jenkins - Grounding Concepts 6.5 | |
A reaction: Maddy has since backed off from this, and now tries to merely defend 'objectivity' about sets (2011:114). My amateurish view is that she is overrating the importance of sets, which merely model mathematics. Look at category theory. |
8978 | Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett] |
Full Idea: Events are not basic items in the universe; they should not be included in any fundamental ontology...all the truths about them are entailed by and explained and made true by truths that do not involve the event concept. | |
From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.12), quoted by Peter Simons - Events 3.1 | |
A reaction: Given the variable time spans of events, their ability to coincide, their ability to contain no motion, their blatantly conventional component, and their recalcitrance to individuation, I say Bennett is right. |
7270 | Historical interpretation aims to recapture the author's view of the work [Croce] |
Full Idea: Historical interpretation enables us to see a work of art as its author saw it in the moment of production. | |
From: Benedetto Croce (Aesthetic as Science of Expression [1902], §II), quoted by W Wimsatt/W Beardsley - The Intentional Fallacy §II | |
A reaction: Wimsatt and Beardsley quote this as the romantic antithesis of their own view, but there is a blurring between understanding a work and judging. Personally I consider intentions essential for understanding, and valuable for judgement. |
10364 | Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett] |
Full Idea: Facts are not the sort of item that can cause anything. A fact is a true proposition (they say); it is not something in the world but is rather something about the world. | |
From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.22), quoted by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.1 | |
A reaction: Compare 10361. Good argument, but maybe 'fact' is ambiguous. See Idea 10365. Events are said to be more concrete, and so can do the job, but their individuation also seems to depend on a description (as Davidson has pointed out). |