8 ideas
| 7068 | If infatuation with science leads to bad scientism, its rejection leads to obscurantism [Critchley] |
| Full Idea: If what is mistaken in much contemporary philosophy is its infatuation with science, which leads to scientism, then the equally mistaken rejection of science leads to obscurantism. | |
| From: Simon Critchley (Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro [2001], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: Clearly a balance has to be struck. I take philosophy to be a quite separate discipline from science, but it is crucial that philosophy respects the physical facts, and scientists are the experts there. Scientists are philosophers' most valued servants. |
| 7075 | To meet the division in our life, try the Subject, Nature, Spirit, Will, Power, Praxis, Unconscious, or Being [Critchley] |
| Full Idea: Against the Kantian division of a priori and empirical, Fichte offered activity of the subject, Schelling offered natural force, Hegel offered Spirit, Schopenhauer the Will, Nietzsche power, Marx praxis, Freud the unconscious, and Heidegger offered Being. | |
| From: Simon Critchley (Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro [2001]) | |
| A reaction: The whole of Continental Philosophy summarised in a sentence. Fichte and Schopenhauer seem to point to existentialism, Schelling gives evolutionary teleology, Marx abandons philosophy, the others are up the creek. |
| 7069 | The French keep returning, to Hegel or Nietzsche or Marx [Critchley] |
| Full Idea: French philosophy since the 1930s might be described as a series of returns: to Hegel (in Kojčve and early Sartre), to Nietzsche (in Foucault and Deleuze), or to Marx (in Althusser). | |
| From: Simon Critchley (Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro [2001], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: An interesting map. The question might be why they return to those three, rather than (say) Hume or Leibniz. If the choice of which one you return to a matter of 'taste' (as Nietzsche would have it)? |
| 17962 | The truth-maker principle is that every truth has a sufficient truth-maker [Forrest] |
| Full Idea: Item x is said to be a sufficient truth-maker for truth-bearer p just in case necessarily if x exists then p is true. ...Every truth has a sufficient truth-maker. Hence, I take it, the sum of all sufficient truth-makers is a universal truth-maker. | |
| From: Peter Forrest (General Facts,Phys Necessity, and Metaph of Time [2006], 1) | |
| A reaction: Note that it is not 'necessary', because something else might make p true instead. |
| 7067 | Food first, then ethics [Critchley] |
| Full Idea: Food first, then ethics. | |
| From: Simon Critchley (Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro [2001], 8857) | |
| A reaction: This is not a dismissal of philosophy, but a key fact which ethical philosophers must face up to. See Mr Doolittle's speech in Shaw's 'Pygmalion. It connects to the debate c.1610 about whether one is entitled to grab someone's plank to avoid drowning. |
| 1466 | Claims about God don't seem to claim or deny anything tangible, so evidence is irrelevant [Flew, by PG] |
| Full Idea: An assertion is logically equivalent to denying its opposite, but claims about a 'gardener', or God, make neither claims nor denials of anything, so no evidence can count against the claim, or for it. | |
| From: report of Antony Flew (Theology and Falsification [1950]) by PG - Db (ideas) |
| 1465 | You can't claim a patch of land is tended by a 'gardener' if there is no evidence, and all counter-evidence is rejected [Flew, by PG] |
| Full Idea: If someone claimed a patch of land was tended by a 'gardener', but there was never a shred of evidence to support this view, the claim would gradually dissolve into meaninglessness, especially if it was suggested that evidence was irrelevant. | |
| From: report of Antony Flew (Theology and Falsification [1950]) by PG - Db (ideas) |
| 1467 | Religious people seem unwilling to accept any evidence that God does not love us, so their claim is unfalsifiable [Flew, by PG] |
| Full Idea: Religious people seem unwilling to accept any evidence which shows that God does not love us, so what would they accept? If nothing counts that way, their claim is unfalsifiable, and hence meaningless. | |
| From: report of Antony Flew (Theology and Falsification [1950]) by PG - Db (ideas) |