Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Good and Evil', 'Realism in Mathematics' and 'Holism: a Shopper's Guide'

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6 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
8755 Maddy replaces pure sets with just objects and perceived sets of objects [Maddy, by Shapiro]
     Full Idea: Maddy dispenses with pure sets, by sketching a strong set theory in which everything is either a physical object or a set of sets of ...physical objects. Eventually a physiological story of perception will extend to sets of physical objects.
     From: report of Penelope Maddy (Realism in Mathematics [1990]) by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 8.3
     A reaction: This doesn't seem to find many supporters, but if we accept the perception of resemblances as innate (as in Hume and Quine), it is isn't adding much to see that we intrinsically see things in groups.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
10718 A natural number is a property of sets [Maddy, by Oliver]
     Full Idea: Maddy takes a natural number to be a certain property of sui generis sets, the property of having a certain number of members.
     From: report of Penelope Maddy (Realism in Mathematics [1990], 3 §2) by Alex Oliver - The Metaphysics of Properties
     A reaction: [I believe Maddy has shifted since then] Presumably this will make room for zero and infinities as natural numbers. Personally I want my natural numbers to count things.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 2. Intuition of Mathematics
8756 Intuition doesn't support much mathematics, and we should question its reliability [Maddy, by Shapiro]
     Full Idea: Maddy says that intuition alone does not support very much mathematics; more importantly, a naturalist cannot accept intuition at face value, but must ask why we are justified in relying on intuition.
     From: report of Penelope Maddy (Realism in Mathematics [1990]) by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 8.3
     A reaction: It depends what you mean by 'intuition', but I identify with her second objection, that every faculty must ultimately be subject to criticism, which seems to point to a fairly rationalist view of things.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
17733 We know mind-independent mathematical truths through sets, which rest on experience [Maddy, by Jenkins]
     Full Idea: Maddy proposes that we can know (some) mind-independent mathematical truths through knowing about sets, and that we can obtain knowledge of sets through experience.
     From: report of Penelope Maddy (Realism in Mathematics [1990]) by Carrie Jenkins - Grounding Concepts 6.5
     A reaction: Maddy has since backed off from this, and now tries to merely defend 'objectivity' about sets (2011:114). My amateurish view is that she is overrating the importance of sets, which merely model mathematics. Look at category theory.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
9381 If some inferences are needed to fix meaning, but we don't know which, they are all relevant [Fodor/Lepore, by Boghossian]
     Full Idea: The Master Argument for linguistic holism is: Some of an expression's inferences are relevant to fixing its meaning; there is no way to distinguish the inferences that are constitutive (from Quine); so all inferences are relevant to fixing meaning.
     From: report of J Fodor / E Lepore (Holism: a Shopper's Guide [1993], §III) by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered
     A reaction: This would only be if you thought that the pattern of inferences is what fixes the meanings, but how can you derive inferences before you have meanings? The underlying language of thought generates the inferences? Meanings are involved!
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
22489 'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot]
     Full Idea: Geach puts 'good' in the class of attributive adjectives, such as 'large' and 'small', contrasting such adjectives with 'predicative' adjectives such as 'red'.
     From: report of Peter Geach (Good and Evil [1956]) by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness Intro
     A reaction: [In Analysis 17, and 'Theories of Ethics' ed Foot] Thus any object can simply be red, but something can only be large or small 'for a rat' or 'for a car'. Hence nothing is just good, but always a good so-and-so. This is Aristotelian, and Foot loves it.