Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Good and Evil', 'Aristotle on Matter' and 'Forget the 'correspondence theory of truth''

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

---

10 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition

12302	Definitions formed an abstract hierarchy for Aristotle, as sets do for us [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: For us it is sets which constitute the most natural example of a hierarchical structure within the abstract realm; but for Aristotle it would have been definitions, via their natural division into genus and differentia.
	From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], §1 n4)
	A reaction: I suppose everyone who thinks about reality in abstraction ends up with a hierarchy. Compare the hierarchy of angelic hosts, or Greek gods. Could we get back to the Aristotelian view, instead of sets, which are out of control at the top end?

2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia

14266	Aristotle sees hierarchies in definitions using genus and differentia (as we see them in sets) [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: For us, sets constitute the most natural example of a hierarchical structure within the abstract realm. But for Aristotle it would have been definitions, via their natural division into genus and differentia.
	From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], 1 n4)
	A reaction: Genus and differentia are only part of the story in Aristotle, and this remarks strikes me as perceptive. It is precisely the mapping of the explanatory hierarchy which Aristotle seeks in a good definition.

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers

10845	To be true a sentence must express a proposition, and not be ambiguous or vague or just expressive [Lewis]
	Full Idea: Sentences or assertions can be derivately called true, if they succeed in expressing determinate propositions. A sentence can be ambiguous or vague or paradoxical or ungrounded or not declarative or a mere expression of feeling.
	From: David Lewis (Forget the 'correspondence theory of truth' [2001], p.276)
	A reaction: Lewis has, of course, a peculiar notion of what a proposition is - it's a set of possible worlds. I, with my more psychological approach, take a proposition to be a particular sort of brain event.

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation

10847	Truthmakers are about existential grounding, not about truth [Lewis]
	Full Idea: Instances of the truthmaker principle are equivalent to biconditionals not about truth but about the existential grounding of all manner of other things; the flying pigs, or what-have-you.
	From: David Lewis (Forget the 'correspondence theory of truth' [2001])
	A reaction: The question then is what the difference is between 'existential grounding' and 'truth'. There wouldn't seem to be any difference at all if the proposition in question was a simple existential claim.

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence

10846	Truthmaker is correspondence, but without the requirement to be one-to-one [Lewis]
	Full Idea: The truthmaker principle seems to be a version of the correspondence theory of truth, but differs mostly in denying that the correspondence of truths to facts must be one-to-one.
	From: David Lewis (Forget the 'correspondence theory of truth' [2001], p.277)
	A reaction: In other words, several different sentences might have exactly the same truthmaker.

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation

14268	Maybe bottom-up grounding shows constitution, and top-down grounding shows essence [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: It may be that the two forms of grounding have a different source; the one from the bottom up is required for the constitution of the thing to be intelligible; the one from the top down is required for the essence of the thing to be intelligible.
	From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], 2)
	A reaction: [He cites Aristotle Met. 1019a8-10 in support] Close reading of Fine would be needed to elucidate this properly, but it is a suggestive line of thought about how we should approach grounding.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object

14267	There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: If the parts of a body can constitute a man, then why should men not constitute a family? Why draw the line at the level of the man? ...Thus the idea of a distinctive notion of constitution, terminating in concrete substances, should be given up.
	From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], 1)
	A reaction: This is in the context of Aristotle, but Fine's view seems to apply to Rudder Baker's distinctive approach.

14264	Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: There is a question of whether there is a viable conception of constitution of the sort Aristotle supposes, one which is uniformly applicable to physical and non-physical objects alike, and which is capable of hierarchical application.
	From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], 1)
	A reaction: This is part of an explication of Aristotle's 'matter' [hule], which might be better translated as 'ingredients', which would fit non-physical things quite well.

22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good

22489	'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot]
	Full Idea: Geach puts 'good' in the class of attributive adjectives, such as 'large' and 'small', contrasting such adjectives with 'predicative' adjectives such as 'red'.
	From: report of Peter Geach (Good and Evil [1956]) by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness Intro
	A reaction: [In Analysis 17, and 'Theories of Ethics' ed Foot] Thus any object can simply be red, but something can only be large or small 'for a rat' or 'for a car'. Hence nothing is just good, but always a good so-and-so. This is Aristotelian, and Foot loves it.

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter

14265	The components of abstract definitions could play the same role as matter for physical objects [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: If one considers Aristotle's standard example of a definition, then it is plausible that its defining terms ('plane figure' in the case of a circle) should be constitutive of it in the same general way as physical matter constitutes something physical.
	From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], 1)
	A reaction: It strikes me that an appropriate translation for the Greek 'hule' might be the English 'ingredients', since Fine seems to be right about the broad application of hule in Aristotle.