Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Good and Evil', 'The Question of Realism' and 'Principles of Philosophy'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

41 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
3656 The greatest good for a state is true philosophers [Descartes]
     Full Idea: The greatest good which can exist in a state is to have true philosophers.
     From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], Pref)
     A reaction: …because they understand true reality, especially the Good.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
15053 If metaphysics can't be settled, it hardly matters whether it makes sense [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: If there is no way of settling metaphysical questions, then who cares whether or not they make sense?
     From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 4 n20)
     A reaction: This footnote is aimed at logical positivists, who seemed to worry about whether metaphysics made sense, and also dismissed its prospects even if it did make sense.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
15054 'Quietist' says abandon metaphysics because answers are unattainable (as in Kant's noumenon) [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: The 'quietist' view of metaphysics says that realist metaphysics should be abandoned, not because its questions cannot be framed, but because their answers cannot be found. The real world of metaphysics is akin to Kant's noumenal world.
     From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 4)
     A reaction: [He cites Blackburn, Dworkin, A.Fine, and Putnam-1987 as quietists] Fine aims to clarify the concepts of factuality and of ground, in order to show that metaphysics is possible.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
15007 If you make 'grounding' fundamental, you have to mention some non-fundamental notions [Sider on Fine,K]
     Full Idea: My main objection to Fine's notion of grounding as fundamental is that it violates 'purity' - that fundamental truths should involve only fundamental notions.
     From: comment on Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001]) by Theodore Sider - Writing the Book of the World 08.2
     A reaction: [p.106 of Sider for 'purity'] The point here is that to define a grounding relation you have to mention the 'higher' levels of the relationship (as in a 'city' being grounded in physical stuff), which doesn't seem fundamental enough.
15006 Something is grounded when it holds, and is explained, and necessitated by something else [Fine,K, by Sider]
     Full Idea: When p 'grounds' q then q holds in virtue of p's holding; q's holding is nothing beyond p's holding; the truth of p explains the truth of q in a particularly tight sense (explanation of q by p in this sense requires that p necessitates q).
     From: report of Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 15-16) by Theodore Sider - Writing the Book of the World 08.1
     A reaction: This proposal has become a hot topic in current metaphysics, as attempts are made to employ 'grounding' in various logical, epistemological and ontological contexts. I'm a fan - it is at the heart of metaphysics as structure of reality.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
15055 Grounding relations are best expressed as relations between sentences [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: I recommend that a statement of ground be cast in the following 'canonical' form: Its being the case that S consists in nothing more than its being the case that T, U... (where S, T, U... are particular sentences).
     From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 5)
     A reaction: The point here is that grounding is to be undestood in terms of sentences (and 'its being the case that...'), rather than in terms of objects, properties or relations. Fine thus makes grounding a human activity, rather than a natural activity.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
15050 Reduction might be producing a sentence which gets closer to the logical form [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: One line of reduction is logical analysis. To say one sentence reduces to another is to say that they express the same proposition (or fact), but the grammatical form of the second is closer to the logical form than the grammatical form of the first.
     From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 3)
     A reaction: Fine objects that S-and-T reduces to S and T, which is two propositions. He also objects that this approach misses the de re ingredient in reduction (that it is about the things themselves, not the sentences). It also overemphasises logical form.
15051 Reduction might be semantic, where a reduced sentence is understood through its reduction [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: A second line of reduction is semantic, and holds in virtue of the meaning of the sentences. It should then be possible to acquire an understanding of the reduced sentence on the basis of understanding the sentences to which it reduces.
     From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 3)
     A reaction: Fine says this avoids the first objection to the grammatical approach (see Reaction to Idea 15050), but still can't handle the de re aspect of reduction. Fine also doubts whether this understanding qualifies as 'reduction'.
15052 Reduction is modal, if the reductions necessarily entail the truth of the target sentence [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: The third, more recent, approach to reduction is a modal matter. A class of propositions will reduce to - or supervene upon - another if, necessarily, any truth from the one is entailed by truths from the other.
     From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 3)
     A reaction: [He cites Armstrong, Chalmers and Jackson for this approach] Fine notes that some people reject supervenience as a sort of reduction. He objects that this reduction doesn't necessarily lead to something more basic.
15056 The notion of reduction (unlike that of 'ground') implies the unreality of what is reduced [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: The notion of ground should be distinguished from the strict notion of reduction. A statement of reduction implies the unreality of what is reduced, but a statement of ground does not.
     From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 5)
     A reaction: That seems like a bit of a caricature of reduction. If you see a grey cloud and it reduces to a swarm of mosquitoes, you do not say that the cloud was 'unreal'. Fine is setting up a stall for 'ground' in the metaphysical market. We all seek structure.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
15047 What is real can only be settled in terms of 'ground' [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: Questions of what is real are to be settled upon the basis of considerations of ground.
     From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], Intro)
     A reaction: This looks like being one of Fine's most important ideas, which is shifting the whole basis of contemporary metaphysics. Only Parmenides and Heidegger thought Being was the target. Aristotle aims at identity. What grounds what is a third alternative.
15048 In metaphysics, reality is regarded as either 'factual', or as 'fundamental' [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: The first main approach says metaphysical reality is to be identified with what is 'objective' or 'factual'. ...According to the second conception, metaphysical reality is to be identified with what is 'irreducible' or 'fundamental'.
     From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 1)
     A reaction: Fine is defending the 'fundamental' approach, via the 'grounding' relation. The whole structure, though, seems to be reality. In particular, a complete story must include the relations which facilitate more than mere fundamentals.
15060 Why should what is explanatorily basic be therefore more real? [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: We may grant that some things are explanatorily more basic than others, but why should that make them more real?
     From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 8)
     A reaction: This is the question asked by the 'quietist'. Fine's answer is that our whole conception of Reality, with its intrinsic structure, is what lies at the basis, and this is primitive.
15046 Reality is a primitive metaphysical concept, which cannot be understood in other terms [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: I conclude that there is a primitive metaphysical concept of reality, one that cannot be understood in fundamentally different terms.
     From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], Intro)
     A reaction: Fine offers arguments to support his claim, but it seems hard to disagree with. The only alternative I can see is to understand reality in terms of our experiences, and this is the road to metaphysical hell.
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
16744 All powers can be explained by obvious features like size, shape and motion of matter [Descartes]
     Full Idea: There are no powers in stones and plants that are not so mysterious that they cannot be explained …from principles that are known to all and admitted by all, namely the shape, size, position, and motion of particles of matter.
     From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], IV.187), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.6
     A reaction: This is an invocation of 'categorical' properties, against dispositions. I take this to be quite wrong. The explanation goes the other way. What supports the structures; what drives the motion; what initiates anything?
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
5016 Five universals: genus, species, difference, property, accident [Descartes]
     Full Idea: The five commonly enumerated universals are: genus, species, difference, property and accident.
     From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.59)
     A reaction: Interestingly, this seems to be Descartes passing on his medieval Aristotelian inheritance, in which things are defined by placing them in a class, and then noting what distinguishes them within that class.
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
5015 A universal is a single idea applied to individual things that are similar to one another [Descartes]
     Full Idea: Universals arise solely from the fact that we avail ourselves of one idea in order to think of all individual things that have a certain similitude. When we understand under the same name all the objects represented by this idea, that name is universal.
     From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.59)
     A reaction: Judging by the boldness of the pronouncement, it looks as if Descartes hasn't recognised the complexity of the problem. How do we spot a 'similarity', especially an abstraction like 'tool' or 'useful'? This sounds like Descartes trying to avoid Platonism.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
16630 If we perceive an attribute, we infer the existence of some substance [Descartes]
     Full Idea: Based on perceiving the presence of some attribute, we conclude there must also be present an existing thing or substance to which it can be attributed.
     From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.52), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 08.1
     A reaction: A rainbow might be a tricky case. This illustrates the persistent belief in substances, even among philosophers who embraced the new corpuscular and mechanistic view of matter.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
5013 A substance needs nothing else in order to exist [Descartes]
     Full Idea: By substance we can understand nothing else than a thing which so exists that it needs no other thing in order to exist.
     From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.51)
     A reaction: Properties, of course, are the things which have dependent existence. Can properties be reduced to substances (e.g. by adopting a materialist theory of mind)? Note that Descartes does not think that substances depend on God for existence.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
16633 A substance has one principal property which is its nature and essence [Descartes]
     Full Idea: Each substance has one principal property that constitutes its nature and essence, to which all its other properties are referred. Extension in length, breadth, and depth constitutes the nature of corporeal substance; and thought of thinking substances.
     From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.53), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 08.3
     A reaction: Property is likely to be 'propria', which is a property distinctive of some thing, not just any old modern property. This is quite a strikingly original view of the nature of essence. Descartes despised 'substantial forms'.
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
3658 Total doubt can't include your existence while doubting [Descartes]
     Full Idea: He who decides to doubt everything cannot nevertheless doubt that he exists while he doubts.
     From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], Pref)
5005 I think, therefore I am, because for a thinking thing to not exist is a contradiction [Descartes]
     Full Idea: There is a contradiction in conceiving that what thinks does not (at the same time as it thinks) exist. Hence this conclusion I think, therefore I am, is the first and most certain that occurs to one who philosophises in an orderly way.
     From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.07)
     A reaction: The classic statement of his argument. The significance here is that it seems to have the structure of an argument, as it involves 'philosophising', which leads to a 'contradiction', and hence to the famous conclusion. It is not just intuitive.
5006 'Thought' is all our conscious awareness, including feeling as well as understanding [Descartes]
     Full Idea: By the word 'thought' I understand everything we are conscious of as operating in us. And that is why not only understanding, willing, imagining, but also feeling, are here the same thing as thinking.
     From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.09)
     A reaction: There is a bit of tension here between Descartes' correct need to include feeling in thought for his Cogito argument, and his tendency to dismiss animal consciousness, on the grounds that they only sense things, and don't make judgements.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
5012 'Nothing comes from nothing' is an eternal truth found within the mind [Descartes]
     Full Idea: The proposition 'nothing comes from nothing' is not to be considered as an existing thing, or the mode of a thing, but as a certain eternal truth which has its seat in our mind and is a common notion or axiom.
     From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.49)
     A reaction: There is a tension here, in his assertion that it is 'eternal', but 'not existing'. How does one distinguish an innate idea from an innate truth? 'Eternal' sounds like an external guarantee of truth, but being 'in our mind' sounds less reliable.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
15061 Although colour depends on us, we can describe the world that way if it picks out fundamentals [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: As long as colour terms pick out fundamental physical properties, I would be willing to countenance their use in the description of Reality in itself, ..even if they are based on a peculiar form of sensory awareness.
     From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 8)
     A reaction: This seems to explain why metaphysicians are so fond of using colour as their example of a property, when it seems rather subjective. There seem to be good reasons for rejecting Fine's view.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
5004 We can know basic Principles without further knowledge, but not the other way round [Descartes]
     Full Idea: It is on the Principles, or first causes, that the knowledge of other things depends, so the Principles can be known without these last, but the other things cannot reciprocally be known without the Principles.
     From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], Pref)
     A reaction: A particularly strong assertion of foundationalism, as it says that not only must the foundations exist, but also we must actually know them. This sounds false, as elementary knowledge then seems to require far too much sophistication.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
15059 Grounding is an explanation of truth, and needs all the virtues of good explanations [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: The main sources of evidence for judgments of ground are intuitive and explanatory. The relationship of ground is a form of explanation, ..explaining what makes a proposition true, which needs simplicity, breadth, coherence, non-circularity and strength.
     From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 7)
     A reaction: My thought is that not only must grounding explain, and therefore be a good explanation, but that the needs of explanation drive our decisions about what are the grounds. It is a bit indeterminate which is tail and which is dog.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
15057 Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: We take ground to be an explanatory relation: if the truth that P is grounded in other truths, then they account for its truth; P's being the case holds in virtue of the other truths' being the case. ...It is the ultimate form of explanation.
     From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 5)
     A reaction: To be 'ultimate' that which grounds would have to be something which thwarted all further explanation. Popper, for example, got quite angry at the suggestion that we should put a block on further investigation in this way.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
5014 We can understand thinking occuring without imagination or sensation [Descartes]
     Full Idea: We can understand thinking without imagination or sensation, as is quite clear to anyone who attends to the matter.
     From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.53)
     A reaction: We may certainly take it that Descartes means if it is understandable then it is logically possible. To believe that thinking could occur without imagination strikes me as an astonishing error. I take imagination to be more central than understanding.
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking
5017 In thinking we shut ourselves off from other substances, showing our identity and separateness [Descartes]
     Full Idea: Because each one of us understands what he thinks, and that in thinking he can shut himself off from every other substance, we may conclude that each of us is really distinct from every other thinking substance and from corporeal substance.
     From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.60)
     A reaction: This seems to be a novel argument which requires elucidation. I can 'shut myself off from every other substance'? If I shut myself off from thinking about food, does that mean hunger is not part of me? Or convince yourself that you don't have a brother?
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
5010 Our free will is so self-evident to us that it must be a basic innate idea [Descartes]
     Full Idea: It is so evident that we are possessed of a free will that can give or withhold its assent, that this may be counted as one of the first and most common notions found innately in us.
     From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.39)
     A reaction: It seems to me plausible to say that we have an innate conception of our own will (our ability to make decisions), though Hume says we only learn about the will from experience, but the idea that it is absolutely 'free' might never cross our minds.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
5011 There are two ultimate classes of existence: thinking substance and extended substance [Descartes]
     Full Idea: I observe two ultimate classes of things: intellectual or thinking things, pertaining to the mind or to thinking substance, and material things, pertaining to extended substance or to body.
     From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.48)
     A reaction: This is clear confirmation that Descartes believed the mind is a substance, rather than an insubstantial world of thinking. It leaves open the possibility of a different theory: that mind is not a substance, but is a Platonic adjunct to reality.
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
5018 Even if tightly united, mind and body are different, as God could separate them [Descartes]
     Full Idea: Even if we suppose God had united a body and a soul so closely that they couldn't be closer, and made a single thing out of the two, they would still remain distinct, because God has the power of separating them, or conserving out without the other.
     From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.60)
     A reaction: If Descartes lost his belief in God (after discussing existence with Kant) would he cease to be a dualist? This quotation seems to be close to conceding a mind-body relationship more like supervenience than interaction.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
5007 Most errors of judgement result from an inaccurate perception of the facts [Descartes]
     Full Idea: What usually misleads us is that we very frequently form a judgement although we do not have an accurate perception of what we judge.
     From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.33)
     A reaction: This seems to me a generally accurate observation, particularly in the making of moral judgements (which was probably not what Descartes was considering). The implication is that judgements are to a large extent forced by our perceptions.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
15058 A proposition ingredient is 'essential' if changing it would change the truth-value [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: A proposition essentially contains a given constituent if its replacement by some other constituent induces a shift in truth value. Thus Socrates is essential to the proposition that Socrates is a philosopher, but not to Socrates is self-identical.
     From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 6)
     A reaction: In this view the replacement of 'is' by 'isn't' would make 'is' (or affirmation) part of the essence of most propositions. This is about linguistic essence, rather than real essence. It has the potential to be trivial. Replace 'slightly' by 'fairly'?
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
5009 We do not praise the acts of an efficient automaton, as their acts are necessary [Descartes]
     Full Idea: We do not praise automata, although they respond exactly to the movements they were designed to produce, since their actions are performed necessarily
     From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.37)
     A reaction: I say we attribute responsibility when we perceive something like a 'person' as causing them. We don't blame small animals, because there is 'no one at home', but we blame children as they develop a full character and identity. We can ignore free will.
5008 The greatest perfection of man is to act by free will, and thus merit praise or blame [Descartes]
     Full Idea: That the will should extend widely accords with its nature, and it is the greatest perfection in man to be able to act by its means, that is, freely, and by so doing we are in peculiar way masters of our actions, and thereby merit praise or blame.
     From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.37)
     A reaction: This seems to me to be a deep-rooted and false understanding which philosophy has inherited from theology. It doesn't strike me that there must an absolute 'buck-stop' to make us responsible. Why is it better for a decision to appear out of nowhere?
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
22489 'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot]
     Full Idea: Geach puts 'good' in the class of attributive adjectives, such as 'large' and 'small', contrasting such adjectives with 'predicative' adjectives such as 'red'.
     From: report of Peter Geach (Good and Evil [1956]) by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness Intro
     A reaction: [In Analysis 17, and 'Theories of Ethics' ed Foot] Thus any object can simply be red, but something can only be large or small 'for a rat' or 'for a car'. Hence nothing is just good, but always a good so-and-so. This is Aristotelian, and Foot loves it.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
15987 Physics only needs geometry or abstract mathematics, which can explain and demonstrate everything [Descartes]
     Full Idea: I do not accept or desire any other principle in physics than in geometry or abstract mathematics, because all the phenomena of nature may be explained by their means, and sure demonstrations can be given of them.
     From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], 2.64), quoted by Peter Alexander - Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles 7
     A reaction: This is his famous and rather extreme view, which might be described as hyper-pythagoreanism (by adding geometry to numbers). It seems to leave out matter, forces and activity.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
12730 We will not try to understand natural or divine ends, or final causes [Descartes]
     Full Idea: We will not seek for the reason of natural things from the end which God or nature has set before him in their creation .
     From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], §28)
     A reaction: Teleology is more relevant to biology than to the other sciences, and it is hard to understand an eye without a notion of 'what it is for'. Planetary motion reveals nothing about purposes. If you demand a purpose, it becomes more baffling.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / c. Matter as extension
16601 Matter is not hard, heavy or coloured, but merely extended in space [Descartes]
     Full Idea: The nature of matter, or body viewed as a whole, consists not in its being something which is hard, heavy, or colored, or which in any other way affects the senses, but only in its being a thing extended in length, breadth and depth.
     From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], 2.4), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 04.5