17 ideas
12302 | Definitions formed an abstract hierarchy for Aristotle, as sets do for us [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: For us it is sets which constitute the most natural example of a hierarchical structure within the abstract realm; but for Aristotle it would have been definitions, via their natural division into genus and differentia. | |
From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], §1 n4) | |
A reaction: I suppose everyone who thinks about reality in abstraction ends up with a hierarchy. Compare the hierarchy of angelic hosts, or Greek gods. Could we get back to the Aristotelian view, instead of sets, which are out of control at the top end? |
14266 | Aristotle sees hierarchies in definitions using genus and differentia (as we see them in sets) [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: For us, sets constitute the most natural example of a hierarchical structure within the abstract realm. But for Aristotle it would have been definitions, via their natural division into genus and differentia. | |
From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], 1 n4) | |
A reaction: Genus and differentia are only part of the story in Aristotle, and this remarks strikes me as perceptive. It is precisely the mapping of the explanatory hierarchy which Aristotle seeks in a good definition. |
14268 | Maybe bottom-up grounding shows constitution, and top-down grounding shows essence [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: It may be that the two forms of grounding have a different source; the one from the bottom up is required for the constitution of the thing to be intelligible; the one from the top down is required for the essence of the thing to be intelligible. | |
From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], 2) | |
A reaction: [He cites Aristotle Met. 1019a8-10 in support] Close reading of Fine would be needed to elucidate this properly, but it is a suggestive line of thought about how we should approach grounding. |
14267 | There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: If the parts of a body can constitute a man, then why should men not constitute a family? Why draw the line at the level of the man? ...Thus the idea of a distinctive notion of constitution, terminating in concrete substances, should be given up. | |
From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], 1) | |
A reaction: This is in the context of Aristotle, but Fine's view seems to apply to Rudder Baker's distinctive approach. |
14264 | Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: There is a question of whether there is a viable conception of constitution of the sort Aristotle supposes, one which is uniformly applicable to physical and non-physical objects alike, and which is capable of hierarchical application. | |
From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], 1) | |
A reaction: This is part of an explication of Aristotle's 'matter' [hule], which might be better translated as 'ingredients', which would fit non-physical things quite well. |
5806 | Belief is the power of metarepresentation [Dretske] |
Full Idea: Belief is the power of metarepresentation. | |
From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §2.3) | |
A reaction: Hm. I have always defined belief as 'commitment to truth', and this definition leaves out both parts. Where is the commitment? If hope is another metarepresentation, how does it differ from belief? I imagine things, not believing them to be true. |
5801 | A mouse hearing a piano played does not believe it, because it lacks concepts and understanding [Dretske] |
Full Idea: A mouse can see and hear a piano being played, but believing is something else; it requires the concept of a piano, and understanding. Mice who hear pianos being played do not believe pianos are being played. | |
From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §1.3) | |
A reaction: Are we to say that when a mouse hears a piano it has no beliefs at all? Might not a belief involve images, so that a mouse calls up appropriate images from previous experiences, which are in a grey area on the edge of belief? |
5802 | Representations are in the head, but their content is not, as stories don't exist in their books [Dretske] |
Full Idea: Representations are in the head, but their content is not; in this sense, the mind isn't in the head any more than stories (i.e. story contents) are in books. | |
From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §1.6) | |
A reaction: This is the final consequence of Putnam's idea that meanings ain't in the head. Intentionality is an extraordinary bridge between the brain and the external world. The ontology of stories, and musical compositions, is one philosophy's deepest problems. |
5809 | Some activities are performed better without consciousness of them [Dretske] |
Full Idea: Some tasks (playing the piano, speaking foreign languages, playing fast sports) are best performed when the agent is largely unconscious of the details. | |
From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], Ch.4 n16) | |
A reaction: A significant point, but it supports the evolutionary view, which is that what matters is success, and consciousness will switch on or off, whichever promotes the activity best. |
5808 | Qualia are just the properties objects are represented as having [Dretske] |
Full Idea: The Representational Thesis of mind identifies the qualities of experience - qualia - with the properties objects are represented as having. | |
From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §3.2) | |
A reaction: This seems to challenge the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, of which I am very fond. Is 'looks beautiful' a property of an object? Is the feeling of anger a property of an object? Qualia are properties of brains? |
5807 | Introspection is the same as the experience one is introspecting [Dretske] |
Full Idea: Introspection has no phenomenology or, if it does, it always has the same phenomenology as the experience one is introspecting. | |
From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §2.4) | |
A reaction: There is a difference between looking at a tree, and being aware of yourself looking at a tree. You can be faintly depressed, and then become aware that you are faintly depressed. He is nearly right. |
5803 | In a representational theory of mind, introspection is displaced perception [Dretske] |
Full Idea: On a representational theory of the mind, introspection becomes an instance of displaced perception - knowledge of internal (mental) facts via an awareness of external (physical) objects. | |
From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §2) | |
A reaction: This sounds close to a behaviourist (e.g. Ryle) account of introspection, via observing one's own behaviour. The word 'displaced' is an easy one, concealing a multitude of questions. |
5805 | Introspection does not involve looking inwards [Dretske] |
Full Idea: The 'problem' of introspection evaporates once one understands that it is not a process in which one looks inward. | |
From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §2) | |
A reaction: I take it that when we introspect we look at the contents of thoughts, which are representations of the external world, on the whole. But surely only the connections of those contents with memories can be seen inwardly? |
5804 | A representational theory of the mind is an externalist theory of the mind [Dretske] |
Full Idea: A representational theory of the mind is an externalist theory of the mind. | |
From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §2) | |
A reaction: Presumably brain events bring the world into the mind, so the world must be mentioned in explaining the mind. Maybe 'externalism' sounds grand, but is stating the boringly obvious. Explanations of mind need no mention of external particulars. |
5800 | All mental facts are representation, which consists of informational functions [Dretske] |
Full Idea: My thesis is that all mental facts are representational facts, and that all representational facts are facts about informational functions. | |
From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], Prol) | |
A reaction: The first half of the thesis seems a bit difficult to disagree with, but that a fact is 'represented' may not be the essence of that fact. The biggest mystery is the content, not its representation. And everything is 'information' about everything else. |
22489 | 'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot] |
Full Idea: Geach puts 'good' in the class of attributive adjectives, such as 'large' and 'small', contrasting such adjectives with 'predicative' adjectives such as 'red'. | |
From: report of Peter Geach (Good and Evil [1956]) by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness Intro | |
A reaction: [In Analysis 17, and 'Theories of Ethics' ed Foot] Thus any object can simply be red, but something can only be large or small 'for a rat' or 'for a car'. Hence nothing is just good, but always a good so-and-so. This is Aristotelian, and Foot loves it. |
14265 | The components of abstract definitions could play the same role as matter for physical objects [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: If one considers Aristotle's standard example of a definition, then it is plausible that its defining terms ('plane figure' in the case of a circle) should be constitutive of it in the same general way as physical matter constitutes something physical. | |
From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], 1) | |
A reaction: It strikes me that an appropriate translation for the Greek 'hule' might be the English 'ingredients', since Fine seems to be right about the broad application of hule in Aristotle. |