Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'General Facts,Phys Necessity, and Metaph of Time', 'The Same F' and 'A Theory of Conditionals'

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4 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
17962 The truth-maker principle is that every truth has a sufficient truth-maker [Forrest]
     Full Idea: Item x is said to be a sufficient truth-maker for truth-bearer p just in case necessarily if x exists then p is true. ...Every truth has a sufficient truth-maker. Hence, I take it, the sum of all sufficient truth-makers is a universal truth-maker.
     From: Peter Forrest (General Facts,Phys Necessity, and Metaph of Time [2006], 1)
     A reaction: Note that it is not 'necessary', because something else might make p true instead.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
12155 Statements of 'relative identity' are really statements of resemblance [Perry]
     Full Idea: Statements of 'relative' identity are not identity statements at all, but what I would prefer to call 'statements of resemblance' or 'common property staztements'.
     From: John Perry (The Same F [1970], n12)
     A reaction: This seems like a neat way to sweep the problem from our sight. There remains a nervous metaphysical problem, though, because something seems to be identical when we spot a resemblance. Even two shades of red have something identical in them.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
14286 In nearby worlds where A is true, 'if A,B' is true or false if B is true or false [Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: Consider a possible world in which A is true and otherwise differs minimally from the actual world. 'If A, then B' is true (false) just in case B is true (false) in that possible world.
     From: Robert C. Stalnaker (A Theory of Conditionals [1968], p.34), quoted by Dorothy Edgington - Conditionals (Stanf) 4.1
     A reaction: This is the first proposal to give a possible worlds semantics for conditional statements. Edgington observes that worlds which are nearby for me may not be nearby for you.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14285 A possible world is the ontological analogue of hypothetical beliefs [Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: A possible world is the ontological analogue of a stock of hypothetical beliefs.
     From: Robert C. Stalnaker (A Theory of Conditionals [1968], p.34), quoted by Dorothy Edgington - Conditionals (Stanf) 4.1
     A reaction: Sounds neat and persuasive. What is the ontological analogue of a stock of hopes? Heaven!