Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Good and Evil', 'Philosophia Epicurea' and 'On Husserl'

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5 ideas

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / b. Form as principle
Form is the principle that connects a thing's constitution (rather than being operative) [Hill,N]
     Full Idea: Form is the state and condition of a thing, a result of the connection among its material principles; it is a constituting principle, not an operative one.
     From: Nicholas Hill (Philosophia Epicurea [1610], n 35)
     A reaction: Pasnau presents this as a denial of form, but it looks to me like someone fishing for what form could be in a more scientific context. Aristotle would have approved of 'principles'. Hill seems to defend the categorical against the dispositional.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
The Cogito demands a bridge to the world, and ends in isolating the ego [Velarde-Mayol]
     Full Idea: All philosophies inspired in the Cogito have the problem of building a bridge from the starting point of consciousness to the external world. The result of this is the isolation and solitude of the very ego.
     From: Victor Velarde-Mayol (On Husserl [2000], 4.7.2)
     A reaction: This strikes me as a pretty good reason not to develop a philosophy which is inspired by the Cogito.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
The representation may not be a likeness [Velarde-Mayol]
     Full Idea: Representationalism is the doctrine that maintains that the object is represented in consciousness by means of an image. ...One should not confuse an image with a likeness.
     From: Victor Velarde-Mayol (On Husserl [2000], 2.4.3)
     A reaction: Helpful reminder that sense-data or whatever may not be a likeness. But then how do they represent? Symbolic representation needs massive interpretation.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot]
     Full Idea: Geach puts 'good' in the class of attributive adjectives, such as 'large' and 'small', contrasting such adjectives with 'predicative' adjectives such as 'red'.
     From: report of Peter Geach (Good and Evil [1956]) by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness Intro
     A reaction: [In Analysis 17, and 'Theories of Ethics' ed Foot] Thus any object can simply be red, but something can only be large or small 'for a rat' or 'for a car'. Hence nothing is just good, but always a good so-and-so. This is Aristotelian, and Foot loves it.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
Find the essence by varying an object, to see what remains invariable [Velarde-Mayol]
     Full Idea: Eidetic Reduction consists of producing variations in the individual object until we see what is invariable in it. What is invariable is its essence or Eidos.
     From: Victor Velarde-Mayol (On Husserl [2000], 3.2.2)
     A reaction: This strikes me as an excellent idea. It more or less describes the method of science. Chemical atoms were thought to be unsplittable, until someone tried a new variation for dealing with them.