Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'General Facts,Phys Necessity, and Metaph of Time', 'Perceptual Content and Monadic Truth' and 'On the Reduction of Necessity to Essence'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

---

4 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism

17962	The truth-maker principle is that every truth has a sufficient truth-maker [Forrest]
	Full Idea: Item x is said to be a sufficient truth-maker for truth-bearer p just in case necessarily if x exists then p is true. ...Every truth has a sufficient truth-maker. Hence, I take it, the sum of all sufficient truth-makers is a universal truth-maker.
	From: Peter Forrest (General Facts,Phys Necessity, and Metaph of Time [2006], 1)
	A reaction: Note that it is not 'necessary', because something else might make p true instead.

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives

16974	The nature of each logical concept is given by a collection of inference rules [Correia]
	Full Idea: The view presented here presupposes that each logical concept is associated with some fixed and well defined collection of rules of inference which characterize its basic logical nature.
	From: Fabrice Correia (On the Reduction of Necessity to Essence [2012], 4)
	A reaction: [He gives Fine's 'Senses of Essences' 57-8 as a source] He seems to have in mind natural deduction, where the rules are for the introduction and elimination of the concepts.

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity

16973	Explain logical necessity by logical consequence, or the other way around? [Correia]
	Full Idea: One view is that logical consequence is to be understood in terms of logical necessity (some proposition holds necessarily, if some group of other propositions holds). Alternatively, logical necessity is a logical consequence of the empty set.
	From: Fabrice Correia (On the Reduction of Necessity to Essence [2012], 3)
	A reaction: I think my Finean preference is for all necessities to have a 'necessitator', so logical necessity results from logic in some way, perhaps from logical consequence, or from the essences of the connectives and operators.

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought

18424	If two people can have phenomenally identical experiences, they can't involve the self [Brogaard]
	Full Idea: It is plausible that you and I can have perceptual experiences with the same phenomenology of two trees at different distances from us (perhaps at different times). ..So our perceptual experiences cannot contain you or me in the content of representation.
	From: Berit Brogaard (Perceptual Content and Monadic Truth [2009], p.223), quoted by Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh - The Inessential Indexical 08.2
	A reaction: If you accept the example, which seems reasonable, then that pretty conclusively shows that perception is not inherently indexical.