3 ideas
| 16209 | How can point-duration slices of people have beliefs or desires? [Thomson] |
| Full Idea: Can one really think that point-duration temporal slices of bodies believe things or want things? | |
| From: Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (People and Their Bodies [1997], p.211), quoted by Katherine Hawley - How Things Persist 2.9 n21 | |
| A reaction: There is a problem with a slice doing anything long-term. The bottom line is that things are said to 'endure', but that is precisely what time-slices are unable to do. Hawley rejects this idea. |
| 3519 | Man uses his body, so must be separate from it [Anon (Plat), by Maslin] |
| Full Idea: A man uses his whole body to do things, and therefore, just as a person is distinct from a tool he uses, so it follows that a man must be distinct from his body. | |
| From: report of Anon (Plat) (Alcibiades [c.340 BCE]) by Keith T. Maslin - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind 2.3 | |
| A reaction: This 'follows'? Every part of my body and my mind makes 'use' of every other part. My body uses my mind to achieve reproduction. He presumably means 'person' rather than 'man'. |
| 22489 | 'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot] |
| Full Idea: Geach puts 'good' in the class of attributive adjectives, such as 'large' and 'small', contrasting such adjectives with 'predicative' adjectives such as 'red'. | |
| From: report of Peter Geach (Good and Evil [1956]) by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness Intro | |
| A reaction: [In Analysis 17, and 'Theories of Ethics' ed Foot] Thus any object can simply be red, but something can only be large or small 'for a rat' or 'for a car'. Hence nothing is just good, but always a good so-and-so. This is Aristotelian, and Foot loves it. |