Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'General Facts,Phys Necessity, and Metaph of Time', 'Epiphenomenal Qualia' and 'fragments/reports'

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5 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism

17962	The truth-maker principle is that every truth has a sufficient truth-maker [Forrest]
	Full Idea: Item x is said to be a sufficient truth-maker for truth-bearer p just in case necessarily if x exists then p is true. ...Every truth has a sufficient truth-maker. Hence, I take it, the sum of all sufficient truth-makers is a universal truth-maker.
	From: Peter Forrest (General Facts,Phys Necessity, and Metaph of Time [2006], 1)
	A reaction: Note that it is not 'necessary', because something else might make p true instead.

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity

490	Everything happens by reason and necessity [Leucippus]
	Full Idea: Nothing happens at random; everything happens out of reason and by necessity.
	From: Leucippus (fragments/reports [c.435 BCE], B002), quoted by (who?) - where?

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument

7880	If a blind persons suddenly sees a kestrel, that doesn't make visual and theoretical kestrels different [Papineau on Jackson]
	Full Idea: An ornithological Mary might know everything theoretical about kestrels, but be blind from birth, then have her sight restored. She now knows "That bird eats mice", so visual kestrels must be ontologically distinct from theoretical ones.
	From: comment on Frank Jackson (Epiphenomenal Qualia [1982]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 6.3
	A reaction: A nice reductio, and I think this pinpoints best what is wrong with the knowledge argument. Knowledge, and the means of acquiring it, are two distinct things. When I see x, I don't acquire knowledge of x, AND knowledge of my seeing x.

7378	No one bothers to imagine what it would really be like to have ALL the physical information [Dennett on Jackson]
	Full Idea: That Mary "has all the physical information" is not readily imaginable, so no one bothers. They just imagine she knows lots and lots - perhaps everything known today - but that is just a drop in the bucket.
	From: comment on Frank Jackson (Epiphenomenal Qualia [1982]) by Daniel C. Dennett - Consciousness Explained 12.5
	A reaction: I certainly don't see how we can rule out a priori the possibility that someone who really had all the physical knowledge might be able to infer the phenomenal properties of colour.

7377	Mary learns when she sees colour, so her complete physical information had missed something [Jackson]
	Full Idea: It seems obvious that Mary will learn something about the world when she is released from her black-and-white room; but then it is inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete; she had all the physical information, so there is more to have.
	From: Frank Jackson (Epiphenomenal Qualia [1982], §1)
	A reaction: This is Jackson's famous 'knowledge argument', which seems to me misconceived. Since I don't think phenomenal colours are properties of objects (Idea 5456), Mary learns more about herself, and about her means of acquiring knowledge.