14 ideas
18889 | Ostensive definitions needn't involve pointing, but must refer to something specific [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: So-called ostensive definitions need not literally involve ostension, e.g. pointing, but they must involve genuine reference of some sort (in this case reference to a sample of water). | |
From: Nathan Salmon (Reference and Essence (1st edn) [1981], 4.11.2) |
22462 | We should speak the truth, but also preserve and pursue it [Foot] |
Full Idea: There belongs to truthfulness not only the avoidance of lying but also that other kind of attachment to truth which has to do with its preservation and pursuit. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Utilitarianism and the Virtues [1985], p.74) | |
A reaction: This is truth as a value, rather than as a mere phenomenon of accurate thought and speech. The importance of 'preserving' the truth is the less common part of this idea. |
14627 | S4, and therefore S5, are invalid for metaphysical modality [Salmon,N, by Williamson] |
Full Idea: Salmon argues that S4 and therefore S5 are invalid for metaphysical modality. | |
From: report of Nathan Salmon (Reference and Essence (1st edn) [1981], 238-40) by Timothy Williamson - Modal Logic within Counterfactual Logic 4 | |
A reaction: [He gives references for Salmon, and for his own reply] Salmon's view seems to be opposed my most modern logicians (such as Ian Rumfitt). |
18888 | Essentialism says some properties must be possessed, if a thing is to exist [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: The metaphysical doctrine of essentialism says that certain properties of things are properties that those things could not fail to have, except by not existing. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (Reference and Essence (1st edn) [1981], 3.8.2) | |
A reaction: A bad account of essentialism, and a long way from Aristotle. It arises from the logicians' tendency to fix objects entirely in terms of a 'flat' list of predicates (called 'properties'!), which ignore structure, constitution, history etc. |
18886 | Frege's 'sense' solves four tricky puzzles [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: Reference via sense solves Frege's four puzzles, of the informativeness of identity statements, the failure of substitutivity in attitude contexts, of negative existentials, and the truth-value of statements using nondenoting singular terms. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (Reference and Essence (1st edn) [1981], 1.1.1) | |
A reaction: These must then be compared with Kripke's three puzzles about referring via sense, and the whole debate is then spread before us. |
18887 | The perfect case of direct reference is a variable which has been assigned a value [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: The paradigm of a nondescriptional, directly referential, singular term is an individual variable. …The denotation of a variable… is semantically determined directly by the assignment of values. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (Reference and Essence (1st edn) [1981], 1.1.2) | |
A reaction: This cuts both ways. Maybe we are muddling ordinary reference with the simplicities of logical assignments, or maybe we make logical assignments because that is the natural way our linguistic thinking works. |
22489 | 'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot] |
Full Idea: Geach puts 'good' in the class of attributive adjectives, such as 'large' and 'small', contrasting such adjectives with 'predicative' adjectives such as 'red'. | |
From: report of Peter Geach (Good and Evil [1956]) by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness Intro | |
A reaction: [In Analysis 17, and 'Theories of Ethics' ed Foot] Thus any object can simply be red, but something can only be large or small 'for a rat' or 'for a car'. Hence nothing is just good, but always a good so-and-so. This is Aristotelian, and Foot loves it. |
22458 | Consequentialists can hurt the innocent in order to prevent further wickedness [Foot] |
Full Idea: For consequentialists there will be nothing that it will not be right to do to a perfectly innocent individual, if that is the only way of preventing another agent from doing more things of the same kind. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Utilitarianism and the Virtues [1985], p.61) | |
A reaction: This is her generalised version that Williams dramatised as Jim and the Indians. Roughly, if you achieve a good outcome, it matters little how it is achieved. Foot sees consequentialism as the main problem with utilitarianism. |
22460 | Why might we think that a state of affairs can be morally good or bad? [Foot] |
Full Idea: We should ask why we think that it makes sense to talk about morally good and bad states of affairs. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Utilitarianism and the Virtues [1985], p.68) | |
A reaction: This is the key question in her attack on consequentialism. There is nothing 'morally' good about my football team winning a great victory. |
22461 | Good outcomes are not external guides to morality, but a part of virtuous actions [Foot] |
Full Idea: It is not that maximum welfare or 'the best outcome' stands outside morality as it foundation and arbiter, but rather that it appears within morality as the end of one of the virtues. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Utilitarianism and the Virtues [1985], p.73) | |
A reaction: She cites justice and benevolence as aiming at different (and even conflicting) outcomes. I'm not sure about her distinction between 'outside' and 'within' morality. I suppose a virtuously created end is a moral end, unlike mere good states of affairs. |
22464 | The idea of a good state of affairs has no role in the thought of Aristotle, Rawls or Scanlon [Foot] |
Full Idea: The idea of the goodness of total states of affairs played no part in Aristotle's moral philosophy, and in modern times plays not part either in Rawls's account of justice or in the theories of more thoroughgoing contractualists such as Scanlon. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Utilitarianism and the Virtues [1985], p.76) | |
A reaction: We can add Kant to that. But if the supremely good state of affairs were permanently achieved, would that make morality irrelevant? A community of the exceptionally virtuous would not need the veil of ignorance, or contracts. |
22463 | Morality is seen as tacit legislation by the community [Foot] |
Full Idea: Morality is thought of as a kind of tacit legislation by the community. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Utilitarianism and the Virtues [1985], p.75) | |
A reaction: Foot presents this as a utilitarian doctrine, because the tacit legislation is felt to produce the best outcomes. This is Nietzsche's good and evil, beyond which he wished to go (presumably following other values). |
22459 | For consequentialism, it is irrational to follow a rule which in this instance ends badly [Foot] |
Full Idea: It would be irrational to obey even the most useful rule if in a particular instance we clearly see that such obedience will not have the best results. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Utilitarianism and the Virtues [1985], p.62) | |
A reaction: This is the simple reason why attempts at rule utilitarianism always lead back to act utilitarianism. Another way of putting it is that a good rule can only be assessed by the outcomes of individual acts that follow it. |
18891 | Nothing in the direct theory of reference blocks anti-essentialism; water structure might have been different [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: There seems to be nothing in the theory of direct reference to block the anti-essentialist assertion that the substance water might have been the very same entity and yet have had a different chemical structure. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (Reference and Essence (1st edn) [1981], 6.23.1) | |
A reaction: Indeed, water could be continuously changing its inner structure, while retaining the surface appearance that gets baptised as 'water'. We make the reasonable empirical assumption, though, that structure-change implies surface-change. |