3 ideas
| 10710 | We accept substance, to avoid infinite backwards chains of meaning [Wittgenstein, by Potter] |
| Full Idea: Wittgenstein is the most renowned modern proponent of substance, and argued that sense must be determinate ...and that any conceptual scheme which genuinely represents a world cannot contain infinite backward chains of meaning. | |
| From: report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (works [1935]) by Michael Potter - Set Theory and Its Philosophy 03.3 | |
| A reaction: This is a key idea for explaining the somewhat surprising revival of the notion of substance in modern times, when it appeared to have been buried by atomism in the seventeenth century. The new argument is a semantic one. |
| 16718 | Primary qualities are the cause of all the other sensible qualities [Albertus Magnus] |
| Full Idea: The primary qualities of tangible things are the cause of all the other sensible qualities. | |
| From: Albertus Magnus (On 'Generation and Corruption' [1261], II.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 21.2 | |
| A reaction: This makes the primary qualities sound suspiciously like the essence. |
| 22489 | 'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot] |
| Full Idea: Geach puts 'good' in the class of attributive adjectives, such as 'large' and 'small', contrasting such adjectives with 'predicative' adjectives such as 'red'. | |
| From: report of Peter Geach (Good and Evil [1956]) by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness Intro | |
| A reaction: [In Analysis 17, and 'Theories of Ethics' ed Foot] Thus any object can simply be red, but something can only be large or small 'for a rat' or 'for a car'. Hence nothing is just good, but always a good so-and-so. This is Aristotelian, and Foot loves it. |