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All the ideas for 'Good and Evil', 'Aristotle on Matter' and 'Epistemology: contemporary introduction'

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33 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
Definitions formed an abstract hierarchy for Aristotle, as sets do for us [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: For us it is sets which constitute the most natural example of a hierarchical structure within the abstract realm; but for Aristotle it would have been definitions, via their natural division into genus and differentia.
     From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], §1 n4)
     A reaction: I suppose everyone who thinks about reality in abstraction ends up with a hierarchy. Compare the hierarchy of angelic hosts, or Greek gods. Could we get back to the Aristotelian view, instead of sets, which are out of control at the top end?
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
Aristotle sees hierarchies in definitions using genus and differentia (as we see them in sets) [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: For us, sets constitute the most natural example of a hierarchical structure within the abstract realm. But for Aristotle it would have been definitions, via their natural division into genus and differentia.
     From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], 1 n4)
     A reaction: Genus and differentia are only part of the story in Aristotle, and this remarks strikes me as perceptive. It is precisely the mapping of the explanatory hierarchy which Aristotle seeks in a good definition.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
Maybe bottom-up grounding shows constitution, and top-down grounding shows essence [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: It may be that the two forms of grounding have a different source; the one from the bottom up is required for the constitution of the thing to be intelligible; the one from the top down is required for the essence of the thing to be intelligible.
     From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], 2)
     A reaction: [He cites Aristotle Met. 1019a8-10 in support] Close reading of Fine would be needed to elucidate this properly, but it is a suggestive line of thought about how we should approach grounding.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: If the parts of a body can constitute a man, then why should men not constitute a family? Why draw the line at the level of the man? ...Thus the idea of a distinctive notion of constitution, terminating in concrete substances, should be given up.
     From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], 1)
     A reaction: This is in the context of Aristotle, but Fine's view seems to apply to Rudder Baker's distinctive approach.
Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: There is a question of whether there is a viable conception of constitution of the sort Aristotle supposes, one which is uniformly applicable to physical and non-physical objects alike, and which is capable of hierarchical application.
     From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], 1)
     A reaction: This is part of an explication of Aristotle's 'matter' [hule], which might be better translated as 'ingredients', which would fit non-physical things quite well.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Because 'gold is malleable' is necessary does not mean that it is analytic [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: Taking the proposition that gold is malleable to be necessary does not commit one to considering it analytic.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], IV p.116)
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
Beliefs are based on perception, memory, introspection or reason [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: The four basic kinds of belief are rooted in perception, memory, introspective consciousness, and reason.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], Intr.p.7)
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
Could you have a single belief on its own? [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: Could one have just a single belief?
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VII p.198)
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
We can make certain of what we know, so knowing does not entail certainty [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: The possibility of making certain of what we already know suggests that knowing a proposition does not entail its being certain.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VIII p.220)
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
If you gradually remove a book's sensory properties, what is left at the end? [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: If you imagine subtracting a book's sensory properties one by one, what is left of it?
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.42)
Sense-data theory is indirect realism, but phenomenalism is direct irrealism [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: Where the sense-datum theory is an indirect realism, phenomenalism is a direct irrealism.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.43)
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
The concepts needed for a priori thought may come from experience [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: I may well need experience to acquire the concepts needed for knowledge of the a priori, such as the concept of a colour.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], IV p.103)
Red and green being exclusive colours seems to be rationally graspable but not analytic [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: The proposition that nothing is red and green all over at once is not analytic, but it is rationally graspable, so it seems to be an a priori synthetic proposition.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], IV p.100)
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
To see something as a field, I obviously need the concept of a field [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: The propositional belief which portrays what I see in front of me AS a field requires my having a concept of one.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.17)
     A reaction: To me this immediately invites the question of what a cow or horse experiences when they look at a familiar field. They know how to leave and enter it, and register its boundaries and qualities. Concepts?
How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it? [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it?
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.20)
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
Sense-data (and the rival 'adverbial' theory) are to explain illusions and hallucinations [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: The sense-datum theory is mainly to explain hallucinations and illusions, though there might be other theories, such as the 'adverbial' theory.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.36)
Sense data imply representative realism, possibly only representing primary qualities [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: A sense-datum theory might be called a representative realism because it conceives perception as a relation in which sense-data represent perceived external (hence real) objects to us. For Locke they were resemblances only of primary qualities.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.33)
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Perception is first simple, then objectual (with concepts) and then propositional [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: Simple perceiving gives rise to objectual perceiving (attaching concepts to the object), which gives rise to propositional perceiving.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.23)
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
The principles of justification have to be a priori [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: The crucial principles of justification are a priori.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], X p.311)
Virtually all rationalists assert that we can have knowledge of synthetic a priori truths [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: Rationalists virtually always assert or imply that, in addition to knowledge of analytic truths, there is knowledge of synthetic a priori truths.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], IV p.105)
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
To remember something is to know it [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: Remembering something is so entails knowing that it is so.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], II p.68)
     A reaction: Clearly I can say I "remember" x, but be wrong. Presumably we then say that I didn't really remember, which requires success, like "I know". It is true (as with "know") that as soon as I say that the something is false, I can't claim to remember it.
I might remember someone I can't recall or image, by recognising them on meeting [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: If I can neither recall nor image Jane I can still remember her, for on seeing her I might recognise her, and might remember, and even recall, our last meeting.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], II p.66)
     A reaction: Hm. I can hardly claim to remember her if I have no concept of her, and don't recall our last meeting. If seeing her triggers recognition, I would say that I NOW remember her, but I didn't before. Memory is more conscious than Audi claims.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Justification is either unanchored (infinite or circular), or anchored (in knowledge or non-knowledge) [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: There are four possible kinds of epistemic chain: infinite and unanchored, circular and unanchored, anchored in a belief which is not knowledge, and anchored in a belief which is bedrock knowledge.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VII p.183)
     A reaction: About right, though I don't think 'chain' is the right word for what is proposed if justification is to be coherent. The justifications float like lilies in the pond of reason, and a Self (Monet?) seems needed to assess the picture
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Internalism about justification implies that there is a right to believe something [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: Internalists about justification tend to conceive of it as a matter of having a right to believe something.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VIII p.234)
     A reaction: I'm an internalist, but I don't understand this, unless it refers to the social aspect of justification. Can I grant myself internal rights? I can justify my belief to other people.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: That 7+5=12 and that carrots are nourishing are mutually consistent, but do not exhibit coherence.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VII p.192)
     A reaction: This shows how difficult it would be to define 'coherent'. Is 'carrots are nourishing' coherent with 'fish are nourishing'? Is the battle of Hastings coherent with the battle of Waterloo?
It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: It is very difficult to specify when an explanatory relation generates enough coherence to create justification.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VII p.193)
     A reaction: I take coherence to be the key concept in epistemology, and quite impossible to define. This is why the 'space of reasons' is a useful concept. It is a courtroom, in which each case is different.
A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: A schizophrenic who thinks he is Napoleon, if he has a completely consistent story with enough interlocking details, may have a belief system that is superbly coherent.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VII p.194)
     A reaction: This is an exaggeration, but the fact is that one isolated lie is totally coherent, so coherence can only emerge when a system is large. Sense experience must be central to coherence.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: If someone consistently prophesied the winners of horse races, it appears that this man knows who will win the races, but surely he does not have justified beliefs as to who will win?
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VIII p.229)
     A reaction: This is where internalists and externalists (notably reliabilists) sharply part company. IF a reliable clairvoyant appeared, we would eventually accept them as a knower. But they DON'T appear, because knowledge needs justification!
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
A reliability theory of knowledge seems to involve truth as correspondence [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: If one favours a reliability theory of knowledge (which is externalist) the correspondence theory of truth seems the most appropriate.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VIII p.243)
     A reaction: Sounds right. Coherence implies some sort of internal assessment, whereas correspondence just needs to plugged into the facts. I like coherence justification and correspondence truth.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified' [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: Reliabilism cannot specify how reliable a process must be before it grounds knowledge, and it cannot specify what is reliable in the first place. 'Reliable' may become circular, and may mean 'justified'.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VIII p.225)
     A reaction: The first time you ever read an instrument, or talk to a stranger, you have no indication of reliability. Circularity looks like a big problem. Knowledge must precede reliability?
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 4. Errors in Introspection
We can be ignorant about ourselves, for example, our desires and motives [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: We can have false beliefs, or some degree of ignorance, about our own mental lives. For example, about our own dispositions, such as not believing that we have a certain ignoble desire.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], III p.83)
     A reaction: This idea, that we don't know ourselves, has become a commonplace of recent philosophy, but I am unconvinced. Mostly we know only too well that we harbour a base desire, and we feel a creeping sense of shame. Total ignorance is very rare.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot]
     Full Idea: Geach puts 'good' in the class of attributive adjectives, such as 'large' and 'small', contrasting such adjectives with 'predicative' adjectives such as 'red'.
     From: report of Peter Geach (Good and Evil [1956]) by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness Intro
     A reaction: [In Analysis 17, and 'Theories of Ethics' ed Foot] Thus any object can simply be red, but something can only be large or small 'for a rat' or 'for a car'. Hence nothing is just good, but always a good so-and-so. This is Aristotelian, and Foot loves it.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
The components of abstract definitions could play the same role as matter for physical objects [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: If one considers Aristotle's standard example of a definition, then it is plausible that its defining terms ('plane figure' in the case of a circle) should be constitutive of it in the same general way as physical matter constitutes something physical.
     From: Kit Fine (Aristotle on Matter [1992], 1)
     A reaction: It strikes me that an appropriate translation for the Greek 'hule' might be the English 'ingredients', since Fine seems to be right about the broad application of hule in Aristotle.