3 ideas
| 21799 | We just use the word 'faculty' when we don't know the psychological cause [Galen] |
| Full Idea: So long as we are ignorant of the true essence of the cause which is operating, we call it a 'faculty'. | |
| From: Galen (On the Natural Faculties [c.170], I.iv), quoted by Dominik Perler - Intro to The Faculties: a History 2 | |
| A reaction: This is probably the view of most modern neuroscientists. I want to defend the idea that we need the concept of a faculty in philosophy, even if the psychologists and neuroscientists say it is too vague for their purposes. |
| 22489 | 'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot] |
| Full Idea: Geach puts 'good' in the class of attributive adjectives, such as 'large' and 'small', contrasting such adjectives with 'predicative' adjectives such as 'red'. | |
| From: report of Peter Geach (Good and Evil [1956]) by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness Intro | |
| A reaction: [In Analysis 17, and 'Theories of Ethics' ed Foot] Thus any object can simply be red, but something can only be large or small 'for a rat' or 'for a car'. Hence nothing is just good, but always a good so-and-so. This is Aristotelian, and Foot loves it. |
| 7636 | It can't be more rational to believe in natural laws than miracles if the laws are not rational [Ishaq on Hume] |
| Full Idea: In Hume's argument against miracles, how can it be more rational to believe the laws than the miracles, if the laws themselves are not based on reason? | |
| From: comment on David Hume (Of Miracles [1748]) by Atif Ishaq - talk | |
| A reaction: A very nice question. Hume never presents his argument with such an overt reliance on reason. But if the argument says you are in the 'habit' of expecting no anomalies in the laws, what is to prevent you changing the habit of a lifetime? |