4 ideas
16050 | The goodness of a picture supervenes on the picture; duplicates must be equally good [Hare] |
Full Idea: Characteristic of value-words is that they name 'supervenient' properties. If we are discussing whether a picture is a good picture, ..and there is another picture that is a replica of it, we cannot say 'they are alike, but one is good and the other not'. | |
From: Richard M. Hare (The Language of Morals [1952], 5.2) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Horgan says this is the passage which introduced 'supervenience' into contemporary discussions. I think the best simple word for it is that the goodness of the picture 'tracks' its physical characteristics. It also depend on them. |
2855 | In primary evaluative words like 'ought' prescription is constant but description can vary [Hare, by Hooker,B] |
Full Idea: Hare says words are secondarily evaluative (e.g. 'soft-hearted') if prescriptive meaning varies but description is constant; primarily evaluative words ('good', 'right', 'ought') are the opposite, with the descriptive content varying. | |
From: report of Richard M. Hare (The Language of Morals [1952]) by Brad W. Hooker - Prescriptivism p.640 | |
A reaction: I would have thought that the prescriptive meaning of the evaluative word could at least vary in strength. You really, really ought to do that. |
22489 | 'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot] |
Full Idea: Geach puts 'good' in the class of attributive adjectives, such as 'large' and 'small', contrasting such adjectives with 'predicative' adjectives such as 'red'. | |
From: report of Peter Geach (Good and Evil [1956]) by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness Intro | |
A reaction: [In Analysis 17, and 'Theories of Ethics' ed Foot] Thus any object can simply be red, but something can only be large or small 'for a rat' or 'for a car'. Hence nothing is just good, but always a good so-and-so. This is Aristotelian, and Foot loves it. |
22456 | Maybe virtues conflict with each other, if some virtue needs a vice for its achievement [Foot] |
Full Idea: Maybe so far from forming a unity ...., the virtues actually conflict with each other: that is, if someone has one of them he inevitably fails to have some other. ...Maybe he a man can only be good in one way be being bad in another. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma [1983], p.57) | |
A reaction: She suggests the self-loathing needed to rein in evil desires. She cites Nietzsche having a similar thought. Presumably the ideal virtuous person has no such conflicts, and the self-loathing undermines eudaimonia. Unity in theory but not in practice? |