8 ideas
22002 | Wolff's version of Leibniz dominated mid-18th C German thought [Pinkard] |
Full Idea: The dominant philosophy of mid-eighteenth century Germany was Wolffianism, a codified and almost legalistically organised form of Leibnizian thought. | |
From: Terry Pinkard (German Philosophy 1760-1860 [2002], Intro) | |
A reaction: Kant grew up in this intellectual climate. |
22021 | Romantics explored beautiful subjectivity, and the re-enchantment of nature [Pinkard] |
Full Idea: Early Romanticism can be seen as the exploration of subjective interiority and as the re-enchantment of nature (as organic). Hegel said they had the idea of a 'beautiful soul', which (he said) either paralysed action, or made them smug. | |
From: Terry Pinkard (German Philosophy 1760-1860 [2002], 06) | |
A reaction: [compressed, inc Note 1] A major dilemma of life is the extent of our social engagement, because it makes life worthwhile, but pollutes the mind with continual conflicts. |
22010 | The combination of Kant and the French Revolution was an excited focus for German philosophy [Pinkard] |
Full Idea: After the French Revolution, philosophy suddenly became the key rallying point for an entire generation of German intellectuals, who had been reading Kant as the harbinger of a new order. | |
From: Terry Pinkard (German Philosophy 1760-1860 [2002], Pt II Intro) | |
A reaction: Kant was a harbinger because he offered an autonomous status to each individual, rather than being subservient to a social order. |
22036 | In Hegel's time naturalism was called 'Spinozism' [Pinkard] |
Full Idea: In Hegel's time the shorthand for the Naturalistic worldview was 'Spinozism'. | |
From: Terry Pinkard (German Philosophy 1760-1860 [2002], 10) | |
A reaction: Spinozism hit Germany like a bomb in 1786, when it was reported that the poet Hölderlin was a fan of Spinoza. |
20183 | So-called 'though experiments' are just philosophers observing features of the world [Cappelen] |
Full Idea: What are called 'thought experiments' in philosophy are in effect just philosophers drawing our attention to interesting features of the world. | |
From: Herman Cappelen (Philosophy without Intuitions [2012], 11.3) | |
A reaction: Thought experiments are said to rely (perhaps excessively) on 'intuition', but Cappelen says intuition is irrelevant, because we are merely making judgements. It think they ARE experiments, if one feature varies while the rest is held steady. |
17962 | The truth-maker principle is that every truth has a sufficient truth-maker [Forrest] |
Full Idea: Item x is said to be a sufficient truth-maker for truth-bearer p just in case necessarily if x exists then p is true. ...Every truth has a sufficient truth-maker. Hence, I take it, the sum of all sufficient truth-makers is a universal truth-maker. | |
From: Peter Forrest (General Facts,Phys Necessity, and Metaph of Time [2006], 1) | |
A reaction: Note that it is not 'necessary', because something else might make p true instead. |
22048 | Idealism is the link between reason and freedom [Pinkard] |
Full Idea: Idealism was conceived as a link between reason and freedom. | |
From: Terry Pinkard (German Philosophy 1760-1860 [2002], 14 Conc) | |
A reaction: I'm beginning to see the Romantic era as the Age of Freedom, which followed the Age of Reason. This idea fits that picture nicely. Pinkard says that paradoxes resulted from the attemptl |
20182 | The word 'intuitive' often plays not role at all in arguments, and can be removed [Cappelen] |
Full Idea: Careful study of uses of 'intuitive' will reveal that it often plays no significant argumentative role, and that removal will improve overall argumentative transparency. | |
From: Herman Cappelen (Philosophy without Intuitions [2012], 04.1) | |
A reaction: This is a key part of Cappelen's argument that 'intuition' is a rather empty concept, and that philosophers do not really rely on it. In effect, he is consigning it to mere rhetoric. He gives lots of examples in support. |