Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'General Facts,Phys Necessity, and Metaph of Time', 'Contemporary Efficient Causation: Aristotelian themes' and 'Aristotle on Learning to be Good'

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3 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
The truth-maker principle is that every truth has a sufficient truth-maker [Forrest]
     Full Idea: Item x is said to be a sufficient truth-maker for truth-bearer p just in case necessarily if x exists then p is true. ...Every truth has a sufficient truth-maker. Hence, I take it, the sum of all sufficient truth-makers is a universal truth-maker.
     From: Peter Forrest (General Facts,Phys Necessity, and Metaph of Time [2006], 1)
     A reaction: Note that it is not 'necessary', because something else might make p true instead.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Intellectualism is an excessive emphasis on reasoning in moral philosophy [Burnyeat]
     Full Idea: Intellectualism, a one-sided preoccupation with reason and reasoning, is a perennial failing in moral philosophy.
     From: Myles F. Burnyeat (Aristotle on Learning to be Good [1980], p.70)
     A reaction: But Kant's reply would be that while there is much more to moral behaviour, the only part which matters in morality is the reasoning part. And Socrates' view (ignorance is evil) is not obviously wrong.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Causation interests us because we want to explain change [Mumford]
     Full Idea: Like Aristotle, the reason we are really interested in causation is because we want to be able to explain change.
     From: Stephen Mumford (Contemporary Efficient Causation: Aristotelian themes [2014], 8)
     A reaction: This pinpoints a very important and simple idea. It raises the question (among others) of whether we have just invented this thing called 'causation', because no explanation of change was visible. Hume certainly couldn't see any explanation.