3 ideas
17962 | The truth-maker principle is that every truth has a sufficient truth-maker [Forrest] |
Full Idea: Item x is said to be a sufficient truth-maker for truth-bearer p just in case necessarily if x exists then p is true. ...Every truth has a sufficient truth-maker. Hence, I take it, the sum of all sufficient truth-makers is a universal truth-maker. | |
From: Peter Forrest (General Facts,Phys Necessity, and Metaph of Time [2006], 1) | |
A reaction: Note that it is not 'necessary', because something else might make p true instead. |
6171 | Beliefs are states of the head that explain behaviour, and also items with referential truth-conditions [McGinn] |
Full Idea: We view beliefs both as states of the head explanatory of behaviour, and as items possessed of referential truth-conditions. | |
From: Colin McGinn (The Structure of Content [1982]), quoted by Mark Rowlands - Externalism Ch.6 | |
A reaction: McGinn wants to build a two-part account of meaning on this point, which Rowlands resists. Hume just wanted to define belief by a feeling, but it seems obvious that truth must also be involved. |
2975 | That honey is sweet I do not affirm, but I agree that it appears so [Timon] |
Full Idea: That honey is sweet I do not affirm, but I agree that it appears so. | |
From: Timon (On Sensations (frags) [c.285 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.104-5 |