6474
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Seeing is not in itself knowledge, but is separate from what is seen, such as a patch of colour [Russell]
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Full Idea:
Undeniably, knowledge comes through seeing, but it is a mistake to regard the mere seeing itself as knowledge; if we are so to regard it, we must distinguish the seeing from what is seen; a patch of colour is one thing, and our seeing it is another.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Mind [1921], Lec. VIII)
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A reaction:
This is Russell's 1921 explanation of why he adopted sense-data (but he rejects them later in this paragraph). This gives a simplistic impression of what he intended, which has three components: the object, the 'sensibile', and the sense-datum.
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6476
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We cannot assume that the subject actually exists, so we cannot distinguish sensations from sense-data [Russell]
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Full Idea:
If we are to avoid a perfectly gratuitous assumption, we must dispense with the subject as one of the actual ingredients of the world; but when we do this, the possibility of distinguishing the sensation from the sense-datum vanishes.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Mind [1921], Lec. VIII)
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A reaction:
This is the reason why Russell himself rejected sense-data. It is more normal, I think, to reject them simply as being superfluous. If the subject can simply perceive the sense-data, why can't they just perceive the object more directly?
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6475
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In perception, the self is just a logical fiction demanded by grammar [Russell]
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Full Idea:
In perception, the idea of the subject appears to be a logical fiction, like mathematical points and instants; it is introduced, not because observation reveals it, but because it is linguistically convenient and apparently demanded by grammar.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Mind [1921], Lec. VIII)
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A reaction:
In 1912, Russell had felt that both the Cogito, and the experience of meta-thought, had confirmed the existence of a non-permanent ego, but here he offers a Humean rejection. His notion of a 'logical fiction' is behaviouristic. I believe in the Self.
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22489
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'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot]
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Full Idea:
Geach puts 'good' in the class of attributive adjectives, such as 'large' and 'small', contrasting such adjectives with 'predicative' adjectives such as 'red'.
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From:
report of Peter Geach (Good and Evil [1956]) by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness Intro
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A reaction:
[In Analysis 17, and 'Theories of Ethics' ed Foot] Thus any object can simply be red, but something can only be large or small 'for a rat' or 'for a car'. Hence nothing is just good, but always a good so-and-so. This is Aristotelian, and Foot loves it.
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