12302
|
Definitions formed an abstract hierarchy for Aristotle, as sets do for us [Fine,K]
|
|
Full Idea:
For us it is sets which constitute the most natural example of a hierarchical structure within the abstract realm; but for Aristotle it would have been definitions, via their natural division into genus and differentia.
|
|
From:
Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], §1 n4)
|
|
A reaction:
I suppose everyone who thinks about reality in abstraction ends up with a hierarchy. Compare the hierarchy of angelic hosts, or Greek gods. Could we get back to the Aristotelian view, instead of sets, which are out of control at the top end?
|
14267
|
There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends [Fine,K]
|
|
Full Idea:
If the parts of a body can constitute a man, then why should men not constitute a family? Why draw the line at the level of the man? ...Thus the idea of a distinctive notion of constitution, terminating in concrete substances, should be given up.
|
|
From:
Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], 1)
|
|
A reaction:
This is in the context of Aristotle, but Fine's view seems to apply to Rudder Baker's distinctive approach.
|
14264
|
Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? [Fine,K]
|
|
Full Idea:
There is a question of whether there is a viable conception of constitution of the sort Aristotle supposes, one which is uniformly applicable to physical and non-physical objects alike, and which is capable of hierarchical application.
|
|
From:
Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], 1)
|
|
A reaction:
This is part of an explication of Aristotle's 'matter' [hule], which might be better translated as 'ingredients', which would fit non-physical things quite well.
|
9145
|
We form the image of a cardinal number by a double abstraction, from the elements and from their order [Cantor]
|
|
Full Idea:
We call 'cardinal number' the general concept which, by means of our active faculty of thought, arises when we make abstraction from an aggregate of its various elements, and of their order. From this double abstraction the number is an image in our mind.
|
|
From:
George Cantor (Beitrage [1915], §1), quoted by Kit Fine - Cantorian Abstraction: Recon. and Defence Intro
|
|
A reaction:
[compressed] This is the great Cantor, creator of set theory, endorsing the traditional abstractionism which Frege and his followers so despise. Fine offers a defence of it. The Frege view is platonist, because it refuses to connect numbers to the world.
|
22489
|
'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot]
|
|
Full Idea:
Geach puts 'good' in the class of attributive adjectives, such as 'large' and 'small', contrasting such adjectives with 'predicative' adjectives such as 'red'.
|
|
From:
report of Peter Geach (Good and Evil [1956]) by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness Intro
|
|
A reaction:
[In Analysis 17, and 'Theories of Ethics' ed Foot] Thus any object can simply be red, but something can only be large or small 'for a rat' or 'for a car'. Hence nothing is just good, but always a good so-and-so. This is Aristotelian, and Foot loves it.
|