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All the ideas for 'General Facts,Phys Necessity, and Metaph of Time', 'Sentences' and 'Intro to Oxford Hndbk of Metaphysics'

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5 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual

9217	Modern empirical metaphysics focuses on ontological commitments of discourse, or on presuppositions [Loux/Zimmerman]
	Full Idea: The empiricist revival of metaphysics came with Quine, who focused on ontological commitments associated with accepting a body of discourse, and Strawson, asking about the presuppositions of our conceptual practices.
	From: M Loux / D Zimmerman (Intro to Oxford Hndbk of Metaphysics [2003])
	A reaction: I find myself preferring the British approach. I can discourse about things without ontological commitment, and utter truths about non-existent things. I really yearn, though, for the third way - actually reasoning towards knowing what's out there.

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism

17962	The truth-maker principle is that every truth has a sufficient truth-maker [Forrest]
	Full Idea: Item x is said to be a sufficient truth-maker for truth-bearer p just in case necessarily if x exists then p is true. ...Every truth has a sufficient truth-maker. Hence, I take it, the sum of all sufficient truth-makers is a universal truth-maker.
	From: Peter Forrest (General Facts,Phys Necessity, and Metaph of Time [2006], 1)
	A reaction: Note that it is not 'necessary', because something else might make p true instead.

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations

18528	The single imagined 'interval' between things only exists in the intellect [Auriol]
	Full Idea: It appears that a single thing, which must be imagined as some sort of interval [intervallum] existing between two things, cannot exist in extramental reality, but only in the intellect.
	From: Peter Auriol (Sentences [1316], I fols318 v a-b), quoted by John Heil - The Universe as We Find It 7
	A reaction: This is the standard medieval denial of the existence of real relations. It contrasts with post-Russell ontology, which seems to admit relations as entities. Heil and Auriol and right.

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter

16589	Prime matter lacks essence, but is only potentially and indeterminately a physical thing [Auriol]
	Full Idea: Prime matter has no essence, nor a nature that is determinate, distinct, and actual. Instead, it is pure potential, and determinable, so that it is indeterminately and indistinctly a material thing.
	From: Peter Auriol (Sentences [1316], II.12.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 03.1
	A reaction: Pasnau thinks Auriol has the best shot at explaining the vague idea of 'prime matter', with the thought that it exists, but indeterminateness is what gives it a lesser mode of existence. It strikes me as best to treat 'exist' as univocal.

28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions

16651	God can do anything non-contradictory, as making straightness with no line, or lightness with no parts [Auriol]
	Full Idea: If someone says 'God could make straightness without a line, and roughness and lightness in weight without parts', …then show me the reason why God can do whatever does not imply a contradiction, yet cannot do these things.
	From: Peter Auriol (Sentences [1316], IV.12.2.2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 11.4
	A reaction: How engagingly bonkers. The key idea preceding this is that God can do all sorts of things that are beyond our understanding. He is then obliged to offer some examples.