5 ideas
17962 | The truth-maker principle is that every truth has a sufficient truth-maker [Forrest] |
Full Idea: Item x is said to be a sufficient truth-maker for truth-bearer p just in case necessarily if x exists then p is true. ...Every truth has a sufficient truth-maker. Hence, I take it, the sum of all sufficient truth-makers is a universal truth-maker. | |
From: Peter Forrest (General Facts,Phys Necessity, and Metaph of Time [2006], 1) | |
A reaction: Note that it is not 'necessary', because something else might make p true instead. |
10304 | Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics [Bernays] |
Full Idea: Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics. | |
From: Paul Bernays (On Platonism in Mathematics [1934]) |
10303 | Restricted Platonism is just an ideal projection of a domain of thought [Bernays] |
Full Idea: A restricted Platonism does not claim to be more than, so to speak, an ideal projection of a domain of thought. | |
From: Paul Bernays (On Platonism in Mathematics [1934], p.261) | |
A reaction: I have always found Platonism to be congenial when it talks of 'ideals', and ridiculous when it talks of a special form of 'existence'. Ideals only 'exist' because we idealise things. I may declare myself, after all, to be a Restricted Platonist. |
10306 | Mathematical abstraction just goes in a different direction from logic [Bernays] |
Full Idea: Mathematical abstraction does not have a lesser degree than logical abstraction, but rather another direction. | |
From: Paul Bernays (On Platonism in Mathematics [1934], p.268) | |
A reaction: His point is that the logicists seem to think that if you increasingly abstract from mathematics, you end up with pure logic. |
16002 | The self is a combination of pairs of attributes: freedom/necessity, infinite/finite, temporal/eternal [Kierkegaard] |
Full Idea: A human being is essentially spirit, but what is spirit? Spirit is to be a self. But what is the Self? In short, it is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity. | |
From: Søren Kierkegaard (Sickness unto Death [1849], p.59) | |
A reaction: The dense language of his first paragraph was to poke fun at fashionable Hegelian writing. The book gets very lucid afterwards! [SY] |