9 ideas
20100 | Classical liberalism seeks freedom of opinion, of private life, of expression, and of property [Micklethwait/Wooldridge] |
Full Idea: The classical liberals agreed on a basic list of freedoms: of opinion (including religion), of private life, of expression, and of property | |
From: Micklethwait,J/Wooldridge,A (The Fourth Revolution [2014], 9) | |
A reaction: Mill is main articulator of this. Modern neo-liberals focus on economic freedom. Neither of them seem to make freedom of opportunity central, though I suspect our modern Liberal Party would. |
8526 | We might treat both tropes and substances as fundamental, so we can't presume it is just tropes [Daly] |
Full Idea: Since C.B. Martin accepts both tropes and substances as fundamental, the claim that tropes are the only fundamental constituents is a further, independent claim. | |
From: Chris Daly (Tropes [1995], §4) | |
A reaction: A dubious mode of argument. Martin may only make the claim because he is ignorant, of facts or of language. Why are some tropes perfectly similar? Is it the result of something more fundamental? |
8527 | More than one trope (even identical ones!) can occupy the same location [Daly] |
Full Idea: More than one trope can occupy the same spatio-temporal location, and it even seems possible for a pair of exactly resembling tropes to occupy the same spatio-temporal location. | |
From: Chris Daly (Tropes [1995], §6) | |
A reaction: This may be the strongest objection to tropes. Being disc-shaped and red would occupy the same location. Aristotle's example of mixing white with white (Idea 557) would be the second case. Individuation of these 'particulars' is the problem. |
8528 | If tropes are linked by the existence of concurrence, a special relation is needed to link them all [Daly] |
Full Idea: To explain how tropes form bundles, concurrence relations are invoked. But tropes F and G and a concurrence relation C don't ensure that F stands in C to G. So trope theory needs 'instantiation' relations (special relational tropes) after all. | |
From: Chris Daly (Tropes [1995], §7) | |
A reaction: Campbell presents relations as 'second-order' items dependent on tropes (Idea 8525), but that seems unclear. Daly's argument resembles Russell's (which he likes), that some sort of universal is inescapable. It also resembles Bradley's regress (7966). |
22489 | 'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot] |
Full Idea: Geach puts 'good' in the class of attributive adjectives, such as 'large' and 'small', contrasting such adjectives with 'predicative' adjectives such as 'red'. | |
From: report of Peter Geach (Good and Evil [1956]) by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness Intro | |
A reaction: [In Analysis 17, and 'Theories of Ethics' ed Foot] Thus any object can simply be red, but something can only be large or small 'for a rat' or 'for a car'. Hence nothing is just good, but always a good so-and-so. This is Aristotelian, and Foot loves it. |
20097 | The welfare state aims at freedom from want, and equality of opportunity [Micklethwait/Wooldridge] |
Full Idea: In the classical liberal tradition freedom meant freedom from external control, and equality meant equality before the law. In the welfare state (of Beatrice Webb) freedom was reinterpreted as freedom from want, and equality as equality of opportunity. | |
From: Micklethwait,J/Wooldridge,A (The Fourth Revolution [2014], 3) | |
A reaction: The authors call this the 'third revolution' in government, after 17th century centralisation and early 19th century accountability. Tawney 1931 is the key text. |
20099 | For communists history is driven by the proletariat [Micklethwait/Wooldridge] |
Full Idea: For the communists the proletariat rather than the state was the locomotive of history. | |
From: Micklethwait,J/Wooldridge,A (The Fourth Revolution [2014], 3) | |
A reaction: I feel increasingly reluctant to support any party which appears to mainly represent the interests of a single social class, no matter how large that class may be. An attraction of liberalism is that it makes no reference to class. |
20098 | Fans of economic freedom claim that capitalism is self-correcting [Micklethwait/Wooldridge] |
Full Idea: The central laissez-faire conceit is that capitalism is a self-correcting mechanism. | |
From: Micklethwait,J/Wooldridge,A (The Fourth Revolution [2014], 3) | |
A reaction: This was Keynes's rather left-wing criticism of standard capitalist views. These resurfaced in the 1980s with mantras about the virtues of 'market forces'. |
20096 | Roman law entrenched property rights [Micklethwait/Wooldridge] |
Full Idea: Roman law entrenched property rights. | |
From: Micklethwait,J/Wooldridge,A (The Fourth Revolution [2014], 1 Intro) | |
A reaction: Normally attributed to Locke, so this is a good corrective. Was the principle gradually forgotten before Locke? |