Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'General Facts,Phys Necessity, and Metaph of Time', 'Causality: Reductionism versus Realism' and 'The Putney Debates'

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4 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
The truth-maker principle is that every truth has a sufficient truth-maker [Forrest]
     Full Idea: Item x is said to be a sufficient truth-maker for truth-bearer p just in case necessarily if x exists then p is true. ...Every truth has a sufficient truth-maker. Hence, I take it, the sum of all sufficient truth-makers is a universal truth-maker.
     From: Peter Forrest (General Facts,Phys Necessity, and Metaph of Time [2006], 1)
     A reaction: Note that it is not 'necessary', because something else might make p true instead.
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
Even the poorest have a life to lead, and so should consent to who governs them [-]
     Full Idea: For really I think that the poorest hee that is in England hath a life to live, as the greatest hee; …and every Man that is to live under a Government ought first by his own Consent to put himself under that Government.
     From: - (The Putney Debates [1647])
     A reaction: [remark made by Thomas Rainsborough] This is the social contract idea which is explicit in Hobbes. I'm sure we can at least trace it back to John Lilburne in the 1630s.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Reductionists can't explain accidents, uninstantiated laws, probabilities, or the existence of any laws [Tooley]
     Full Idea: Reductionist accounts of causation cannot distinguish laws from accidental uniformities, cannot allow for basic uninstantiated laws, can't explain probabilistic laws, and cannot even demonstrate the existence of laws.
     From: Michael Tooley (Causality: Reductionism versus Realism [1990], 2)
     A reaction: I am tempted to say that this is so much the worse for the idea of laws. Extensive regularities only occur for a reason. Probabilities aren't laws. Hypothetical facts will cover uninstantiated laws. Laws are just patterns.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
Quantum physics suggests that the basic laws of nature are probabilistic [Tooley]
     Full Idea: Quantum physics seems to lend strong support to the idea that the basic laws of nature may well be probabilistic.
     From: Michael Tooley (Causality: Reductionism versus Realism [1990], 3.2.1)
     A reaction: Groan. Quantum physics should be outlawed from all philosophical discussions. The scientists don't understand it themselves. I'm certainly not going to build my worldview on it. I don't accept that these probabilities could count as 'laws'.