Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Good and Evil', 'Steps Towards a Constructive Nominalism' and 'The Problem of Consciousness'

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4 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta

17619	We renounce all abstract entities [Goodman/Quine]
	Full Idea: We do not believe in abstract entities..... We renounce them altogether.
	From: Goodman,N/Quine,W (Steps Towards a Constructive Nominalism [1947], p.105), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Defending the Axioms
	A reaction: Goodman always kept the faith here, but Quine decided to embrace sets, as a minimal commitment to abstracta needed for mathematics, which was needed for science. My sympathies are with Goodman. This is the modern form of 'nominalism'.

17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism

7388	McGinn invites surrender, by saying it is hopeless trying to imagine conscious machines [Dennett on McGinn]
	Full Idea: McGinn invites his readers to join him in surrender: It's just impossible to imagine how software could make a conscious robot. Don't even try, he says. Other philosophical experiments (involving China) "work" by dissuading readers from imagining.
	From: comment on Colin McGinn (The Problem of Consciousness [1991]) by Daniel C. Dennett - Consciousness Explained 14.1
	A reaction: I agree with Dennett. If you don't try to imagine how robots might do it, you are also denied the right to try to imagine how brains might manage it. Admittedly this is hard, but good imagination needs study, effort, discussion, time, information...

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability

3185	Multiple realisability rules out hidden essences and experts as the source of water- and gold-concepts [McGinn]
	Full Idea: The multiple realisability emphasised by functionalists rules out the hidden essences (and the 'deferential' move in semantics) that one finds in the cases, for example, of "water" and "gold" emphasised by Kripke and Putnam.
	From: Colin McGinn (The Problem of Consciousness [1991], p.132)
	A reaction: Presumably if they are 'hidden', then the people to whom we 'defer' for our concepts can't actually know about the essences we are supposed to be discussing. You can mean essences without knowing them. Cf. Loch Ness Monster.

22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good

22489	'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot]
	Full Idea: Geach puts 'good' in the class of attributive adjectives, such as 'large' and 'small', contrasting such adjectives with 'predicative' adjectives such as 'red'.
	From: report of Peter Geach (Good and Evil [1956]) by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness Intro
	A reaction: [In Analysis 17, and 'Theories of Ethics' ed Foot] Thus any object can simply be red, but something can only be large or small 'for a rat' or 'for a car'. Hence nothing is just good, but always a good so-and-so. This is Aristotelian, and Foot loves it.