Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Good and Evil', 'On the Natural Faculties' and 'The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme'

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6 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
19044 Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true [Davidson]
     Full Idea: The notion of fitting the totality of experience ...adds nothing intelligible to the simple concept of being true. ....Nothing, ...no thing, makes sentences and theories true: not experience, not surface irritations, not the world.
     From: Donald Davidson (The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme [1974], p.11), quoted by Willard Quine - On the Very Idea of a Third Dogma p.39
     A reaction: If you don't have a concept of what normally makes a sentence true, I don't see how you go about distinguishing what is true from what is false. You can't just examine the sentence to see if it has the 'primitive' property of truth. Holism is involved....
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
6400 Without the dualism of scheme and content, not much is left of empiricism [Davidson]
     Full Idea: The third dogma of empiricism is the dualism of scheme and content, of organizing system and something waiting to be organized, which cannot be made intelligible and defensible. If we give it up, it is not clear that any distinctive empiricism remains.
     From: Donald Davidson (The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme [1974], p.189)
     A reaction: The first two dogmas were 'analyticity' and 'reductionism', as identified by Quine in 1953. Presumably Hume's Principles of Association (Idea 2189) would be an example of a scheme. A key issue is whether there is any 'pure' content.
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
6398 Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background [Davidson]
     Full Idea: Different points of view make sense, but only if there is a common co-ordinate system on which to plot them.
     From: Donald Davidson (The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme [1974], p.184)
     A reaction: This seems right to me. I am very struck by the close similarities between people from wildly differing cultural backgrounds, as seen, for example, at the Olympic Games.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
21799 We just use the word 'faculty' when we don't know the psychological cause [Galen]
     Full Idea: So long as we are ignorant of the true essence of the cause which is operating, we call it a 'faculty'.
     From: Galen (On the Natural Faculties [c.170], I.iv), quoted by Dominik Perler - Intro to The Faculties: a History 2
     A reaction: This is probably the view of most modern neuroscientists. I want to defend the idea that we need the concept of a faculty in philosophy, even if the psychologists and neuroscientists say it is too vague for their purposes.
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
6399 Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes [Davidson]
     Full Idea: Studying the criteria of translation is a way of focusing on criteria of identity for conceptual schemes.
     From: Donald Davidson (The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme [1974], p.184)
     A reaction: This is why it was an inspired idea of Quine's to make translation a central topic in philosophy. We must be cautious, though, about saying that the language is the conceptual scheme, as that leaves animals with no scheme at all.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
22489 'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot]
     Full Idea: Geach puts 'good' in the class of attributive adjectives, such as 'large' and 'small', contrasting such adjectives with 'predicative' adjectives such as 'red'.
     From: report of Peter Geach (Good and Evil [1956]) by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness Intro
     A reaction: [In Analysis 17, and 'Theories of Ethics' ed Foot] Thus any object can simply be red, but something can only be large or small 'for a rat' or 'for a car'. Hence nothing is just good, but always a good so-and-so. This is Aristotelian, and Foot loves it.