17 ideas
17610 | The Axiom of Choice paradoxically allows decomposing a sphere into two identical spheres [Maddy] |
Full Idea: One feature of the Axiom of Choice that troubled many mathematicians was the so-called Banach-Tarski paradox: using the Axiom, a sphere can be decomposed into finitely many parts and those parts reassembled into two spheres the same size as the original. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Defending the Axioms [2011], 1.3) | |
A reaction: (The key is that the parts are non-measurable). To an outsider it is puzzling that the Axiom has been universally accepted, even though it produces such a result. Someone can explain that, I'm sure. |
17620 | Critics of if-thenism say that not all starting points, even consistent ones, are worth studying [Maddy] |
Full Idea: If-thenism denies that mathematics is in the business of discovering truths about abstracta. ...[their opponents] obviously don't regard any starting point, even a consistent one, as equally worthy of investigation. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Defending the Axioms [2011], 3.3) | |
A reaction: I have some sympathy with if-thenism, in that you can obviously study the implications of any 'if' you like, but deep down I agree with the critics. |
17605 | Hilbert's geometry and Dedekind's real numbers were role models for axiomatization [Maddy] |
Full Idea: At the end of the nineteenth century there was a renewed emphasis on rigor, the central tool of which was axiomatization, along the lines of Hilbert's axioms for geometry and Dedekind's axioms for real numbers. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Defending the Axioms [2011], 1.3) |
17625 | If two mathematical themes coincide, that suggest a single deep truth [Maddy] |
Full Idea: The fact that two apparently fruitful mathematical themes turn out to coincide makes it all the more likely that they're tracking a genuine strain of mathematical depth. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Defending the Axioms [2011], 5.3ii) |
17615 | Every infinite set of reals is either countable or of the same size as the full set of reals [Maddy] |
Full Idea: One form of the Continuum Hypothesis is the claim that every infinite set of reals is either countable or of the same size as the full set of reals. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Defending the Axioms [2011], 2.4 n40) |
17618 | Set-theory tracks the contours of mathematical depth and fruitfulness [Maddy] |
Full Idea: Our set-theoretic methods track the underlying contours of mathematical depth. ...What sets are, most fundamentally, is markers for these contours ...they are maximally effective trackers of certain trains of mathematical fruitfulness. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Defending the Axioms [2011], 3.4) | |
A reaction: This seems to make it more like a map of mathematics than the actual essence of mathematics. |
17614 | The connection of arithmetic to perception has been idealised away in modern infinitary mathematics [Maddy] |
Full Idea: Ordinary perceptual cognition is most likely involved in our grasp of elementary arithmetic, but ...this connection to the physical world has long since been idealized away in the infinitary structures of contemporary pure mathematics. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Defending the Axioms [2011], 2.3) | |
A reaction: Despite this, Maddy's quest is for a 'naturalistic' account of mathematics. She ends up defending 'objectivity' (and invoking Tyler Burge), rather than even modest realism. You can't 'idealise away' the counting of objects. I blame Cantor. |
12893 | Contextualism says sceptical arguments are true, relative to their strict context [Cohen,S] |
Full Idea: Contextualism explains the appeal of sceptical arguments by allowing that the claims of the sceptic are true, relative to the very strict context in which they are made. | |
From: Stewart Cohen (Contextualism Defended [2005], p.57) | |
A reaction: This strikes me a right. I've always thought that global scepticism must be conceded if we are being very strict indeed about justification, but also that it is ridiculous to be that strict. So the epistemological question is 'How strict should we be?' |
12896 | Knowledge is context-sensitive, because justification is [Cohen,S] |
Full Idea: The context-sensitivity of knowledge is inherited from one of its components, i.e. justification. | |
From: Stewart Cohen (Contextualism Defended [2005], p.68) | |
A reaction: I think this is exactly right - that there is nothing relative or contextual about what is actually true, or what someone believes, but knowleddge is wholly relative because it rests on shifting standards of justification. |
12894 | There aren't invariant high standards for knowledge, because even those can be raised [Cohen,S] |
Full Idea: The problem for invariantism is that competent speakers, under sceptical pressure, tend to deny that we know even the most conspicuous facts of perception, the clearest memories etc. | |
From: Stewart Cohen (Contextualism Defended [2005], p.58) | |
A reaction: This is aimed at Idea 12892. This seems to me a strong response to the rather weak invariantist case (that there is 'really and truly' only one invariant standard for knowledge). Full strength scepticism about everything demolishes all knowledge. |
20937 | The state should produce higher civilisations for all, in tune with the economic apparatus [Gramsci] |
Full Idea: The role of the State is always that of creating new and higher types of civilisation; of adapting the 'civilisation' and the morality of the broades popular masses to the necessities of the continuous development of the economic apparatus of production. | |
From: Antonio Gramsci (Selections from Prison Notebooks [1971], 2 'Collective') | |
A reaction: This makes education virtually the prime role of the state. Reminiscent of Sir John Reith's original dream, in the 1930s, for the BBC. Many marxists feel that the economy is in direct conflict with morality and civilisation. |
20935 | Eventually political parties lose touch with the class they represent, which is dangerous [Gramsci] |
Full Idea: At a certain point in their lives, social classes become detached from their traditional parties. In that particular form ...the parties are no longer recognised by their class as its exopression. ...The field is then open for violent solutions. | |
From: Antonio Gramsci (Selections from Prison Notebooks [1971], 2 'Parties') | |
A reaction: Left wing parties pursue ideologies that don't connect with the actual current interests of the working class, and righ wing parties are taken over by rich elites who don't value safe traditonal communities. (This thought is resonant in the 2018 UK). |
20936 | Caesarism emerges when two forces in society are paralysed in conflict [Gramsci] |
Full Idea: Caesarism (as the emergence of a 'heroic' personality) expresses a situation in which the forces in conflict balance each other in a catastrophic manner ...which can only terminate in their reciprocal destruction. | |
From: Antonio Gramsci (Selections from Prison Notebooks [1971], 2 'Caesarism') | |
A reaction: He goes on to distinguish progressive and reactionary versions of Caesarism. Gramsci's interest is in the circumstances that throw up such people. Marx had identified 'Bonapartism'. |
20941 | Totalitarian parties cut their members off from other cultural organisations [Gramsci] |
Full Idea: A totalitarian party ensures that members find in that particular party all the satisfactions that they formerly found in a multiplicity of organisations. They break the threads that bind them to extraneous cultural organisms. | |
From: Antonio Gramsci (Selections from Prison Notebooks [1971], 2 'Organisation') | |
A reaction: British parties traditionally had a 'club house', where you could do most of your socialising. Presumably Nazis left the church, and various interest groups. |
20939 | What is the function of a parliament? Does it even constitute a part of the State structure? [Gramsci] |
Full Idea: The question has to be asked: do parliaments, even in fact constitute a part of the State structure? In other words, what is the real function? | |
From: Antonio Gramsci (Selections from Prison Notebooks [1971], 2 'Parliament') | |
A reaction: Nice question. In the UK it is only the cabinet which has active power. Backbench MPs are usually very frustrated, especially if their party has a comfortable majority, and their vote is not precious. They are privileged lobbyists. |
20938 | Liberalism's weakness is its powerful rigid bureaucracy [Gramsci] |
Full Idea: Liberalism's weakness is the bureacracy - the crystallisation of the leading personnel - which exercises power, and at a certain point it becomes a caste. | |
From: Antonio Gramsci (Selections from Prison Notebooks [1971], 2 'Hegemony') | |
A reaction: This sounds more like what is called 'the Establishment' in Britain, which is the hidden controllers of power, rather than the administrators (whose role is only despised by right-wingers). |
20940 | Perfect political equality requires economic equality [Gramsci] |
Full Idea: The idea that complete and perfect political equality cannot exist without economic equality ...remains correct. | |
From: Antonio Gramsci (Selections from Prison Notebooks [1971], 2 'The State') | |
A reaction: In the west we are living in a period (2018) when the top 0.1% of the wealthy are racing away, creating huge inequality. Their wealth controls the media, and it seems unrestrainable. The belief that we live in a 'democracy' is an illusion. |