Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Good and Evil', 'Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed)' and 'Plural Quantification Exposed'

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33 ideas

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
Free logic is one of the few first-order non-classical logics [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: Free logic is an unusual example of a non-classical logic which is first-order.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], Pref)
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / a. Symbols of ST
X1 x X2 x X3... x Xn indicates the 'cartesian product' of those sets [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: X1 x X2 x X3... x Xn indicates the 'cartesian product' of those sets, the set of all the n-tuples with its first member in X1, its second in X2, and so on.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.0)
<a,b&62; is a set whose members occur in the order shown [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: <a,b> is a set whose members occur in the order shown; <x1,x2,x3, ..xn> is an 'n-tuple' ordered set.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.10)
a ∈ X says a is an object in set X; a ∉ X says a is not in X [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: a ∈ X means that a is a member of the set X, that is, a is one of the objects in X. a ∉ X indicates that a is not in X.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.2)
{x; A(x)} is a set of objects satisfying the condition A(x) [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: {x; A(x)} indicates a set of objects which satisfy the condition A(x).
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.2)
{a1, a2, ...an} indicates that a set comprising just those objects [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: {a1, a2, ...an} indicates that the set comprises of just those objects.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.2)
Φ indicates the empty set, which has no members [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: Φ indicates the empty set, which has no members
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.4)
{a} is the 'singleton' set of a (not the object a itself) [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: {a} is the 'singleton' set of a, not to be confused with the object a itself.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.4)
X⊂Y means set X is a 'proper subset' of set Y [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: X⊂Y means set X is a 'proper subset' of set Y (if and only if all of its members are members of Y, but some things in Y are not in X)
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6)
X⊆Y means set X is a 'subset' of set Y [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: X⊆Y means set X is a 'subset' of set Y (if and only if all of its members are members of Y).
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6)
X = Y means the set X equals the set Y [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: X = Y means the set X equals the set Y, which means they have the same members (i.e. X⊆Y and Y⊆X).
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6)
X ∩ Y indicates the 'intersection' of sets X and Y, the objects which are in both sets [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: X ∩ Y indicates the 'intersection' of sets X and Y, which is a set containing just those things that are in both X and Y.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8)
X∪Y indicates the 'union' of all the things in sets X and Y [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: X ∪ Y indicates the 'union' of sets X and Y, which is a set containing just those things that are in X or Y (or both).
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8)
Y - X is the 'relative complement' of X with respect to Y; the things in Y that are not in X [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: Y - X indicates the 'relative complement' of X with respect to Y, that is, all the things in Y that are not in X.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8)
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
A 'singleton' is a set with only one member [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: A 'singleton' is a set with only one member.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.4)
The 'empty set' or 'null set' has no members [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: The 'empty set' or 'null set' is a set with no members.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.4)
A set is a 'subset' of another set if all of its members are in that set [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: A set is a 'subset' of another set if all of its members are in that set.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6)
A 'proper subset' is smaller than the containing set [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: A set is a 'proper subset' of another set if some things in the large set are not in the smaller set
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6)
The 'relative complement' is things in the second set not in the first [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: The 'relative complement' of one set with respect to another is the things in the second set that aren't in the first.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8)
The 'intersection' of two sets is a set of the things that are in both sets [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: The 'intersection' of two sets is a set containing the things that are in both sets.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8)
The 'union' of two sets is a set containing all the things in either of the sets [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: The 'union' of two sets is a set containing all the things in either of the sets
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8)
The 'induction clause' says complex formulas retain the properties of their basic formulas [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: The 'induction clause' says that whenever one constructs more complex formulas out of formulas that have the property P, the resulting formulas will also have that property.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.2)
An 'ordered pair' (or ordered n-tuple) is a set with its members in a particular order [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: An 'ordered pair' (or ordered n-tuple) is a set with its members in a particular order.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.10)
A 'cartesian product' of sets is the set of all the n-tuples with one member in each of the sets [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: A 'cartesian product' of sets is the set of all the n-tuples with one member in each of the sets.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.10)
A 'set' is a collection of objects [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: A 'set' is a collection of objects.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.2)
A 'member' of a set is one of the objects in the set [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: A 'member' of a set is one of the objects in the set.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.2)
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / c. Basic theorems of ST
The empty set Φ is a subset of every set (including itself) [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: The empty set Φ is a subset of every set (including itself).
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6)
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / n. Axiom of Comprehension
A comprehension axiom is 'predicative' if the formula has no bound second-order variables [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: If φ contains no bound second-order variables, the corresponding comprehension axiom is said to be 'predicative'; otherwise it is 'impredicative'.
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §1)
     A reaction: ['Predicative' roughly means that a new predicate is created, and 'impredicative' means that it just uses existing predicates]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
A 'pure logic' must be ontologically innocent, universal, and without presuppositions [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: I offer these three claims as a partial analysis of 'pure logic': ontological innocence (no new entities are introduced), universal applicability (to any realm of discourse), and cognitive primacy (no extra-logical ideas are presupposed).
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §1)
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Plural quantification depends too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: If my arguments are correct, the theory of plural quantification has no right to the title 'logic'. ...The impredicative plural comprehension axioms depend too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations.
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §4)
Can second-order logic be ontologically first-order, with all the benefits of second-order? [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: According to its supporters, second-order logic allow us to pay the ontological price of a mere first-order theory and get the corresponding monadic second-order theory for free.
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §0)
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
The modern concept of an object is rooted in quantificational logic [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: Our modern general concept of an object is given content only in connection with modern quantificational logic.
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §2)
     A reaction: [He mentions Frege, Carnap, Quine and Dummett] This is the first thing to tell beginners in modern analytical metaphysics. The word 'object' is very confusing. I think I prefer 'entity'.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot]
     Full Idea: Geach puts 'good' in the class of attributive adjectives, such as 'large' and 'small', contrasting such adjectives with 'predicative' adjectives such as 'red'.
     From: report of Peter Geach (Good and Evil [1956]) by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness Intro
     A reaction: [In Analysis 17, and 'Theories of Ethics' ed Foot] Thus any object can simply be red, but something can only be large or small 'for a rat' or 'for a car'. Hence nothing is just good, but always a good so-and-so. This is Aristotelian, and Foot loves it.