7 ideas
7746 | We don't normally think of names as having senses (e.g. we don't give definitions of them) [Searle] |
Full Idea: If Tully=Cicero is synthetic, the names must have different senses, which seems implausible, for we don't normally think of proper names as having senses in the way that predicates do (we do not, e.g., give definitions of proper names). | |
From: John Searle (Proper Names [1958], p.89) | |
A reaction: It is probably necessary to prize apart the question of whether Tully 'has' (intrinsically) a sense, from whether we think of Tully in that way. Stacks of books have appeared about this one, since Kripke. |
7747 | How can a proper name be correlated with its object if it hasn't got a sense? [Searle] |
Full Idea: It seems that a proper name could not have a reference unless it did have a sense, for how, unless the name has a sense, is it to be correlated with the object? | |
From: John Searle (Proper Names [1958], p.91) | |
A reaction: This might (just) be the most important question ever asked in modern philosophy, since it provoked Kripke into answering it, by giving a social, causal, externalist account of how names (and hence lots of language) actually work. But Searle has a point. |
7748 | 'Aristotle' means more than just 'an object that was christened "Aristotle"' [Searle] |
Full Idea: Aristotle being identical with an object that was originally christened will not suffice, for the force of "Aristotle" is greater than the force of 'identical with an object named "Aristotle"', for not just any object named "Aristotle" will do. | |
From: John Searle (Proper Names [1958], p.93) | |
A reaction: This anticipates Kripke's proposal to base reference on baptism. I remain unsure about how rigid a designation of Aristotle could be, in a possible world where his father died young, and he became an illiterate soldier who hates philosophy. |
7749 | Reference for proper names presupposes a set of uniquely referring descriptions [Searle] |
Full Idea: To use a proper name referringly is to presuppose the truth of certain uniquely referring descriptive statements. ...Names are pegs on which to hang descriptions. | |
From: John Searle (Proper Names [1958], p.94) | |
A reaction: This 'cluster' view of Searle's has become notorious, but I think one could at least try to mount a defence. The objection to Searle is that none of the descriptions are necessary, unlike just being the named object. |
7750 | Proper names are logically connected with their characteristics, in a loose way [Searle] |
Full Idea: If asked whether or not proper names are logically connected with characteristics of the object to which they refer, the answer is 'yes, in a loose sort of way'. | |
From: John Searle (Proper Names [1958], p.96) | |
A reaction: It seems to be inviting trouble to assert that a connection is both 'logical' and 'loose'. Clearly Searle has been reading too much later Wittgenstein. This is probably the weakest point in Searle's proposal, which brought a landslide of criticism. |
18545 | The disinterested attitude of the judge is the hallmark of a judgement of beauty [Shaftesbury, by Scruton] |
Full Idea: Shaftesbury explained the peculiar features of the judgement of beauty in terms of the disinterested attitude of the judge. | |
From: report of 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Characteristics [1711]) by Roger Scruton - Beauty: a very short introduction 1 | |
A reaction: Good. I take our vocabulary to mark a distinction between expressions of subjective preference, and expressions of what aspire to be objective facts. 'I love this' versus 'this is good or beautiful'. |
22489 | 'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot] |
Full Idea: Geach puts 'good' in the class of attributive adjectives, such as 'large' and 'small', contrasting such adjectives with 'predicative' adjectives such as 'red'. | |
From: report of Peter Geach (Good and Evil [1956]) by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness Intro | |
A reaction: [In Analysis 17, and 'Theories of Ethics' ed Foot] Thus any object can simply be red, but something can only be large or small 'for a rat' or 'for a car'. Hence nothing is just good, but always a good so-and-so. This is Aristotelian, and Foot loves it. |