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All the ideas for 'Good and Evil', 'On the General Idea of Proof Theory' and 'The Value of Science'

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4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence

13827	Logical consequence isn't a black box (Tarski's approach); we should explain how arguments work [Prawitz]
	Full Idea: Defining logical consequence in the way Tarski does is a rather meagre result, treating an argument as a black box, observing input and output, while disregarding inner structure. We should define logical consequence on the basis of valid arguments.
	From: Dag Prawitz (On the General Idea of Proof Theory [1974], §2)

5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models

13826	Model theory looks at valid sentences and consequence, but not how we know these things [Prawitz]
	Full Idea: In model theory, which has dominated the last decades, one concentrates on logically valid sentences, and what follows logically from what, but one disregards questions concerning how we know these things.
	From: Dag Prawitz (On the General Idea of Proof Theory [1974], §1)

22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good

22489	'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot]
	Full Idea: Geach puts 'good' in the class of attributive adjectives, such as 'large' and 'small', contrasting such adjectives with 'predicative' adjectives such as 'red'.
	From: report of Peter Geach (Good and Evil [1956]) by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness Intro
	A reaction: [In Analysis 17, and 'Theories of Ethics' ed Foot] Thus any object can simply be red, but something can only be large or small 'for a rat' or 'for a car'. Hence nothing is just good, but always a good so-and-so. This is Aristotelian, and Foot loves it.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature

15877	The aim of science is just to create a comprehensive, elegant language to describe brute facts [Poincaré, by Harré]
	Full Idea: In Poincaré's view, we try to construct a language within which the brute facts of experience are expressed as comprehensively and as elegantly as possible. The job of science is the forging of a language precisely suited to that purpose.
	From: report of Henri Poincaré (The Value of Science [1906], Pt III) by Rom Harré - Laws of Nature 2
	A reaction: I'm often struck by how obscure and difficult our accounts of self-evident facts can be. Chairs are easy, and the metaphysics of chairs is hideous. Why is that? I'm a robust realist, but I like Poincaré's idea. He permits facts.